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CORNELL   STUDIES    IN    PHILOSOPHY 

No.  7 


THE  FUNDAMENTAL   PRINCIPLE   OF 
FICHTE'S   PHILOSOPHY 


BY 

ELLEN   BLISS  TALBOT,  A.B. 

FORMERLY   SCHOLAR  AND   FELLOW  IN   THE   SAGE  SCHOOL   OF   PHILOSOPHY 


A   THESIS 

Presented   to   the  University  Faculty  of  Cornell  University  in 

Partial  Fulfilment  of  the  Requirements  for  the 

Degree  OF  Doctor  of  Philosophy 


OF  THE  A 

UNIVERSITv^    ' 

OF 

'' iLlFORNJ 


THE    MACMILLAN    COMPANY 

LONDON:    MACMILLAN   &   CO.,  Ltd. 
1906 


T3 


PREFACE. 

The  purpose  of  this  monograph  is  to  make  a  careful  study  of 
Fichte's  conception  of  the  ultimate  principle.  In  his  various 
writings  the  principle  appears  under  many  different  names. 
*  The  Ego,'  '  the  Idea  of  the  Ego,'  '  the  moral  world-order,* 
*God,'  'the  Absolute,'  'Being,'  'the  Light,'  are  some  of  the 
phrases  by  which  it  is  most  commonly  designated. 

It  is  not  the  main  purpose  of  this  study  to  examine  the  much 
discussed  question  of  the  relation  between  the  two  periods  of 
Fichte's  philosophy.  But  the  question  is  so  intimately  connected 
with  the  problem  which  I  have  undertaken  that  some  discussion 
of  it  is  inevitable.  I  have  tried,  however,  to  keep  well  within 
the  limits  of  my  theme,  and  instead  of  considering  the  relation 
between  the  two  periods  in  all  its  aspects,  have  sought  merely  to 
determine  how  far  the  conception  of  the  fundamental  principle 
which  we  find  in  Fichte's  later  writings  differs  from  that  which 
appears  in  the  earlier  ones. 

The  references  to  Fichte's  writings  are  to  the  Sdmmtliche 
Werke  (Berlin,  1 845-1 846,  8  vols.)  and  to  the  Nachgelassene 
Werke  (Bonn,  1834- 183  5,  3  vols.).  References  to  the  Sdmmt- 
liche  Werke  are  indicated  by  the  letters  S.  W.;  to  the  Nachgelas- 
sene Werke,  by  the  letters  N.  W.  References  to  the  Kritik  der 
reinen  Vernunft  are  indicated  by  the  letters  A  (for  the  First  Edi- 
tion) and  B  (for  the  Second).  All  other  references  to  Kant's 
writings  are  made  to  Hartenstein's  second  edition  of  the  Sammt- 
liche  Werke  (Leipzig,  1 867-1 868,  8  vols.)  and  are  indicated  by 
the  letter  H. 

My  thanks  are  due,  first  of  all,  to  my  former  teacher,  Professor 
J.  E.  Creighton,  of  Cornell  University,  for  many  valuable  sugges- 
tions during  the  progress  of  the  work  and  for  assistance  while  it 
was  passing  through  the  press  ;  then,  to  Professor  Ernest  Albee, 
of  Cornell  University,  for  his  kindness  in  reading  part  of  the 
proof;  to  my  colleague.  Miss  Paula  Hofer,  of  Mount  Holyoke 
College,  and  my  former  colleague,  Dr.  Natalie  VVipplinger,  now 


IV  PREFA  CE. 

of  Wellesley  College,  for  help  with  regard  to  a  nice  question  of 
German  syntax ;  and  to  Miss  Grace  Hadley,  of  Mount  Holyoke 
College,  for  her  assistance  in  reading  part  of  the  proof.  I  wish 
also  to  express  my  thanks  to  the  editors  of  Kant-Studien  and 
Mind  for  permission  to  use  parts  of  my  articles  upon  Fichte 
which  have  appeared  in  these  journals  (in  Kant-Studien,  Vol.  IV, 
pp.  286  fif.,  and  in  Mind,  N.  S.,  Vol.  X,  pp.  336  ff.). 

E.  B.  T. 

Mount  Holyoke  College, 
South  Hadley,  Mass., 
July,  1906. 


Page 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS. 

CHAPTER  I. 

Kant  and  Fichte  :  The  Relation  of  Human  Consciousness  to  Its 

Ideal I-2I 

Dualism  of  form  and  content  in  the  Kritik  der  reinen  Ver- 
nunft,  pp.  1-9  ;  In  the  Kritik  der praktischen  Vermm/t,  pp. 
10-13  ;  In  the  Kritik  der  Urtheilskraft,  pp.  13-15  ;  Fichte' s 
conception  of  the  nature  of  consciousness,  pp.  16-21. 


CHAPTER  II. 

The  Works  of  the  First  Period  :  The  Idea  of  the  Ego 22-68 

Ideahsm  and  dogmatism,  pp.  22-25  ;  The  Ego  as  unity  of 
subject  and  object,  pp.  25-28  ;  The  three  Grtmdsdtze,  pp. 
29-33  ;  The  self-limitation  of  the  Ego,  pp.  33-36  ;  Kant  • 
and  Fichte,  pp.  36-38  ;  The  Ego  as  Idea,  pp.  38-43  ;  The 
two  conceptions  of  the  ideal  in  the  Griindlage,  pp.  43-46  ; 
In  the  Sittenlehre  of  1798,  pp.  47-53  ;  Explanation  of  the 
contradiction,  pp.  53-56  ;  The  disappearance  of  individuality, 
pp.  56-61  ;  The  higher  and  the  lower  individuality,  pp. 
61-63  ;  Altruism  and  the  suppression  of  individuahty,  pp.  * 
64-67  ;  The  ideal  as  a  higher  form  of  consciousness,  p.  67. 


CHAPTER  III. 

The  Works  of  the  Second  Period  :  Being  and  Existence 69-122 

Apparent  change  in  the  conception  of  the  fundamental  prin- 
ciple in  the  second  period,  pp.  69-73  ;  The  principle  still 
conceived  as  activity,  pp.  73-74  ;  Nature  of  the  change  in 
the  second  period,  pp.  74-81  ;  Relation  between  consciousness 
and  its  ultimate  ground  in  the  earlier  writings,  pp.  81-83  ;  In 
the  later  writings,  pp.  83-92  ;  Why  the  Absolute  manifests 
itself,  pp.  92-100  ;  Freedom  as  the  ground  of  actuality,  pp.  • 
100-106  ;  The  presence  of  value  in  the  realm  of  fact,  pp. 
106-109  ;  Significance  of  the  distinction  between  Sein  and 
Dasein,  pp.  109-113  ;  Is  Fichte's  ultimate  principle  the 
hypostatization  of  the  supreme  value?  pp.  11 3-1 16;  The 
absolute  value  as  self-realizing  principle,  pp.  1 16-120  ;  The 
universal  consciousness,  pp.  120-122. 


VI  CONTENTS. 

APPENDIX. 

Page. 

Note  A.  — The  Various  Forms  of  Kant's  Conce^x\orC oiintellek- 

tuelle  Anschauung 123-133 

Note  B. —Kant's  'I  Think* 134-136 

Index.., 137-140 


CHAPTER    I. 


Kant  and  Fichte  :  The  Relation  of  Human  Consciousness 

TO  Its  Ideal. 

The  relation  of  Fichte  to  the  master  to  whom  he  always  gave 
the  chief  credit  of  his  own  doctrines  has  been  carefully  studied 
many  times  and  has  been  discussed  from  various  points  of  view. 
The  present  chapter  does  not  profess  to  give  an  exhaustive 
treatment  of  this  question.  Its  purpose  is  rather  to  consider  it 
in  the  particular  aspect  which  will  be  of  most  service  in  our 
further  examination  of  Fichte's  doctrine.  The  problem  of  the 
relation  between  human  consciousness  and  the  ideal  unity  which 
it  is  ever  seeking  to  attain,  suggests  an  interesting  comparison 
between  the  two  philosophers  and  gives  at  the  same  time  a  con- 
venient method  of  approach  to  the  more  detailed  study  of  Fichte 
which  we  shall  attempt  in  the  later  chapters. 

In  the  Kritik  der  reineti  Vernunft,  a  sharp  line  of  distinction  is 
drawn  between  the  formal  and  the  material  aspect  of  human 
cognition.  On  the  one  hand,  we  have  the  matter,  which  is  given 
from  without ;  on  the  other,  the  formative  activity,  which  comes 
from  within.  These  two  seem  to  be  utterly  disparate  :  the  matter 
is  mere  matter ;  the  form,  mere  form.  The  content  of  knowing, 
\{  we  look  at  it  in  itself,  is  a  mere  manifold  —  chaotic,  unrelated, 
meaningless.  It  is  only  through  the  unifying  activity  of  the 
understanding  that  this  formless  mass  receives  shape  and  mean- 
ing ;  it  is  only  because  the  scattered  sensations  have  been  worked 
upon  by  a  relating  activity  that  they  have  been  united  into  signi- 
ficant wholes.^     In  itself  the  matter  is  essentially  formless.     "  In 

1  It  is  implied  in  this  interpretation  that  space  and  time,  as  well  as  the  categories, 
are  phases  of  the  activity  of  the  self.  It  would  take  us  too  far  from  our  main  problem 
if  we  should  stop  to  discuss  the  correctness  of  this  assumption.  Explicitly,  Kant 
makes  space  and  time  pure  forms  and  yet  denies  spontaneity  of  them.  But  it  seems 
that  the  logic  of  his  system  requires  him  to  say  that  the  entire  formal  aspect  of  our 
experience  is  due  to  the  spontaneity  of  consciousness,  while  only  the  material  aspect 
is  to  be  referred  to  receptivity.  And  perhaps  it  may  be  urged  that  by  introducing  the 
imagination,  which  is  to  mediate  between  sense  and  understanding,  and  by  making 
the  pure  schema  a  transcendental  determination  of  time,  Kant  implicitly  corrects  his 
explicit  statements. 


2  FICHTKS  FUNDAMENTAL   PRINCIPLE. 

the  phenomenon  I  call  that  which  corresponds  to  the  sensation 
its  matter,  but  that  which  makes  it  possible  for  the  manifold  of 
the  phenomenon  to  be  arranged^  in  certain  relations  I  call  its 
form.  .  .  .  That  through  which  alone  the  sensations  can  be 
arranged  and  put  into  a  certain  form  cannot  itself  in  turn  be 
sensation."  - 

And  on  the  other  hand,  if  we  look  at  the  unifying  activity  of 
thought  by  itself,  it  seems  to  be  mere  form.  For  its  content  it  is 
wholly  dependent  upon  something  external.  As  soon  as  the 
manifold  is  given,  the  unifying  activity  can  shape  and  mould  it ; 
but  the  manifold  must  be  given.  The  formative  principle  has  no 
power  to  create  its  own  content ;  the  form  of  knowledge  is  essen- 
tially empty.  "  The  manifold  must  be  given  for  perception  before 
the  synthesis  of  the  understanding  and  independently  of  it.  .  .  . 
The  categories  are  rules  only  for  an  understanding  whose  whole 
faculty  consists  in  thinking  (that  is,  in  the  act  of  bringing  to 
the  unity  of  apperception  the  synthesis  of  the  manifold  which 
it  has  received  in  perception),  an  understanding,  therefore,  which 
by  itself  knows  nothing,  but  which  merely  binds  together  and 
arranges  the  material  for  knowledge,  the  perception  which  must 
be  given  to  it  by  the  object."  ^ 

Even  when  we  consider  this  formative  principle  in  its  highest 
manifestation,  the  transcendental  unity  of  apperception,  the  case 
is  no  better  ;  here,  too,  the  form  is  mere  form.  One  might  think, 
indeed,  that  in  this  pure  self-consciousness  we  have,  at  least  im- 
plicitly, that  union  of  subject  and  object  which  must  always  con- 
stitute the  ideal  of  knowledge  ;  here,  if  nowhere  else,  it  would 
seem,  we  may  hope  to  find  a  form  which  can  supply  its  own  con- 
tent, which  needs  no  aid  from  any  foreign  principle.  But  Kant 
does  not  long  permit  us  to  cherish  this  hope.  On  this  point  his 
statements  are  very  explicit :  we  may  not  say  that  in  the  pure 
Ego,  form  and  content,  subject-  and  object-self,  are  one ;  for  in 
the  pure  Ego  there  is  no  content,  no  object-self,  at  all.  The 
transcendental  unity  of  apperception  is  mere  form  ;  in  itself  it  has 

II  have  followed  the  reading  of  the  Second  Edition,  "  geordnet  werden  kann  "  \ 
the  First  Edition  has  "geordnet,  angeschaut  wird." 
2  A,  20;  B,  34.  'B,  145. 


KANT  AND   FICHTE.  3 

no  content  whatever.  We  may  call  the  Ego  simple  "because 
this  idea  (Vorstellung)  has  no  content  and  thus  no  manifold."^ 
"  Through  the  Ego  as  simple  idea  nothing  manifold  is  given ; 
the  manifold  can  be  given  only  in  perception,  which  is  different 
from  the  Ego."  ^ 

Thus  we  seem  to  have  a  complete  opposition  between  the  two 
factors  of  human  knowing  :  its  matter  is  essentially  formless  ;  its 
form,  essentially  empty.  We  must  not  forget,  however,  that  we 
have  discovered  this  opposition  by  considering  the  two  elements 
abstractly.  In  the  concrete  process  of  thought,  the  content  is 
not  formless,  nor  is  the  form  empty.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  we 
never  have  mere  form  or  mere  content ;  we  always  have  a  union 
of  form  and  content.  How  clearly  Kant  himself  sees  this,  is 
perhaps  an  open  question.'  It  is  one,  however,  that  we  need  not 
stop  to  consider ;  for  even  if  we  maintain  that  Kant  regarded 
his  separation  of  form  and  matter  as  a  methodological  device,  we 
must  still  admit  that  his  doctrine  of  the  nature  of  thought  is  far 
from  satisfactory.  He  may  not  mean  to  say  that  the  two  ele- 
ments of  our  knowledge  ever  actually  exist  apart ;  but  there  can 
be  little  doubt  that  he  represents  their  union  in  thinking  as  more 
or  less  artificial.     The  two  factors  are  always  found  together,  but 

^A,  381.  ^B,  135. 

3  There  are,  no  doubt,  many  passages  in  the  Kritik  der  reinen  Vernunft  which 
speak  of  the  formal  element  of  thought  as  if  it  existed  in  the  mind  ready-made,  like  a 
mould  waiting  to  be  filled.  But  words  like  the  following  seem  to  indicate  that  Kant 
sometimes  rose  above  this  crude  conception  : 

"In  this  I  or  He  or  It  .  .  .  which  thinks,  nothing  more  is  represented  than  a 
transcendental  subject  of  the  thoughts  —  an  -^^  which  can  be  known  only  by  means  of 
the  thoughts,  its  predicates,  and  of  which,  apart  from  them,  we  can  never  have  the 
least  concept"  (A,  346  ;  B,  404), 

"  The  manifold  given  in  a  sensuous  perception  belongs  of  necessity  under  the  ori- 
ginal synthetic  unity  of  apperception  "  (B,  143.) 

*'  The  understanding  cannot  perceive  anything  ;  the  senses  cannot  think  anything. 
Only  from  the  union  of  the  two  can  knowledge  arise.  But  we  should  not  on  this 
account  confuse  their  respective  contributions  ;  on  the  contrary  there  is  good  reason 
for  our  carefully  separating  and  distinguishing  the  one  from  the  other"  (A,  51  ;  B, 

75  f.). 

Perhaps  we  shall  come  nearest  to  the  truth  if  we  say  that  Kant  held  both  views 
without  clearly  differentiating  them  ;  that  he  never  quite  outgrew  his  earlier  and  cruder 
notion  of  form  and  matter  as  actually  existing  apart,  but  that  on  the  other  hand  he 
sometimes  had  glimpses  of  the  truer  conception. 


4  FICHTES  FUNDAMENTAL   PRINCIPLE. 

they  are  not  shown  to  belong  together ;  they  imply,  but  at  the 
same  time  repel,  each  other ;  they  do  not  constitute  an  organic 
unity.  As  Professor  Creighton  says  :  **  Each  object  of  knowledge 
is  taken  as  really  composed  of  a  contribution  from  sense  and  a 
contribution  from  understanding.  These  elements  really  enter 
into  it,  and  can  be  analyzed  out  of  it.  .  .  .  The  synthetic  char- 
acter of  thought  ...  is  conceived  ...  as  analogous  to  a  process 
of  mechanical  fabrication,  or  chemical  combination."  ' 

This  defect  in  human  knowing,  as  Kant  conceives  it,  comes  out 
most  clearly  when  we  consider  the  contrast  between  our  cogni- 
tion and  that  ideal  of  knowledge  which  he  holds  before  us  in  his 
conception  of  intellektuelle  Anschauung.  The  whole  question  of 
the  nature  of  intellektuelle  Anschauung  and  of  its  relation  to  the 
other  features  of  Kant's  system  is  one  of  much  interest.  Thiele's 
careful  study,^  to  which  I  am  much  indebted,  has  made  it  evident 
that  the  conception,  as  it  appears  in  the  Kritik,  has  more  than 
one  form.  According  to  his  interpretation,  there  are  three  main 
stages  in  the  development  of  the  doctrine.  On  this  point  I  am 
inclined  to  disagree  with  him  :  the  conception,  it  seems  to  me, 
has  only  two  distinct  phases ;  and  it  has  these  two  because  at 
different  times  Kant  approaches  the  problem  from  two  different 
points  of  view.^  In  human  cognition,  form  and  matter  seem 
to  stand  apart ;  but  in  the  ideal  of  knowledge  they  must  consti- 
tute a  perfect  unity.  Now  in  one  phase  of  the  doctrine  of  intel- 
lektuelle Anschauung,  Kant  starts  with  the  concept  of  matter  and 
seeks  to  pass  from  it  to  the  thought  of  this  organic  unity,  while 
in  the  other  phase  he  attempts  to  reach  the  ideal  by  starting  with 
the  concept  of  form.  In  the  one  case,  he  tries  to  give  us  a  matter 
which  contains  its  own  principle  of  form  ;  in  the  other,  a  form 
which  supplies  itself  with  content. 

The  first  attempt  gives  us  the  doctrine  in  its  cruder  aspect. 
hitellektuelle  Anschauung  is  the  faculty  of  immediately  apprehend- 
ing things  in  themselves.  Our  cognition  is  defective  because  it 
deals  with  mere  phenomena ;  the  objects  of  perceptive  under- 

1  "The  Nature  of  Intellectual  Synthesis,"  Philosophical Revie^v,  V,  145. 

2  Kanf  s  intellektuelle  Anschauung  als  Grundbegriff  seines  Kriticismus,  Halle, 
1876. 

3  For  a  discussion  of  this  question,  see  Appendix,  Note  A. 


KANT  AND   FICHTE.  5 

standing  are  noumena.  *'  We  are  of  such  a  nature  that  our  per- 
ception can  never  be  other  than  sensuous  ;  that  is,  it  is  nothing 
but  the  way  in  which  we  are  affected  by  objects."  ^  And  since 
this  is  so,  we  can  never  know  objects  as  they  are  ;  their  real 
nature  is  warped  by  the  fact  that  they  are  apprehended  in  space 
and  time.  If,  however,  there  were  a  mode  of  perception  which 
was  non-sensuous,  it  might  apprehend  objects  as  they  are.  Such 
a  faculty  Kant  calls  intellectual  perception  or  sometimes  perceptive 
understanding.  "If  I  assume  things  which  are  mere  objects  of 
the  understanding  and  which  yet  as  such  can  be  given  to  a 
perception  —  which,  however,  would  be,  not  sensuous  per- 
ception, but  intuitus  intellectualis  —  things  of  this  sort  would 
be  called  noumena  or  intelligibilia.  .  .  .  For  if  the  senses 
merely  represent  something  to  us  as  it  appears,  this  something 
must  still  in  itself  be  a  thing  and  an  object  of  a  non-sensuous 
perception,  that  is,  of  the  understanding.  In  other  words,  a  kind 
of  knowledge  must  be  possible  in  which  no  sensibility  is  found 
and  which  alone  has  absolute  objective  reality,  in  which,  that 
is,  objects  are  represented  to  us  as  they  are,  whereas  in  the 
empirical  use  of  our  understanding  things  are  known  only  as 
they  appear!'  ^ 

In  this  passage,  intellektuelle  Anschauung  seems  to  be  con- 
ceived as  pure  receptivity.  Objects  are  still  *  given  '  to  perception, 
are  '  represented '  to  the  understanding  which  apprehends  them. 
This  intellectual  perception  is  superior  to  our  knowledge  simply 
in  the  fact  that  the  content  is  given  as  it  is  in  itself,  and  is  not 
altered  in  the  process  of  being  received  and  unified.  The  matter 
given  in  human  experience  is  warped  by  being  subjected  to  the 
unifying  activity  which  works  through  the  pure  forms  of  per- 
ception and  conception.  As  given,  it  is  a  shapeless  mass,  which 
receives  form  only  through  the  activity  of  a  new  principle ;  and 
this  principle  is  regarded  by  Kant,  not  as  dwelling  in  the  matter 
itself,  but  as  working  upon  it  from  without.  In  intellektuelle 
Anschauung,  on  the  contrary,  the  form  is  immanent.  No  dis- 
cursive faculty  of  understanding  imposes  upon  the  discrete  con- 

lA,  51;  B,  75.  2  A,  249. 


6  FICHTKS  FUNDAMENTAL  PRINCIPLE. 

tent  a  unity  that  is  foreign  to  its  nature/  The  matter  ot  intel- 
lektuelle  Anschaimng  contains  its  own  principle  of  unity  ;  the 
content  is  at  the  same  time  the  form. 

This  conception,  however,  is  far  from  being  satisfactory.  For, 
although  from  one  point  of  view  intellektuelle  Anschaimng  seems 
to  have  its  form  within  itself,  and  in  so  far  to  be  an  organic  unity, 
yet  from  another,  we  see  that  the  unity  is  by  no  means  perfect. 
So  long  as  we  have  the  faculty  of  apprehension  set  over  against 
that  which  it  apprehends,  there  must  be  at  least  a  partial  opposi- 
tion of  form  and  matter.  The  given  content  may  bring  its  form 
with  it ;  but  in  the  process  of  being  received,  it  will  of  necessity 
undergo  some  modification  ;  the  form  of  the  apprehended  content 
must  differ  from  that  of  the  content  which  is  not  apprehended. 

In  the  second  and  higher  phase  of  the  doctrine,  this  difficulty 
does  not  exist.  Here  Kant  starts  with  the  formal  principle  of 
knowledge,  and  asks  himself  how  it  must  be  modified  in  order  to 
correspond  to  our  notion  of  ideal  cognition.  The  great  defect  of 
the  pure  Ego  is  its  emptiness  ;  the  /  think  is  indeed  the  highest 
form,  but  it  is  form  devoid  of  content.  And  because  of  its 
emptiness,  it  cannot  in  itself  give  us  any  cognition  whatever. 
**  In  the  original  synthetic  unity  of  apperception  ...  I  am  con- 
scious of  myself,  not  as  I  appear  to  myself,  nor  as  I  am  in 
myself;  I  am  conscious  merely  that  I  am.  This  conscious  state 
(  Vorstelhmg)  is  a  thinkings  not  a  perceiving.  Now  for  knowledge 
of  the  self,  we  need,  not  only  the  act  of  thinking,  which  brings 
the  manifold  of  every  possible  perception  to  the  unity  of  apper- 
ception, but  also  a  definite  mode  of  perception,  by  which  this 
manifold  is  given."  ^ 

Thus  it  is  the  emptiness  of  the  /  tliink  which  prevents  it  from 
meeting  the  requirements  of  our  ideal.  It  is  because  it  has  no 
content  of  its  own,  because  it  is  dependent  upon  something  else 
for  the  matter  with  which  it  works,  that  it  is  defective  as  a  princi- 
ple of  knowledge.  If  then  we  are  to  conceive  of  intellektuelle 
Anschauung  as   free  from  the  limitations  of  the  pure    Ego  of 

'  **  An  understanding  to  which  [the  noumenon]  belongs,  that  is,  one  which  cog- 
nizes its  object,  not  discursively  through  categories,  but  intuitively  {intuitiv')  in  a 
non-sensuous  perception "  (A,  256;  B,  311  f.). 

2B,  157. 


KANT  AND   FICHTE.  7 

apperception,  we  must  think  of  it  as  self-consciousness  which  is 
not  empty,  but  which  finds  within  itself  the  material  upon  which 
it  is  to  work.  And  this  is  the  conception  to  which  Kant  comes. 
In  the  higher  form  of  the  doctrine,  intellektuelle  Anschaimng  is 
described  as  a  pure  self-consciousness  which  is  its  own  object,  a 
self-consciousness  in  which  the  act  of  unifying  the  manifold  is  at 
the  same  time  the  process  whereby  this  manifold  first  comes  into 
being.  '*  The  consciousness  of  self  (or  apperception)  is  the 
simple  idea  (  Vorstelhing)  of  the  Ego  ;  and  if  through  it  alone  all 
the  manifold  in  the  subject  were  given  by  self -activity  (selbst- 
thdtig),  then  the  inner  perception  would  be  intellectual."  ^  *' An 
understanding  in  which,  through  its  self-consciousness,  all  the 
manifold  was  also  given,  would  perceive."^  In  this  thought  of 
the  pure  self-consciousness  which  is  one  Avith  its  object  because 
it  has  itself  for  object,  we  have  Kant's  highest  conception  of  the 
ideal  of  knowledge.  Here  at  last  we  find  the  perfect  union  of 
form  and  content ;  here  the  dualism  which  is  so  manifest  in  human 
cognition  gives  place  to  a  higher  unity. 

This  is  certainly  a  more  satisfactory  conception  of  the  ideal  of 
knowledge  than  that  which  we  have  in  the  first  form  of  the 
doctrine.  Still  it  is  by  no  means  free  from  difficulty.  For 
Kant's  intellektuelle  Anschaimng  is  at  best  but  a  problematic  con- 
cept ;  we  can  never  assert  that  there  is  any  reality  corresponding 
to  it.  Moreover,  our  notion  of  this  perfect  cognition  is  so  vague 
and  indefinite  that  strictly  speaking  we  have  no  right  to  call  it  a 
concept  at  all.  "  We  could  .  .  .  not  prove  that  another  kind  of 
perception  [than  the  sensuous]  is  possible,  and  although  our 
thought  can  abstract  from  every  kind  of  sensibility,  still  it  remains 
a  question  whether  after  the  abstraction  any  object  at  all  is  left, 
whether  what  we  have,  is  not  merely  the  form  of  a  concept."  ^ 
*'  One  cannot  assume  that  [noumena]  can  be  given  without  pre- 
supposing that  another  kind  of  perception  than  the  sensuous  is 
possible ;  and  this  presupposition  we  have  no  right  to  make.  .  .  . 
We  have  an  understanding  which  problematically  extends  beyond 
the  sphere  of  phenomena ;  but  we  have  no  perception,  nor  even 

IB,  68.  2B,  135.  3 A,  252  f. 


8  FICHTES  FUNDAMENTAL   PRINCIPLE. 

the  concept  of  a  possible  perception,  by  which  objects  lying  out- 
side the  field  of  sensibility  could  be  given  to  us."  ^  But  the  case 
is  even  more  serious  than  this.  Not  only  is  it  true  that  our  ideal 
of  knowledge  is,  and  must  be,  vague,  and  that  we  have  no  war- 
rant for  saying  that  there  is  any  reality  corresponding  to  it ; 
there  is  the  further  difficulty  that  it  is  for  us  utterly  unattainable 
—  nay,  more,  that  it  is  a  goal  to  which  human  knowing  cannot 
even  approximate.  The  limits  of  our  cognition  are  fixed  once 
for  all.  Whatever  progress  the  future  may  bring,  must  always 
be  a  progress  within  these  limits,  never  a  transcending  of  them. 
We  know  only  the  appearance  ;  we  can  never  come  face  to  face 
with  the  thing-in-itself.  Progress  in  knowledge  can  consist 
merely  in  learning  more  and  more  about  phenomena ;  it  can 
never  bring  us  one  whit  nearer  to  the  reality  behind  them. 

That  Kant  draws  this  sharp  line  of  demarcation  between  human 
knowing  and  its  ideal,  is  evident,  I  think,  as  soon  as  one  con- 
siders the  general  spirit  of  the  Kritik.  The  declaration  that 
metaphysics  is  impossible,  the  assertion  that  our  knowledge  must 
be  limited  to  phenomena,  the  insistence  that  our  perception  is 
always  sensuous  and  that  the  transcendental  Ego  cannot  have 
the  slightest  content,  indicate  a  belief  that  the  difference  between 
our  cognition  and  intellektuelle  Anschaiiung  is  one,  not  of  degree, 
but  of  kind.  The  few  passages  in  the  Kritik  which  seem  to 
throw  any  doubt  upon  this  interpretation  are  those  in  which  Kant 
speaks  of  the  possible  common  root  of  sensibility  and  under- 
standing. *'  Human  cognition  has  two  stems,  sensibility  and 
understanding  ;  these  perhaps  spring  from  a  common  root,  which, 
however,  is  unknown  to  us."  ^  *'  That  something  which  forms 
the  ground  of  external  phenomena  .  .  .  might  also,  regarded  as 
noumenon  (or  better,  as  transcendental  object),  be  at  the  same 
time  the  subject  of  the  thoughts."  ^  From  these  passages  it 
seems  that  Kant  recognized  the  possibility  that  the  formal  and 
material  aspects  of  thought  might  have  the  same  origin.  Still 
his  emphatic  repudiation  of  the  principles  of  the  Wissenschafts- 

lA,  254  f.  ;  B,  309f. 

2  A,  15;  B,  29.      Cf.  A,  835;  B,  863. 

3  A,  358. 


KANT  AND   FICHTE.  9 

lehre^  shows  that  this  recognition  did  not  affect  his  general 
position.  So  much  at  least  he  would  say,  that/<?r  us  the  dualism 
of  form  and  content  is  ultimate  ;  ^  that  our  ideal  of  a  unity  in 
which  it  is  surmounted,  is  only  a  problematic  concept ;  and  that 
so  far  as  lue  can  ever  know,  our  cognition  is  wholly  different  in 
kind  from  this  ideal  unity. 

It  seems  necessary  to  lay  some  emphasis  upon  this  point  be- 
cause it  is  often  overlooked.^  Reading  Kant,  as  we  do,  in  the 
light  of  those  who  came  after  him,  we  are  sometimes  prone  to 
attribute  to  him  doctrines  which  should  really  be  credited  to  his 
successors.  In  a  sense,  of  course,  it  is  true  that  the  conception 
of  knowledge  as  an  ever-deepening  unity  of  subject  and  object 
owes  its  being  to  Kant ;  but  it  is  true  chiefly  in  the  sense  that, 
by  drawing  a  sharp  line  of  distinction  between  the  two  aspects  of 
consciousness,  Kant  set  others  to  thinking  how  the  opposition 
might  be  overcome.  The  thought  that  subject  and  object  innst 
be  a  unity,  that  the  apparent  dualism  in  our  knowing  cannot  be 
ultimate,  is  to  be  credited,  not  to  Kant,  but  to  Fichte ;  and  I  do 
not  see  what  is  to  be  gained  by  attributing  to  Kant  a  doctrine 
which  he  explicitly  rejected,  and  which  is  at  variance  with  the 
general  spirit  of  his  philosophy. 

1  In  the  Allgenieine  Literaturzeitung  for  1799,  Kant  explains  his  attitude  toward 
Fichte' s  development  of  the  critical  philosophy.  "I  regard  Fichte's  Wissenschafts- 
lehre,^''  he  says,  *'as  a  system  which  it  is  utterly  impossible  to  accept.  .  .  .  Why  it 
should  be  assumed  that  I  have  meant  to  give  merely  a  propaedeutic  to  the  transcen- 
dental philosophy,  not  the  system  of  this  philosophy  itself,  is  incomprehensible  to  me. 
Such  a  purpose  has  never  entered  my  mind,  since  I  have  regarded  it  as  the  best  evi- 
dence of  the  truth  of  the  Kritik  der  reinen  Vernunft  that  we  have  in  it  the  completed 
whole  of  pure  philosophy  "  (H.,  VIII,  600). 

2  That  is,  in  this  life.  In  one  passage  he  speaks  of  the  possibility  that  death  may 
be  "the  end  of  this  sensuous  use  of  our  knowing  faculty  and  the  beginning  of  the 
intellectual  use  of  it"  (A,  778  ;  B,  806  f.). 

^  E.  g.,  by  Thiele.  His  position  is  not  stated  with  so  much  clearness  as  is  to  be 
wished  ;  but  apparently  he  tries  to  show  that  our  own  self- consciousness,  as  Kant  con- 
ceived it,  not  merely  suggests  the  ideal,  but  is  itself  a  partial  realization  of  the  ideal. 
Intellektuelle  Anschauung  in  its  highest  form  is,  according  to  Thiele,  "  absolute 
knowing,  absolute  identity  of  knowing  and  being."  **  Our  human  self-consciousness 
is  a  very  feeble  reflection  of  this  absolute  knowing."  Apparently,  however,  the  differ- 
ence between  the  two  is  not  in  kind,  but  merely  in  degree.  "In  the  act  of  thought, 
'  I,'  subject  and  object  coincide  ;  here  the  knowing  is  the  known  ;  hei-e  is  identity  of 
knowing  and  being"  {Kant's  intellektuelle  Anschauung,  95).  In  the  Appendix, 
Note  B,  Thiele' s  interpretation  is  briefly  considered. 


lO  FICHTKS  FUNDAMENTAL   PRINCIPLE. 

It  is  often  said,  however,  that  the  duaHsm  which  is  so  manifest 
in  the  earlier  Kritik  is  overcome  to  a  considerable  extent  in  the 
Kritik  der  praktischen  Vernunft  and  the  Kritik  der  Urtheilskraft. 
With  regard  to  the  former  of  these  two  works,  there  is  one  re- 
spect, as  we  shall  presently  see,  in  which  the  statement  is  true  ; 
but  there  are  other  defects  of  Kant's  ethical  theory  which  quite 
counterbalance  this  gain.  And  in  general  I  incline  to  think  that 
the  amount  and  value  of  the  correction  which  Kant  is  said  to 
have  made  in  these  later  writings  have  been  greatly  overestimated. 

In  the  sphere  of  knowledge,  we  have  seen,  there  is  no  possi- 
bility of  the  slightest  approximation  to  the  ideal ;  the  differ- 
ence between  human  cognition  and  intellektiielle  Anschauung  is 
absolute.  In  the  moral  realm,  however,  the  case  seems  at  first 
sight  to  be  somewhat  better.  Apparently  Kant  believes  that  we 
may  gradually  approach  the  ideal  of  morality ;  the  task  is  in- 
deed infinite,  yet  there  is  a  possibility  of  progress.  ''  The  per- 
fect conformity  of  the  will  to  the  moral  law  is  holiness,  a  perfec- 
tion of  which  no  rational  being  in  the  world  of  sense  is  capable  at 
any  moment  of  his  existence.  Since,  however,  it  is  demanded  as 
practically  necessary,  it  can  be  found  only  in  an  infinite  progress 
toward  this  perfect  conformity.  .  .  .  For  a  rational,  but  finite 
being,  there  is  possible  only  an  infinite  progress  from  the  lower 
to  the  higher  stages  of  moral  perfection.  The  Infinite  Being  .  .  . 
sees  in  what  is  to  us  an  endless  series,  a  complete  conformity  to 
the  moral  law."  ^ 

At  first  thought  this  may  seem  to  be  a  decided  advance  upon 
the  doctrine  of  the  Kritik  der  reinen  Vernunft.  As  soon,  how- 
ever, as  we  examine  the  matter  closely,  we  see  that  the  gain  is 
more  apparent  than  real  ;  for  the  advantage  has  been  secured  by 
lowering  the  concept  of  the  ideal.  In  the  earlier  Kritik,  the 
ideal  is  described  as  an  organic  unity  of  content  and  form  ;  but 
in  the  Kritik  der  praktischen  Vernunft  it  seems  to  be  conceived 
as  mere  form. 

The  dualism  which  appears  in  the  sphere  of  knowledge  as  the 
opposition  of  sense  and  understanding  meets  us  in  the  moral 
realm  as  the  opposition  of  desire  and  the  moral  law.     According 

^  Kr.  d.pr.   K,  H.,  V,  128  f. 


KANT  AND   FICHTE.  1 1 

to  Kant,  the  law  is  purely  formal ;  its  whole  content  must  be 
sought  in  natural  desire.  And  the  relation  between  it  and  this 
desire  is  represented  as  complete  opposition.  Natural  impulse 
has  its  source  in  the  world  of  sense.  It  is  utterly  disparate  from 
that  pure  self-consciousness  which  forms  the  basis  of  all  morality. 
'*  The  will  is  placed  between  its  a  priori  principle,  which  is  formal, 
and  its  a  posteriori  impulse,  which  is  material."  ^  "■  Only  a  formal 
law,  that  is,  a  law  which  prescribes  to  reason,  as  the  highest  con- 
dition of  its  maxims,  nothing  else  than  the  form  of  its  universal 
legislation,  can  be  a  priori  a  ground  of  determination  for  the  prac- 
tical reason."  ^  Now  if  the  two  elements  of  our  ethical  experi- 
ence are  essentially  opposed,  the  only  morality  possible  for  us 
will  consist  in  the  subjugation  of  one  of  them  by  the  other.  And 
this  is  precisely  the  conception  which  Kant  seems  to  have  of  the 
nature  of  moral  progress.  The  development  is  regarded  as  the 
gradual  annihilation  of  our  natural  impulses.  Desire  is  not  to 
be  taken  up  into  the  law  and  purified  until  it  is  worthy  to  be  the 
content  of  the  moral  life  ;  it  is  to  be  crushed  out.  The  ideal 
is  to  be  found,  not  in  the  organic  unity  of  content  and  form,  but 
in  the  complete  subjection  of  content  to  form.  "  The  essence  of 
all  moral  worth  in  actions  depends  upon  the  immediate  determi- 
nation of  the  will  by  the  moral  law.  If  the  determination  of  the 
will  takes  place  in  accord  with  the  moral  law,  but  yet  only  by 
means  of  a  feeling,  of  whatever  sort  it  may  be^  which  must  be 
presupposed  in  order  that  there  may  be  a  sufficient  ground  of 
determination  for  the  will,  .  .  .  then  the  action  will  have  legality, 
to  be  sure,  but  no  moral  quality ^  ^  "  The  moral  law  .  .  .  does 
violence  to  all  our  inclinations."  ^  *'  Only  that  which  is  united 
with  my  will  solely  as  ground,  never  as  effect,  only  that  which 
instead  of  obeying  my  inclination,  overpowers  it,  or  at  least  utterly 
excludes  it  from  calculation  in  the  choice,  thus,  only  the  law, 
existing  solely  for  itself,  can  be  an  object  of  respect."  ^ 

1  Grundlegiing  zur  Metaphysik  der  Sitten,  H.,  IV,  248. 

2  Kr.  d.  pr.   K,  H.,  V,  68.  ^xhe  italics  in  this  phrase  are  mine. 
*  Op.  cit.,  H.,  V,  76.  5  Op.  cit.,  H.,  V,  77. 

6  Grundl.  zur  Met.  d.  Sitten,  H.,  IV,  248. 


12  FICHTE'S  FUNDAMENTAL   PRINCIPLE. 

These  quotations  seem  to  show  that  the  advance  which  is 
made  in  the  ethical  writings  is  only  apparent ;  that  the  ideal  to 
which  we  are  able  to  approximate,  is  not  a  unity  of  form  and 
matter,  but  mere  empty  form.  It  might  be  urged,  however,  that 
in  identifying  the  formal  law  with  the  ideal  of  the  moral  life,  we 
are  misrepresenting  Kant.  Holiness,  he  tells  us,  is  indeed  the 
highest  good,  but  it  is  not  the  complete  good.  The  sinnmiim 
bonum  in  this  latter  sense  is  **  happiness  distributed  ...  in 
exact  proportion  to  morality."  ^  I  mention  this  as  a  possible  in- 
terpretation, not  as  one  which  I  myself  accept ;  the  conception 
of  the  moral  ideal  as  a  union  of  happiness  and  virtue  seems  to 
me  quite  foreign  to  the  spirit  of  the  Kantian  ethics.  For  our 
present  purpose,  however,  it  is  not  necessary  to  decide  between 
these  two  interpretations.  For  even  if  one  maintained  that  Kant's 
moral  ideal  is  the  smnmum  bonum  in  the  sense  of  the  '  complete 
good '  and  is  therefore  a  unity  of  form  and  content,  it  would  still 
be  true  that  this  is  a  lower  conception  of  the  ideal  than  that 
which  we  find  in  the  Kritik  der  reinen  Vermmft,  The  complete 
good  is  indeed  a  union  of  form  and  matter,  but  it  is  by~no  means 
an  organic  union.  Virtue  and  happiness  are  not  one  in  essence  ; 
they  are  held  together  by  an  external  force.  In  themselves  they 
are  utterly  opposed ;  in  order  to  make  their  union  intelligible,  we 
must  postulate  the  existence  of  a  Divine  Being.  "  One  must 
regret  that  the  keenness  of  these  men  [the  Stoics  and  Epicu- 
reans] .  .  .  was  unfortunately  directed  to  the  task  of  searching 
out  an  identity  between  the  most  dissimilar  concepts,  those  of 
happiness  and  virtue."  ^  "  Happiness  and  morality  are  two  speci- 
fically different  elements  of  the  highest  good,  and  their  union, 
therefore,  cannot  be  known  analytically,  .  .  .  but  is  a  synthesis 
of  the  concepts."  ^  *'  Thus  the  highest  good  is  possible  in  the 
world  only  in  so  far  as  a  Supreme  Being  is  assumed  who  has  a 
causality  corresponding  to  the  moral  nature."  * 

1  Kr.  d.  pr.   v.,  H.,  V,  Ii6.  2  op.  cit.,  H.,  V,  117. 

3  Op.  cit.f  H.,  V,  119.  We  have  here  another  illustration  of  that  mechanical  con- 
ception of  synthesis  to  which  Professor  Creighton  calls  attention  in  the  article  from 
which  we  have  quoted.     See  above,  p.  4. 

*  Op.  cit.,  H.,  V,  131. 


KANT  AND  FICHTE.  1 3 

We  see,  then,  that  whichever  view  we  take  of  Kant's  moral 
end,  it  is  far  from  being  the  organic  unity  of  form  and  content 
which  we  have  in  the  higher  stage  of  the  doctrine  of  i?iteliektuelle 
Anschaiinng.  We  are  therefore  justified  in  saying  that  with  regard 
to  the  relation  between  human  experience  and  its  ideal,  the  second 
Kritik  makes  no  real  advance  upon  the  first.  The  ideal  of 
morality  is  less  inaccessible  than  that  of  knowledge  only  because 
it  is  lower.  And  we  are  as  far  as  ever  from  the  conception  of 
human  experience  as  being  implicitly  that  unity  of  form  and  con- 
tent which  we  must  always  regard  as  the  ideal. 

Nor  can  I  see  that  the  case  is  much  better  when  we  come  to 
the  Kritik  der  Ui'theilskraft.  It  is  often  said,  to  be  sure,  that  in 
this  work  Kant  finally  overcomes  the  dualism  of  his  system  ;  that 
in  the  aesthetic  judgment  we  have  the  unity  of  subject  and  object 
for  which  we  have  long  been  searching  ;  and  that  the  concept 
of  design  bridges  the  gulf  between  the  phenomenal  and  nou- 
menal  worlds/  It  does  not  seem  to  me,  however,  that  Kant  really 
solves  the  problem  in  either  of  these  cases,  though  he  perhaps 
indicates  the  direction  in  which  the  solution  is  to  be  sought.     At 

1  Professor  Caird,  for  example,  seems  to  incline  to  this  view.  He  admits  that  Kant 
himself,  after  seeming  to  assert  the  unity  of  subject  and  object  in  the  sesthetic  Ideas 
and  in  the  concept  of  design,  finally  *'  recoils"  from  this  conclusion  and  '*  determines 
as  subjective  the  very  Ideas  by  which  the  opposition  of  objective  and  subjective  seemed 
to  be  broken  down."  But  bethinks  that  "this  reversion  to  Dualism  .  .  .  should 
not  conceal  from  us  the  real  tendency  "  of  Kant's  thought,  **  which  in  the  Critique  of 
Judgment  has  all  but  come  full  circle  and  returned  to  the  unity  which  it  began  by 
breaking  up"    {The   Critical  Philosophy  of  Immanuel  Kant,  Glasgow,  1 889,   II, 

453)- 

It  may  be  of  interest  to  notice  Fichte's  judgment  upon  this  question.  In  the 
Wissenschaftslehre  of  1 804,  he  says  that  the  Kritik  der  Urtheihkraft,  which  pro- 
fesses to  mediate  between  the  sensible  and  intelligible  worlds,  does  not  fulfill  its 
promise.  Instead  of  one  Absolute,  Kant  has  three.  "  In  the  Kritik  der  reinen  Ver- 
nunft,  his  .\hso\\x\.Q  \s  sensible  experience  =^  x.'^  The  Kritik  der  praktischen  VW- 
nun  ft  gives  us  "  the  second  Absolute,  a  moral  world  ^=  2."  These  two  worlds  are 
utterly  opposed  to  one  another.  Now  in  the  Introduction  to  the  Kritik  der  Urtheils- 
krafty  we  have  "  the  admission  that  the  supersensible  and  the  sensible  world  must  be 
united  in  a  common,  but  quite  inaccessible  root,  which  root  would  be  the  third  Abso- 
lute ^=:r.  [Presumably  Fichte's  reference  is  to  \  IX  of  the  Introduction,  H.,  V, 
201  ff.]  I  say  a  thiid,  separated  from  the  other  two  Absolutes  and  subsisting  by 
itself,  although  it  is  to  serve  as  the  connection  of  the  other  two  members.  And  in 
saying  this,  I  do  Kant  no  injustice.  For  if  this  j  is  inaccessible,  then  it  may  contain 
the  connection  of  the  other  two  ;  but  I,  for  my  part,  cannot  penetrate  it  nor  conceive 
the  other  two  mediately,  as  proceeding  from  it"  (N.  W.,  II,  103  f. ). 


14  FICHTES  FUNDAMENTAL   PRINCIPLE. 

first,  indeed,  it  may  seem  that  in  the  immediate  apprehension  of 
the  beautiful,  we  have  that  harmony  of  subject  and  object  for 
which  the  theoretical  consciousness  seeks  in  vain.  But  when  we 
recall  Kant's  comparison  of  aesthetic  and  rational  Ideas,  we  see 
that  this  can  hardly  have  been  his  meaning.  "  Ideas  .  .  .  are 
conscious  states  ( Vorstellungen)  which  are  referred  to  an  object 
according  to  a  certain  (subjective  or  objective)  principle,  but  in 
such  a  way  that  they  can  never  become  knowledge  of  the  object. 
Either  they  are  referred  to  a  perception  according  to  a  merely 
subjectiv^e  principle  of  the  agreement  of  our  faculties  of  cognition 
(imagination  and  understanding),  and  in  this  case  we  call  them 
cesthetic  Ideas  ;  or  they  are  referred  to  a  concept  according  to  an 
objective  principle  and  yet  can  never  give  a  knowledge  of  the  ob- 
ject, in  which  case  we  call  them  Ideas  of  reason.  .  .  .  An  cesthciic 
Idea  cannot  become  knowledge,  because  it  is  d.  perception  (of  the 
imagination)  for  which  an  adequate  concept  can  never  be  found. 
An  Idea  of  reason  can  never  become  knowledge,  because  it  con- 
tains a  concept  (of  the  supersensible)  for  which  the  corresponding 
perception  can  never  be  given."  ^ 

The  natural  inference  from  this  passage  seems  to  be  that  the 
ideal  of  knowledge  is  no  more  fully  realized  in  the  aesthetic,  than 
in  the  rational,  Idea.  Just  as  the  latter  needs  perception,  in  order 
that  it  may  become  valid  knowledge,  so  the  former  needs  concep- 
tion. There  is  a  defect  even  in  our  apprehension  of  the  beauti- 
ful ;  the  adequate  concept  (formal  element)  is  lacking.  Even  if  we 
were  willing  to  grant  that  in  his  doctrine  of  the  beautiful  Kant 
comes  somewhat  nearer  to  the  perfect  harmony  of  subject  and 
object,  still  we  cannot  help  feeling  that  there  is  an  essential  dif- 
ference between  aesthetic  contemplation,  as  he  conceives  it,  and 
his  ideal  of  intellektuelle  Anschannng. 

And  when  we  turn  to  the  teleological  faculty  of  judgment, 
there  seems  to  be  still  less  reason  for  maintaining  that  the  dualism 
of  the  earlier  works  is  overcome.  For  Kant  frequently  reminds 
us  of  the  difference  between  our  cognition,  with  its  inevitable 
dualism,  and  the  ideal  of  a  perceptive  understanding,  in  whose 

^Kr.d.  ^:,  H.,  V,  353. 


kAmNT  and  FICHTE.  I  5 

act  of  thought  the  existence  of  the  object  is  given. ^  And  he 
tells  us  more  than  once  that  the  concept  of  design,  which  is  sup- 
posed to  mediate  between  the  sensible  and  the  intelligible  world, 
has  merely  subjective  validity.  All  that  it  does,  is  to  make  it 
possible  for  us  to  tJiink  the  unity  of  nature  and  freedom.  "The 
concept  of  the  purposiveness  of  nature  in  her  products  is  one 
which  it  is  necessary  for  the  human  judgment  to  use  in  consider- 
ing nature,  but  not  one  which  touches  the  determination  of  objects 
themselves.  Thus  it  is  a  subjective  principle  of  reason  for  the 
judgment,  which  as  regulative  (not  constitutive)  has  just  as  much 
necessary  validity  for  our  Jinman  judgment  as  if  it  were  an  objec- 
tive principle."  ^ 

It  seems  clear,  then,  that  Kant's  conception  of  experience  had 
not  changed  when  he  wrote  the  Kritik  der  Urtheilskraft.  The 
opposition  which  the  first  Kritik  finds  between  the  two  aspects  of 
human  experience,  and  which  reappears  in  the  ethical  treatises, 
meets  us  for  the  third  time  in  the  Kritik  der  Urtheilskraft.  In 
themselves,  form  and  matter  may  not  be  opposed  ;  but  Kant  is 
very  sure  that  as  aspects  of  our  experience  they  stand  apart ;  that, 
alike  in  our  simplest  perception  and  in  our  most  complicated  proc- 
esses of  reasoning,  in  our  esthetic  consciousness  and  in  our  moral 
life,  the  dualism  of  content  and  form  persists.  We  have  indeed  a 
vague  notion  of  a  kind  of  consciousness  in  which  this  dualism  is 
surmounted  :  intellectual  perception  as  a  self-consciousness  by 
whose  act  of  unity  the  manifold  content  comes  into  being,  is  a 
perfect  harmony  of  subject  and  object.  But  the  concept  of  this 
harmony  is  merely  problematic  ;  we  do  not  know  that  any  such 
cognition  really  exists.  And  we  may  be  sure  that  if  it  does  exist, 
it  is  wholly  unlike  our  own  consciousness. 

The  difference  between   Kant  and   Fichte  is   nowhere   more 

1  **  For  the  human  understanding  it  is  absolutely  necessary  to  distinguish  the  possi- 
bility from  the  actuality  of  things.  The  ground  of  this  necessity  lies  in  the  subject 
and  in  the  nature  of  his  faculty  of  knowledge.  For  there  would  be  no  such  distinc- 
tion (between  the  possible  and  the  actual)  if  it  were  not  that  our  faculty  of  knowl- 
edge needs  for  its  exercise  two  quite  different  things,  the  understanding  for  concepts, 
and  sensuous  perception  for  the  objects  which  correspond  to  the  concepts.  That  is, 
if  our  understanding  were  perceptive,  it  would  have  no  objects  except  the  actual'^ 
((9/.  «V.,H.,  V,  414). 

2  Op.  cit.,  H.,  V,  417. 


1 6  FICHTES  FUNDAMENTAL  PRINCIPLE. 

clearly  marked  than  at  this  point.  The  motive  of  Fichte's  phi- 
losophy is  its  constant  effort  to  rise  above  the  opposition  of  form 
and  matter.  Kant  regards  this  dualism  as  insurmountable ; 
Fichte  insists  that  it  can  and  must  be  resolved.  His  repeated 
attacks  upon  the  notion  of  the  thing-in-itself  show  how  utterly  he 
repudiates  the  doctrine  of  a  fundamental  opposition  between  the 
content  and  the  form  of  thought.  Knowledge,  our  knowledge, 
is  a  unity.  It  appears  indeed  as  duality :  but  its  task  is  just  to 
rise  above  this  dualism ;  to  conquer  this  phenomenality  ;  to 
know  itself,  not  in  its  appearance,  but  in  its  truth. 

But  although  Fichte  insists  that  thought  is  essentially  unitary, 
he  does  not  deny  that  it  seems  to  itself  dualistic,  nay,  more,  that 
it  must  seem  so.  '^  Egohood  consists  in  the  absolute  identity  of 
the  subjective  and  the  objective  (absolute  union  of  being  with 
consciousness  and  of  consciousness  with  being).  .  .  .  The  es- 
sence of  the  Ego  is  not  the  subjective  nor  the  objective,  but  — 
an  identity.  ...  Is  it  possible  for  any  one  to  think  this  iden- 
tity as  himself?  Surely  not;  for  to  think  of  oneself,  one  must 
make  that  distinction  between  subjective  and  objective  which  is 
not  made  in  this  concept  [of  identity].  Without  this  distinc- 
tion no  thinking  is  in  any  wise  possible."  ^ 

We  see  then  that  Fichte  admits  as  readily  as  Kant  the  dualism 
of  form  and  matter  in  our  cognition  ;  he  makes  no  attempt  to 
deny  that  on  the  plane  of  ordinary  consciousness  these  two 
aspects  of  knowing  are  sharply  opposed.  But  he  differs  from 
Kant  in  his  insistence  that  we  can  rise  above  this  plane,  to  a 
point  from  which  we  can  see  that  the  opposition  is  not  the  high- 
est truth.  "For  a  thorough -going  idealism,  a  priori  and  a  pos- 
teriori are  not  two,  but  one  ;  only,  this  one  is  looked  at  from  two 
sides."  ^  The  insight  into  this  truth  is  a  philosophic  insight.  It 
is  only  by  philosophical  reflection  that  we  can  hope  to  discover 
the  unity  which  underlies  the  seeming  duality  of  our  experience. 
The  finding  of  this  unity  and  the  exposition  of  the  relation  be- 
tween it  and  the  superficial  duaHty  is  the  great  task  which  the 
philosopher  must  undertake. 

^Das  System  der  Sittenlehre  (1798),  S.  W.,  IV,  42. 

^  Ersle  Einleitung  in  die  Wissenschaftslehre,  S.  W.,  I,  447. 


KANT  AND   FICHTE.  1/ 

That  human  thought  is  essentially  a  unity,  is  in  the  first  in- 
stance, as  Fichte  readily  admits,  an  assumption.  But  he  main- 
tains that  it  is  one  of  those  assumptions  which  every  philosopher 
must  make.  Philosophy  as  he  conceives  it,  is  simply  the  syste- 
matic effort  to  bring  all  the  facts  of  experience,  discordant  though 
they  seem,  into  relation  with  one  supreme  principle.  In  assum- 
ing the  possibility  of  metaphysics  —  and  Fichte  of  course  does 
this  without  hesitation  —  we  are  practically  assuming  that  the 
apparent  duality  of  our  experience  is  not  ultimate,  that  beneath 
all  the  oppositions  which  force  themselves  so  insistently  upon  our 
thought,  there  is  an  underlying  unity.  **  It  is  easy  to  see  that  in 
presupposing  the  possibility  of  such  a  Wissenschaftslehre  in  gen- 
eral ...  we  are  always  presupposing  that  human  knowing 
actually  constitutes  a  system.  But  if  it  is  to  be  a  system,  then 
we  can  also  .  .  .  show  that  there  must  be  an  absolutely  first 
Gruiidsatzy  ^  That  human  thought  is  essentially  unitary,  fol- 
lows, then,  from  the  assertion  that  philosophy,  as  Fichte  con- 
ceives it,  is  possible.  But  this  assumption  of  the  possibiHty  of 
philosophy  involves  also  another  presupposition.  For  it  is  con- 
ceivable that  human  experience  might  be  the  dualistic  manifesta- 
tion of  an  underlying  unity  and  yet  that  metaphysics  should  be 
quite  impossible  for  us.  Kant  himself  admits  that  our  experi- 
ence may  have  its  roots  in  a  unitary  principle  ;  but  he  maintains 
that,  supposing  this  principle  to  exist,  yet  from  the  very  nature 
of  the  case  we  can  never  know  anything  about  it  and  that  there- 
fore the  problems  of  metaphysics  are  for  us  utterly  insoluble. 
If  philosophy  is  to  be  possible,  then,  it  must  be  true,  not  only 
that  there  is  such  an  underlying  unity,  but  also  that  we  may  have 
some  sort  of  acquaintance  with  it.  It  cannot  be  utterly  inacces- 
sible to  human  thinking ;  our  own  consciousness  must  give  us 
the  key  to  its  nature. 

These,  then,  are  the  two  presuppositions  with  which  Fichte 
starts  —  that  human  thought,  in  spite  of  all  its  superficial  oppo- 
sitions, is  the  expression  of  a  unitary  principle,  and  that  in  some 
degree  we  are  able  by  philosophical  reflection  to  get  at  this  prin- 
ciple.    As  we  have  already  seen,  he  clearly  recognizes  that  these 

1  Ober  den  Begriff  der  Wissemchaftslehre^  S.  W.,  I,  52. 


1 8  FICHTES  FUNDAMENTAL    PRINCIPLE, 

are  assumptions.  From  the  very  nature  of  the  case  they  can- 
not at  the  outset  be  proved ;  they  are  the  fundamental  postu- 
lates of  every  philosophy.  The  only  way  in  which  we  can  hope 
to  justify  them  is  by  working  out  a  satisfactory  system  of  thought 
based  upon  them.  When  philosophy  shall  have  fulfilled  her 
task,  that  is,  when  the  unitary  principle  shall  have  been  discov- 
ered and  the  seeming  duality  of  its  manifestation  explained,  then, 
and  then  only,  will  our  primary  assumptions  have  received  their 
justification.  "Before  the  actual  investigation  one  cannot  deter- 
mine whether  the  solution  of  the  problem  [of  philosophy]  is 
possible  or  not,  that  is,  whether  all  our  knowing  has  a  firm  ground 
which  can  be  discovered  {erkemibar)^  or  whether  on  the  contrary 
it  .  .  .  rests  ultimately  on  nothing,  or  at  least  nothing  for  us. 
But  if  our  knowing  is  to  have  a  ground  for  us,  then  this  prob- 
lem must  admit  of  solution  and  there  must  be  a  science  in  which 
it  is  solved.  And  [conversely]  if  there  is  such  a  science,  then 
our  knowing  has  a  ground  which  can  be  discovered.  Hence, 
before  the  investigation  we  can  say  nothing  as  to  the  nature  of 
our  knowing,  as  to  whether  it  has  or  has  not  a  ground.  The 
possibility  of  the  requisite  science  can  be  shown  only  through 
its  actuality."  ^  But  while  Fichte  admits  that  the  correctness  of 
his  assumption  can  be  shown  only  by  the  actual  discovery  of 
the  supreme  unity,  he  by  no  means  accepts  the  counter-proposi- 
tion that  the  failure  to  make  the  discovery  indicates  that  expe- 
rience has  no  unitary  principle  or  even  that  we  are  incapable  of 
finding  it.  *'  If  we  do  not  succeed  "  in  discovering  it,  one  of 
two  things  must  be  true.  **  Either  there  is  no  such  system  "  as 
"we  have  supposed,  in  human  knowing,  **  or  we  ourselves  have 
.•simply  failed  to  find  it  and  must  leave  the  discovery  to  more  for- 
tunate successors.  To  jump  at  the  conclusion  that  there  is  no 
such  system,  simply  because  we  have  not  found  it  is  to  make  an 
assumption  which  does  not  deserve  to  be  dignified  with  a  serious 
refutation."^ 

We  see  then  that  Fichte's  point  of  departure  from  Kant  is 
found  in  his  unwillingness  to  admit  that  the  dualism  in  human 


J  op.  cit.,  S.  W.,  I,  43  f. 
2  op.  cit.,  S.  W.,  I,  54. 


KANT  AND   FICHTE.  19 

consciousness  is  insurmountable.  He  refuses  to  accept  the  out- 
come of  Kant's  argument  —  the  doctrine  of  the  impossibility  of 
metaphysics.  No  one,  he  insists,  can  be  justified  in  asserting 
that  philosophy  is  impossible.  The  most  that  one  has  a  right  to 
say,  is  that  he  himself  has  not  succeeded  in  working  out  a  satis- 
factory philosophical  theory ;  but  that  any  one  should  presume 
to  set  absolute  bounds  for  the  human  reason  is  preposterous. 
And  in  the  courage  of  this  belief,  Fichte  presses  on  in  quest  of 
the  great  solution  which  perhaps  thought  may  never  attain,  but 
which  at  least  it  must  ever  seek. 

And  the  clue  which  guides  him  in  his  search  was  given  him 
by  the  very  master  who  has  told  us  that  all  search  is  vain.  Not 
only  did  Kant,  by  pointing  out  the  dualism  of  human  thought, 
set  the  problem  for  his  successors,  but  the  very  means  which  he 
took  for  emphasizing  this  dualism  seems  to  have  suggested  to 
Fichte  the  way  of  escape.  When  Kant  wishes  to  show  us  how 
poor  a  thing  our  knowledge  is,  he  does  it  by  contrasting  the 
actual  attainment  with  the  ideal.  What  we  need  in  order  that 
the  ideal  of  thought  may  be  realized,  or  as  Kant  would  put  it, 
that  we  may  attain  to  perfect  cognition,  is  a  self-consciousness 
which,  besides  being  a  unitary  principle,  as  our  self-consciousness 
is,  shall  also  be  a  creative  principle,  an  understanding  whose  very 
act  of  unifying  brings  into  being  a  manifold  of  perception.  Our 
self-consciousness  is  not  thus  creative  ;  on  the  contrary,  the  I  think 
is  "the  poorest  of  all  ideas."  ^  The  vast  difference  between  in- 
tellektuelle  Anschaming  and  our  human  way  of  thinking  should 
suffice  to  convince  us  that  the  barriers  within  which  our  thought 
is  confined,  are  insurmountable. 

This  comparison  with  the  ideal,  which  seems  to  Kant  so  dis- 
astrous for  self-consciousness,  suggests  to  Fichte  the  key  to  the 
solution  of  his  problem.  For  this  ideal  which  lies  so  far  removed, 
is  yet  the  ideal  of  human  thought,  is  the  principle  which  must 
guide  this  thought  through  all  its  development  —  is  indeed  its 
real  essence,  its  highest  truth.  Or,  to  put  the  matter  otherwise, 
we  may  say  that  the  ideal  —  the  Idea  of  the  Ego  —  is  that  very 
creative  principle  for  which  we  have  been  looking.     "  In  the 

1  B,  408. 


20  FICHTES  FUNDAMENTAL   PRINCIPLE. 

ideal  is  life  forever."  It  is  a  motive  power,  a  principle  of  activity, 
a  productive  force.  Consciousness,  regarded  as  merely  intellec- 
tual, is  bound  in  the  fetters  of  an  inevitable  dualism  ;  to  the  '  Ego 
as  intelligence '  a  Non-Ego  is  ever  opposed.  But  if  you  regard 
consciousness  merely  in  this  way,  you  mistake  its  true  nature.  It 
has  also  an  ideal  side,  an  aspect  of  infinity ;  and  he  who  would 
know  the  full  meaning  of  experience  must  not  ignore  this  aspect. 

Thus  we  see  that  the  means  by  which  Fichte  effected  his 
transformation  of  Kant's  doctrine  is  a  simple  one :  it  consists  in 
pointing  out  that  the  chief  value  of  the  ideal  is  not  in  showing  us 
the  defects  of  human  knowledge,  but  rather  in  helping  us  to  a 
better  understanding  of  its  real  nature.  All  knowing  is  a  union 
of  form  and  matter,  of  subject  and  object.  This  union  may  have 
various  degrees  of  completeness  ;  the  duality  is  never  quite  over- 
come in  actual  or  individual  modes  of  knowing.  The  essence  of 
thought,  however,  consists  not  in  its  particularity,  but  in  its  abso- 
luteness. The  more  perfectly  the  duality  has  been  overcome, 
the  more  has  the  true  nature  of  knowing  been  manifested.  For 
its  true  nature  is  not  the  actual,  but  the  ideal.  Our  conscious- 
ness becomes  intelligible  only  when  it  is  considered  in  its  rela- 
tion to  absolute  knowing. 

This  insistence  that  the  nature  of  thought  can  be  understood 
only  when  it  is  interpreted  in  the  light  of  its  ideal,  illustrates  a 
difference  in  method  between  Kant  and  Fichte.  Kant  starts  with 
human  experience  and  finds  in  it  certain  oppositions,  all  of  which 
may  be  regarded  as  different  phases  of  the  fundamental  opposi- 
tion between  content  and  form.  Since  he  sees  no  way  of  rising 
above  these,  he  accepts  them  as  ultimate.  If  we  hold  that  thought 
is  essentially  dualistic,  however,  we  can  never  hope  to  bridge 
the  gulf  between  it  and  that  ideal  unity  in  which  all  differences 
are  harmonized.  Thus  for  Kant  the  relation  between  experience 
and  its  ideal  is  conceived  negatively ;  the  ideal  is  the  negation  of 
the  real.  Now  Fichte,  we  have  said,  sees  as  plainly  as  Kant  the 
dualistic  aspect  of  our  experience ;  but  he  does  not  succumb  to 
it  so  readily.  For  him  a  purely  negative  relation  is  unthinkable  ; 
the  ideal  cannot  be  the  negation  of  the  real.  And  if  it  be  true 
that  by  starting  with  experience  we  can  never  show  the  relation 


KANT  AND  FICHTE.  21 

between  it  and  its  ideal,  then  we  must  not  start  with  experience. 
If  we  cannot  explain  the  ideal  by  means  of  the  real,  we  must  try- 
to  explain  the  real  by  means  of  the  ideal. 

The  way  in  which  Fichte  attempts  to  do  this  will  be  described 
in  the  next  chapter.  Here  we  have  simply  pointed  out  the  path 
that  he  follows  in  his  attempt  to  pass  beyond  the  barriers 
which  Kant  had  set  for  the  human  mind.  The  clue  which 
guides  him  in  his  search  is  the  thought  that  the  explanation  of 
the  real  is  to  be  found  in  the  ideal.  How  he  conceives  this  ideal 
and  how  he  works  out  his  doctrine  of  the  relation  between  it  and 
actual  experience,  must  be  considered  in  detail  in  the  following 
chapter. 


CHAPTER   11. 
The  Works  of  the  First   Period:  The  Idea  of  the  Ego. 

In  the  more  detailed  study  of  Fichte  upon  which  we  are  now 
entering,  the  two  periods  of  his  philosophy  will  be  considered 
separately.  Whether  or  not  the  works  of  the  so-called  *  second 
period '  represent  a  change  in  any  of  his  essential  doctrines,  they 
are,  at  least  outwardly,  less  closely  connected  with  Kant  than 
the  earlier  writings  are ;  and  it  will  be  more  convenient  for  us  to 
study  first  the  works  in  which  the  relation  to  Kant  is  more 
obvious.  In  the  present  chapter,  therefore,  we  shall  confine  our- 
selves in  the  main  to  treatises  whose  date  is  prior  to  the  year 
1800.  In  Chapter  III  we  shall  take  up  the  later  works,  and  in 
this  connection  the  vexed  question  of  the  relation  between  the 
two  periods  will  receive  some  attention. 

In  the  preceding  chapter  we  suggested  that  one  of  the  great 
differences  between  Kant  and  Fichte  lies  in  the  conception  of  the 
relation  between  consciousness  and  its  ideal.  For  Kant,  as  we 
have  seen,  the  relation  is  a  negative  one ;  the  ideal  is  that  which 
consciousness  is  not  and  never  can  be ;  nay,  more,  that  to  which 
it  cannot  even  approach.  Fichte,  on  the  other  hand,  conceives 
the  relation  positively.  He  maintains  that  consciousness  is  not 
essentially  unlike  its  ideal,  but  that  in  spite  of  its  explicit  duality, 
it  is  implicitly  a  unity. 

Now  the  task  of  philosophy,  as  Fichte  understands  it,  is  to 
explain  the  dualism  of  consciousness  by  showing  how  it  could 
have  arisen  from  a  unitary  principle.  And  the  only  way  in  which 
he  can  hope  to  accomplish  it  is  by  calling  to  his  aid  that  very 
consciousness  which  is  to  be  explained.  If  we  do  not  find  the 
clue  to  the  solution  of  the  problem  in  our  own  experience,  we 
cannot  hope  to  find  it  anywhere.  The  philosopher  after  all  is 
only  a  man,  and  he  has  nothing  to  work  with,  except  that  which 
is  in  some  degree  accessible  to  every  man.^ 

1 "  The  finite  rational  being  has  nothing  outside  experience  ;  experience  contains 
the  whole  matter  {Stoff)  of  his  thinking.     The  philosopher  of  necessity  is  subject  to 


THE  IDEA    OF   THE  EGO.  23 

We  must  appeal,  then,  to  experience.  But  the  problem  is  to 
find  the  explanatoiy  ground  of  experience,  and  it  is  involved  **  in 
the  very  concept  of  ground"  that  it  lies  "outside  that  of  which 
it  is  the  ground."  How  then  can  we  hope  that  experience  will 
help  us  solve  our  problem  ?  To  this  question  Fichte's  answer  is 
that  by  an  act  of  philosophical  reflection  we  must  make  an 
analysis  of  experience,  must  separate  the  elements  which  are 
united  in  it.  When  we  do  this  we  see  that  experience  has  two 
aspects,  the  objective  and  the  subjective,  the  thing  that  is  known 
and  the  intelligence  that  knows.  "  The  philosopher  can  abstract 
from  either  one  of  these  and  thus  .  .  .  raise  himself  above 
experience.  If  he  abstracts  from  the  former,  he  gets,  as  the 
explanatory  ground  of  experience,  an  intelligence  in  itself,  that  is, 
intelligence  abstracted  from  its  relation  to  experience ;  if  he 
abstracts  from  the  latter,  he  gets  a  thing  in  itself,  that  is,  in 
abstraction  from  the  fact  that  it  is  presented  in  experience.  The 
first  procedure  is  called  idealism  ;  the  second,  dogmatising  ^ 

These  two  are  the  only  philosophical  systems  which  are  pos- 
sible ;  that  is,  the  only  consistent  philosophical  systems.  For 
since  experience  has  but  these  two  aspects,  the  subjective  and 
the  objective,  we  can  hope  to  show  its  essential  unity  only  by 
exhibiting  one  of  them  as  a  special  form  of  the  other;  we  must 
either  explain  intelligence  by  deducing  it  from  the  thing,  or 
explain  the  thing  by  deducing  it  from  intelligence.  Dogmatism 
takes  as  its  principle  of  explanation,  the  thing-in-itself — mere 
lifeless  being  —  and  seeks  to  deduce  life  and  consciousness  from 
it.  Idealism  takes  as  its  principle,  intelligence  or  the  Ego,  which 
is  an  activity.  Every  consistent  philosophy  is  thus  either  dog- 
matism or  idealism. 

Now  Fichte  admits  that  there  is  no  way  of  proving  directly 
that  the  true  philosophy  is  idealism  rather  than  dogmatism.  "  It 
is  a  mere  presupposition  "  that  intelligence  is  the  explanatory 
ground  of  experience,  **  that  from  it  can  be  deduced  the  whole 
system  of  our  necessary  ideas,  not  only  of  a  world  as  composed 

the  same  conditions"  {Erste  Einlditing  in  die  Wissenschaftslehre,  1797,8.  W.,  I, 

425). 

1  Op.  cit.,  S.  W.,  I,  424  ff. 


24  FICHTES  FUNDAMENTAL   PRINCIPLE. 

of  objects  which  receive  their  determinations  from  a  subsuming 
and  reflecting  judgment,  but  also  of  ourselves  as  free  and  practical 
beings,  subject  to  laws."  ^  Nor  is  it  possible  for  the  idealist  to 
offer  any  direct  refutation  of  dogmatism.  "  Neither  of  these  two 
systems  can  directly  overthrow  the  other ;  for  their  conflict  is 
with  regard  to  the  first  principle,"  which  is  assumed  as  a  starting- 
point  and  is  therefore  "  incapable  of  deduction."  ^  The  only  justi- 
fication that  either  can  have,  must  consist  in  the  successful 
accomplishment  of  its  task.  But  if  this  is  our  criterion,  then, 
Fichte  claims,  we  have  at  the  outset  a  partial  justification  for 
idealism.  For  it  can  be  shown  that  "  dogmatism  is  utterly 
incapable  of  explaining  what  it  has  to  explain.  ...  It  must 
explain  the  idea,  and  it  undertakes  to  make  this  conceivable  by 
a  reference  to  the  influence  of  a  thing-in-itself ;  but  in  doing  this 
it  must  not  contradict  what  immediate  consciousness  tells  us  with 
regard  to  the  idea."^  If  now  we  should  take  the  thing  as  our 
principle  of  explanation,  all  that  it  could  possibly  give  us  is  a 
being,  not  an  idea  (not  a  being  for  intelligence).  "  In  intelligence 
—  to  use  a  figurative  expression  —  there  is  a  double  series,  of  the 
being  and  the  contemplating,  of  the  real  and  the  ideal."  The 
most  that  dogmatism  can  give  us  is  the  "  single  series  of  the 
real."  *  Dogmatism  then  is  utterly  unable  to  bridge  "  the  gulf 
between  things  and  ideas.  Instead  of  an  explanation  it  offers  a 
few  empty  words.  ...  It  is  not  a  philosophy,  but  only  a  feeble 
affirmation  and  assertion.  Idealism  remains  as  the  only  possible 
philosophy."  ^ 

It  will  readily  be  seen  that  this  does  not  give  us  a  complete 
defence  of  idealism.  And  Fichte  himself  maintains,  as  we  have 
said,  that  the  real  justification  of  idealistic  philosophy  must  con- 
sist, not  in  the  failure  of  the  rival  theory,  but  in  its  own  success. 
Nevertheless  he  feels  that  even  at  the  outset  of  the  investigation 
the  idealistic  hypothesis  has  the  advantage.  For  it  is  not  con- 
demned by  the  very  nature  of  the  problem  as  is  the  case  with 
realism.     Dogmatism   takes    as  its  starting-point  mere    lifeless 

1  Op.  cit.y  S.  W.,  I,  445.  2  Op.  cit.,  S.  W.,  I,  429. 

3  Op.  cit.,  S.  W.,  I,  435.  «  Op.  cit.,  S.  W.,  I,  436. 

5   op.  cit.,  S.  W.,  I,  438. 


THE  IDEA    OF   THE  EGO.  25 

being,  the  thing-in-itself,  and  seeks  by  this  principle  to  explain 
the  existence  and  nature  of  consciousness.  In  so  doing,  it  is 
attempting  the  impossible  :  it  is  trying  to  explain  thought  through 
something  which  by  hypothesis  has  no  relation  to  thought. 
With  idealism  the  case  is  different.  Starting  with  thought,  it 
does  not  attempt  to  deduce  a  being  unrelated  to  thought,  but 
rather  a  being  which  exists  simply  in  and  for  the  thinking  process. 
Thus  there  is  no  irreconcilable  opposition  between  the  two  terms 
which  it  seeks  to  relate  ;  and  even  before  the  attempt  is  made, 
there  is  reason  to  suppose  that  the  solution  of  the  problem  of 
knowledge  must  lie  in  some  form  of  idealism. 

Fichte's  principle  of  explanation,  then,  is  the  Ego.  It  is  pos- 
sible, however,  to  understand  this  Ego  in  two  different  ways  : 
namely,  as  pure  subject  (mere  form)  and  as  the  unity  of  subject 
and  object  (of  form  and  matter).  The  first  interpretation  is  at 
least  suggested  by  the  discussion  in  the  Erste  Einleitiing  which  we 
have  just  been  considering.  Consciousness  itself  contains  two 
principles,  a  formal  and  a  material.  But  its  material  principle  is 
just  that  which  leads  us  to  postulate  the  existence  of  the  thing- 
in-itself.  Hence  when  Fichte  says  that  instead  of  trying  to  ex- 
plain the  Ego  by  the  thing  we  should  rather  seek  to  explain  the 
thing  by  the  Ego,  one  can  hardly  be  blamed  for  supposing  him 
to  mean  that  the  subjective  principle  is  ultimate  and  that  the 
objective  is  a  secondary  manifestation  of  it.  And  if  we  interpret 
the  Wissenschaftslehre  in  this  way,  it  seems  to  be  a  thorough- 
going subjective  idealism,  in  which  all  the  material  aspect  of 
thought  is  regarded  as  mere  Schein,  while  the  formal  aspect  alone 
is  taken  as  real. 

But  this  does  not  seem  to  be  Fichte's  meaning.  Our  key  to 
the  nature  of  the  ultimate  principle  is  consciousness  in  its  dual 
aspect  of  subject  and  object.  In  experience  we  always  find  both 
form  and  matter,  and  it  is  impossible  for  us  to  conceive  of  the 
one  as  existing  without  the  other.  Each  principle  has  its  rights  ; 
to  make  either  the  explanatory  ground  of  the  other  would  be  to 
do  injustice  to  this  other.  Hence  the  unitary  principle  which  the 
analysis  of  consciousness  reveals,  must  not  be  identified  with 
either  one  of  the  two  aspects  taken  alone,  but  rather  with  both  of 


26  FICHTES  FUNDAMENTAL   PRINCIPLE. 

them.  Now  in  consciousness,  the  two  aspects  are  in  opposition  ; 
subject  and  object  are  always  found  together,  but  they  are  found 
opposed.  The  one  principle,  then,  which  is  to  explain  both  and 
to  do  justice  to  both,  must  be  that  unity  of  subject  and  object 
which  is  never  explicit  in  consciousness  but  which  is  always  im- 
plied in  it. 

This,  it  seems  to  me,  is  Fichte's  real  meaning.  There  can  be 
little  doubt,  indeed,  that  many  of  his  contemporaries  interpreted 
him  as  teaching  that  the  ultimate  principle  is  the  formal  or  sub- 
jective aspect  of  experience.  Schelling,  e.  g.,  apparently  under- 
stood him  in  this  way  and  hence  regarded  his  own  Identitdtsphi- 
losophie  as  making  a  distinct  advance  upon  the  Fichtean  doctrine 
by  pointing  out  that  the  true  principle  is  neither  the  subjective 
nor  the  objective,  but  the  harmony  of  the  two.^  Fichte  himself, 
however,  insists  that  he  has  been  misunderstood,  that  his  prin- 
ciple is,  and  always  has  been,  the  unity  of  subject  and  object. 
That  some  of  the  most  emphatic  statements  of  his  position  are 
found  in  his  later  writings  ^  should  not  be  interpreted  as  meaning 
that  he  held  one  view  in  the  first  period  and  afterwards,  under 
the  influence  of  Schelling,  abandoned  it  for  another.^  Schelling 
himself  may  have  thought  this  to  be  the  case.     But  in  the  first 

1  See,  e.  g.^  a  passage  in  the  Darstellung  meines  Systems  der  Philosophie.  After 
warning  the  reader  not  to  misunderstand  him  when  he  calls  his  system  idealism, 
Schelling  continues  as  follows :  **  But  now  it  may  very  well  be  that  the  idealism,  e.  £., 
which  Fichte  at  first  worked  out  and  which  even  now  he  still  defends,  has  a  signifi- 
cance quite  different  from  mine.  Fichte,  e.  g.,  seems  to  have  regarded  idealism  in 
a  wholly  subjective  sense,  whereas  I  regard  it  in  an  objective  sense.  Fichte  in  his 
idealism  seems  to  have  remained  at  the  standpoint  of  reflection,  while  I,  with  my 
principle  of  idealism,  have  placed  myself  at  the  standpoint  of  production.  Idealism 
in  the  subjective  sense  might  say,  '  The  Ego  is  all'  ;  idealism  in  the  objective  sense 
would  reverse  this  and  say,  '  All  is  the  Ego'  "  (S.  W.,  Zw.  Abthl.,  II,  109). 

2  In  the  second  edition  of  the  Grundlage  der gesammten  Wissenschaftslehre ,  e.  g.^ 
Fichte  appends  to  his  discussion  of  the  first  Grundsatz  a  note  in  which  he  says : 
**  All  this  means,  in  other  words  in  which  I  have  since  expressed  it,  that  the  Ego  is 
necessarily  identity- of  subject  and  object,  subject-object;  and  it  is  this  absolutely, 
without  further  mediation"  (S.  W.,  I,  98,  note).  The  second  edition  of  the 
Grundlage  appeared  in  1802.  For  similar  statements,  see  Darstellung  der  Wissen- 
schaftslehre (i8oi),  S.  W.,  II,  76  ;  also  the  Wissenschaftslehre  of  1804,  N.  W.,  II, 
96.  Cf.  with  these  I.  H.  Fichte's  defence  of  his  father  against  Schelling' s  misin- 
terpretation (y.  G.  Fichte' 5  SdnimtUche  Werke,  Bd.  I,  Vorrede  des  Herattsgebers^ 
S.  XV,  ff.). 

'  If  the  statements  in  the  second  period  are  more  numerous  and  more  emphatic, 
the  reason  is  not  far  to  seek.     From  the  comments  and  criticisms  of  his  contempo- 


THE  IDEA    OF   THE  EGO.  2/ 

place,  as  we  have  just  said,  Fichte  explicitly  denies  it;  and  in  the 
second  place,  we  have,  in  the  works  of  the  first  period,  a  few  very- 
definite  statements  which  should  convince  us  that  even  at  this 
time  he  conceived  his  ultimate  principle  as  a  unity  of  the  sub- 
jective and  objective  aspects  of  human  experience.  E.  g.,  in  the 
Sitterilehre  of  1798,  we  find  the  following  passages  : 

"  No  one  can  hope  to  solve  the  problem  of  all  philosophy  .  .  . 
who  does  not  find  a  point  in  which  the  objective  and  the  sub- 
jective are  not  separated  at  all,  but  are  entirely  one."  The  Wis- 
senschaftslehre  *'  finds  such  a  point  and  starts  from  it.  Egohood, 
intelligence,  reason,  ...  is  this  point.  This  absolute  identity 
of  subject  and  object  in  the  Ego  can  only  be  inferred ;  we  can 
never  put  our  finger  upon  it  as  a  fact  of  actual  consciousness. 
Whenever  actual  consciousness  arises,  even  if  it  be  only  the  con- 
sciousness of  self,  the  separation  ensues.  I  am  conscious  of  my- 
self only  in  so  far  as  I  distinguish  myself,  the  conscious  subject, 
from  myself  as  the  object  of  this  consciousness.  TJie  whole  mech- 
anism of  consciousness  is  based  upon  the  various  aspects  of  this 
separation  of  subjective  and  objective  and  of  their  subsequent 
union ''^ 

"  Knowing  and  being  [the  formal  element  and  the  material] 
are  separated,  not  outside  consciousness  and  independently  of  it, 
but  only  in  consciousness  ;  their  separation  is  the  condition  of  the 
possibility  of  all  consciousness.  .  .  .  The  One  which  is  thus  sepa- 
rated is  the  ground  of  all  consciousness."  ^ 

And  even  in  the  Erste  Einleitung,  which,  as  we  saw,  seemed  to 
suggest  the  other  interpretation,  there  are  indications  that  Fichte 
did  not  mean  to  represent  his  ultimate  principle  as  identical  with  the 
merely  subjective  aspect  of  consciousness.  ;The  point  upon  which 
he  is  insisting  in  his  discussion  is  that  intelligence,  and  not  the  thing, 
shall  be  our  explanatory  ground.  But  when  he  tells  us  that  intelli- 
gence contains,  as  it  were,  a  double  series,  —  the  real  and  the  ideal, 
—  he  is  evidently  thinking  of  his  ultimate  principle  as  a  unity  of 
subject  and  object.    The  chief  difficulty  apparently  is  one  of  termi  - 

raries  Fichte  realized  that  the  earlier  works  had  been  misunderstood ;  in  the  later 
writings,  therefore,  he  tried  to  express  himself  tnore  exactly. 

IS.  W.,  IV,   I. 

2S.  W.,  IV,  5.      Cf.  S.  W.,  IV,  42,  quoted  above,  p.  16. 


28  FICHTKS  FUNDAMENTAL    PRINCIPLE. 

nology.  Fichte's  theory  is  that  consciousness,  as  an  imperfect 
union  of  subject  and  object,  points  to  an  ultimate  ground  in  which 
the  union  is  complete  ;  but  the  relation  in  which  his  doctrine  stood 
to  contemporary  thought  made  it  almost  inevitable  that  his  termi- 
nology should  be  somewhat  confused.  His  arch-enemy  is  the 
conception  of  the  thing-in-itself,  and  it  is  in  his  crusade  against 
this  pernicious  notion  that  he  unconsciously  falls  into  modes  of 
speech  which  subject  him  to  misinterpretation.  He  seems  to 
have  used  the  term  *  Non-Ego '  in  two  different  senses.  Some- 
times the  word  signifies  simply  the  objective  principle  in  con- 
sciousness. When  this  is  so,  the  object  is  regarded  as  the  corre- 
late of  the  subject,  as  standing  on  the  same  plane  with  it,  and  the 
finite  Ego,  or  the  Ego  as  intelligence,  is  merely  the  subjective 
principle.  In  this  case,  the  absolute  Ego  —  the  explanatory 
ground  of  experience — is  thought  of  as  being  related  just  as 
closely  to  the  Non-Ego  as  to  the  individual  Ego ;  it  is  the  unity 
of  the  two.  At  other  times,  however,  Fichte  means  by  the  Non- 
Ego,  not  the  objective  aspect  of  consciousness,  but  the  thing-in- 
itself,  conceived  as  existing  without  any  necessary  relation  to 
consciousness.  In  this  case,  the  individual  Ego  is  no  longer 
merely  the  subjective  principle ;  it  is  consciousness  in  its  dual 
aspect  of  subject  and  object.  Hence  Fichte  is  now  concerned  to 
prove  that  the  Non-Ego  does  not  stand  on  the  same  plane  with 
the  individual  Ego.  The  Non-Ego,  conceived  of  as  existing  apart 
from  consciousness,  ^'.y  mere  Schehiy  a  creature  of  the  imagination, 
an  Unding ;  consciousness,  not  the  thing-in-itself,  gives  us  the 
clue  to  the  nature  of  the  ultimate  principle. 

This  interpretation,  I  think,  disposes  of  the  particular  difficulty 
which  we  have  just  been  considering.  So  far  as  we  have  gone, 
there  seems  to  be  no  objection  to  our  saying  that  Fichte  regards 
his  ultimate  principle  as  a  unity  of  form  and  content,  rather  than 
mere  form.  There  is,  however,  another  aspect  of  the  question 
which  calls  for  more  detailed  consideration.  It  appears  in  con- 
nection with  Fichte's  doctrine  of  the  Idea  of  the  Ego,  and  before 
we  consider  it  we  must  examine  that  doctrine  in  some  detail. 

The  development  of  the  conception  of  the  Ego  as  Idea  may 
best  be  traced  in  the  Grundlage  der  gesammten  Wissenschaftslehre 


THE  IDEA    OF   THE  EGO.  29 

(1794).  As  we  have  already  seen,  Fichte  believes  that  the  task 
of  philosophy  is  to  discover  the  unity  which  forms  the  foundation 
of  all  experience  and  to  show  the  relation  which  it  bears  to  the 
dualistic  nature  of  our  ordinary  consciousness.  This  underlying 
unity,  we  have  also  seen,  is  to  be  found  by  a  philosophical 
analysis  of  experience.  The  correct  analysis  gives  us  as  our 
ultimate  principle,  the  Ego  rather  than  the  thing ;  dn  idealistic 
interpretation  of  experience  is  the  only  one  that  is  possible  for 
us.  So  much  we  have  learned  from  the  Erste  Einleitiing,  which, 
though  published  three  years  later  than  the  Grurtdlage,  is  really 
an  introduction  to  it  and  was  written  for  the  purpose  of  making  its 
meaning  clearer. 

The  Erste  Einleitiing  tells  us  that  the  ground  of  experience  can 
be  discovered  by  a  philosophical  analysis  of  consciousness  ;  in  the 
Grundlage  this  analysis  is  performed  for  us.  The  book  opens 
with  an  attempt  to  get  at  the  nature  of  the  fundamental  principle 
by  considering  a  simple  act  of  judgment.  The  proposition  "  A 
is  ^  "  is  the  one  which  Fichte  selects  ;  but,  he  tells  us,  any  affir- 
mative judgment  that  is  universally  accepted  would  serve  equally 
well.  What  now  is  involved  in  this  proposition  of  identity,  this 
assertion  that  a  thing  is  itself?  The  ground  of  the  judgment,  that 
which  alone  enables  us  to  make  it,  is  the  fundamental  principle 
of  all  consciousness,  *'  The  Ego  originally  posits  its  own  being." 
The  line  of  reasoning  by  which  Fichte  seeks  to  show  us  that  this 
Grundsatz  forms  the  basis  of  the  proposition  of  identity  ^  is  some- 
what artificial  and  would  perhaps  scarcely  convince  any  one  who 
was  not  already  prepared  to  admit  the  contention.  We  may 
therefore  pass  over  the  set  argument  and  content  ourselves  with 
dwelling  for  a  little  time  on  the  essential  meaning  of  the  assertion 
that  all  affirmative  judgment  implies  the  self-positing  of  the  Ego. 

Since  Kant's  deduction  of  the  categories  from  the  transcen- 
dental unity  of  apperception,  the  thought  that  every  act  of  judg- 
ment involves  the  assertion  of  the  self  has  been  familiar  to 
students  of  philosophy.  It  seems,  however,  that  Kant  himself 
failed  to  grasp  the  whole  meaning  of  his  doctrine.  The  task  of 
discovering  its  full  significance  remained  for  his  successors ;  and 

»  s.  w.,  I,  92  ff. 


30  FICHTE'S  FUNDAMENTAL   PRINCIPLE. 

all  the  forms  of  post-Kantian  idealism  may  be  regarded  as  so 
many  attempts  to  get  a  clearer  conception  of  the  nature  of  judg- 
ment in  its  relation  to  the  self.  As  Fichte  points  out,  however, 
Kant  was  not  the  first  to  have  a  glimpse  of  this  truth.  Des- 
cartes's  "  Cogito,  ergo  sum,"  though  it  is  an  inadequate  formu- 
lation and  though  Descartes  himself  seems  quite  unconscious  of 
its  deeper  significance,  is  yet  a  gleam  of  real  light.  The  *'  Cogito, 
ergo  sum,"  Fichte  tells  us,  regarded  ''  not  as  minor  premise  and 
conclusion  of  a  syllogism,  but  ...  as  immediate  fact  of  con- 
sciousness," is  at  bottom  simply  a  recognition  of  that  self-assertion 
of  the  Ego  which  is  involved  in  all  thinking.^ 

The  fuller  meaning  of  the  doctrine  may  be  seen  when  we  con- 
sider Fichte's  statement  that  this  self-affirmation  of  the  Ego  gives 
us  the  category  of  reality.  The  declaration  that  something  is, 
or  is  real,  has  no  meaning  save  as  it  embodies  an  implicit  refer- 
ence to  the  self  for  which  this  something  is  real.  He  who  hesi- 
tates to  affirm  the  existence  of  himself^  cannot  logically  affirm 
anything ;  for  in  the  act  of  asserting  anything  whatever  about 
any  subject,  he  inevitably  proclaims  the  existence  of  his  own 
consciousness. 

Self-consciousness  then,  as  Descartes  dimly  saw,  must  be  our 
starting-point.  But  self-consciousness  as  revealed  to  us  in 
judgment,  the  primary  intellectual  act,  involves  something  more 
than  mere  consciousness  of  self.  Judgment  has  not  only  an 
affirmative,  but  also  a  negative  aspect.  In  the  negative  judg- 
ment —  for  example,  "  A  is  not  not-^  "  —  this  second  aspect  of 
consciousness  is  revealed.  It  is  expressed  in  our  second  Gnind- 
satz,  which  forms  the  basis  of  all  negative  judgment,  "  To  the 
Ego  a  Non-Ego  is  absolutely  opposed."  ^  This  Gnindsatz  is  in 
a  sense  subordinate  to  the  first  one.     The  first  is  unconditioned 

IS.  W..  I,  99  f. 

2  In  this  discussion,  I  mean  to  use  the  terms  *  self  and  '  existence  of  self  with- 
out any  implication  of  a  substantial  self  which  is  supposed  to  support  and  possess  con- 
sciousness. There  seems  to  be  no  need,  either  in  psychology  or  in  metaphysics,  of 
asserting  the  existence  of  such  a  self,  either  as  immediate  datum  of  consciousness  or 
as  necessary  inference  from  the  facts  of  consciousness.  The  self,  as  I  use  the  term, 
is  identical  with  consciousness  or  experience  ;  it  has  just  as  much  substantiality  and 
unity  as  experience  has  —  so  much  and  no  more. 

3S.  W.,  I,  104. 


THE  IDEA    OF   THE  EGO.  31 

both  in  form  and  content.  The  second  is  unconditioned  in  form, 
but  conditioned  in  content  —  derives  its  content  from  the  first. 
It  is  unconditioned  in  form  because  negation  is  in  a  sense  as  truly 
a  primary  act  of  consciousness  as  affirmation  is  ;  it  is  conditioned 
in  content  because  negation  is  negation  only  as  compared  with 
affirmation.  **  If  the  consciousness  of  the  first  act  did  not  ac- 
company the  consciousness  of  the  second,  then  the  second  positing 
{Setzen)  would  not  be  an  oppositing  (Gegensetzeri),  but  merely  a 
positing.  It  first  becomes  an  oppositing  through  reference  to  a 
positing."  ^ 

Negation  then,  as  well  as  affirmation,  is  a  fundamental  aspect 
of  judgment.  If  we  consider  the  matter  a  Httle,  we  see  that  any 
judgment,  when  taken  in  its  full  meaning,  involves  both  assertion 
and  denial.  The  simplest  affirmation  that  we  can  make  brings 
with  it  an  implied  negation.  All  judgment  is  at  once  inclusive 
and  exclusive  :  to  declare  that  a  thing  is  this,  is  to  declare  that 
it  is  not  that}  It  should  be  noted,  however,  that  affirmation  is 
ordinarily  more  effective  than  negation.^  To  say  that  a  particular 
flower  is  not  a  Crucifer  is  to  exclude  one  possibility,  but  to  leave 
many  others  open ;  to  say  that  it  is  Composite  is  to  destroy  at 
one  blow  a  host  of  possibilities.  This  greater  effectiveness  of  the 
affirmative  judgment  justifies  us  in  assenting  to  Fichte's  proposi- 
tion that  the  fundamental  characteristic  of  thought  is  affirmation. 

But  when  we  have  shown  that  consciousness  involves  both 

IS.  w.,  I,  103. 

2  This  view  of  the  matter,  as  is  readily  seen,  rests  upon  the  doctrine  that  every 
judgment  involves  some  approach  to  disjunction.  And  for  my  own  part  I  cannot  see 
how  any  other  doctrine  is  tenable.  For  if  my  assertion  that  A  is  B  does  not  imply  a 
denial  that  A  is  something  else,  e.  g.,  C,  then  it  tells  us  nothing  whatever  and  thus 
is  not  a  judgment.  Cf.  Bosanquet,  Logic  or  the  Morphology  of  Knowledge  (Oxford, 
1888),  I,  340.  *'  The  whole  assertory  state  within  which  the  simpler  forms  of  judg- 
ment, at  any  rate  from  Comparison  upwards,  have  their  import,  is  from  the  first  of  a 
disjunctive  nature."  Professor  Bosanquet  guards  his  statement  by  excluding  what  he 
calls  the  'judgment  of  quality,'  but  I  think  he  would  admit  that  even  this,  the 
simplest  type  of  judgment,  has  an  aspect  of  negation.  For  in  another  passage  he 
tells  us  that  negation  "has  from  the  first  its  essential  place  in  knowledge"  ( C?/. 
cit.,  I,  297). 

'  When  we  have  a  perfect  disjunction,  consisting  of  only  two  members,  negation  is 
of  course  as  effective  as  affirmation.  But  in  this  case  the  negation  derives  its  effective- 
ness in  large  measure  from  the  disjunction  upon  which  it  rests  ;  and  this  disjunction, 
while  it  of  course  involves  negation,  is  still  predominantly  affirmative. 


32  FICHTE'S  FUNDAMENTAL   PRINCIPLE. 

affirmation  and  negation,  we  have  not  even  yet  disclosed  its  full 
nature.  For  these  two  moments,  as  Fichte  points  out,  are  ap- 
parently in  utter  opposition  to  each  other.  On  the  one  hand  we 
have  bare  identity ;  the  Ego  posits  itself.  On  the  other  hand 
we  have  bare  contradiction  ;  to  the  Ego  a  Non-Ego  is  absolutely 
opposed.  Now  if  consciousness  is  to  be  understood,  this  contra- 
diction between  its  two  moments  must,  in  some  way  or  other,  be 
resolved.  For  if  affirmation  and  negation  are  both  aspects  of 
experience,  their  opposition  cannot  be  ultimate.  That  they  are 
aspects  of  one  reality  and  that  therefore  they  cannot  be  in  absolute 
contradiction,  Fichte  indicates  in  his  third  Gnmdsatz,  "  In  the 
Ego. I  oppose  to  the  divisible  Ego  a  divisible  Non-Ego"  ;^  that 
is,  being  interpreted,  the  opposition  is  an  opposition  within  con- 
sciousness and  not  an  opposition  to  consciousness  —  one  which 
consciousness  itself  creates,  not  one  which  is  thrustvupon  it  by 
something  external. 

In  these  three  propositions  which  Fichte  develops  at  the  out- 
set of  his  study,  we  have  the  three  moments  which  are  involved 
in  every  act  of  thought  —  thesis,  antithesis,  and  synthesis.  This 
dialectic  nature  of  thought,  which  Hegel  makes  the  basis  of  his 
system,  is  thus  recognized  by  Fichte,  though  he  does  not  work 
it  out  so  fully  as  his  successor  did. 

But  the  postulation  of  this  fundamental  synthesis  is  little  more 
than  a  recognition  that  Ego  and  Non-Ego  are  correlative  aspects 
of  consciousness  and  that  hence  they  must  be  harmonized.  How 
they  are  to  be  harmonized,  still  remains  to  be  shown  ;  and  this 
is  the  task  of  the  rest  of  the  Gmndlage.  In  general,  Fichte's 
method  consists  in  bringing  to  light  one  opposition  after  another 
and  in  resolving  these  oppositions  by  a  succession  of  syntheses. 
Thus  in  this  first  synthesis,  by  which  he  seeks  to  reconcile  Ego 
and  Non-Ego,  he  finds  yet  other  oppositions.  This  third  Grund- 
satz  involves  two  opposed  propositions  :  (i)  '*  The  Ego  posits  the 
Non-Ego  as  determined  by  the  Ego  "  and  (2)  "  The  Ego  posits 
itself  as  determined  by  the  Non-Ego."  ^  The  first  of  these, 
Fichte  tells  us,  forms  the  basis  of  the  practical  part  of  the  Wis- 
senschaftslehre  ;  the  second,  the  basis  of  the  theoretical  part.  This 
IS.  W.,  I,  no.  2s.  w.,  T,  125  f. 


THE  IDEA    OF   THE  EGO.  33 

opposition  between  the  practical  and  theoretical  aspects  of  con- 
sciousness must  of  course,  in  due  time,  be  resolved  by  synthesis  ; 
but  Fichte  passes  by  this  task  for  the  present  and  proceeds  in- 
stead to  develop  the  theoretical  part  of  the  Wissenschaftslehre^ 
from  the  proposition,  *'  The  Ego  posits  itself  as  determined  by 
the  Non-Ego." 

To  follow,  through  all  its  windings,  this  involved  and  somewhat 
artificial  discussion  would  be  a  wearisome  task  and  perhaps  of 
comparatively  little  value.  We  may  therefore  pass  over  it  with 
a  brief  statement.  In  this  proposition  upon  which  the  theoretical 
WissenscJiaftslehre  rests,  we  still  have  an  opposition.  For  accord- 
ingly as  we  emphasize  the  one  or  the  other  phrase  in  it,  we  rep- 
resent the  Ego  as  passive  or  as  active.  If  we  say,  **  The  Ega 
posits  itself  as  determined  by  the  Non-Ego,"  we  emphasize  its 
activity.  But  if  we  say,  "  The  Ego  posits  itself  as  determined  by 
the  Non-Ego,''  we  emphasize  its  passivity.  Both  these  aspects 
of  the  Ego  —  its  activity  and  its  passivity  —  are  involved  in  our 
proposition,  and  thus  we  have  once  more  a  contradiction  to  be 
removed.  Fichte's  solution,  if  we  pass  over  some  intermediate 
steps,  is  this.  We  must  suppose  that  the  activity  of  the  Ego  has 
two  opposite  directions  —  one  centrifugal  or  outward-going,  the 
other  centripetal.  The  infinite  outward-going  activity  (produc- 
tion) receives  a  oh^oki^Anstoss)  and  in  consequence  is  driven  back 
upon  itself  (reflection).  This  double  process  of  production  and 
reflection,  repeated  in  successively  higher  stages,  gives  rise  to  the 
various  forms  —  sensation,  perception,  imagination,  conception, 
and  reasoning.  In  these  successive  products  of  reflection,  the 
Non-Ego  comes  into  view,  first  as  mere  sensation  which  is  not 
referred  to  an  object,  and  later  as  brought  under  a  concept  and 
regarded  as  the  cause  of  our  perception.  Finally  in  reason,  the 
last  stage  of  all,  the  Non-Ego  is  recognized  by  the  Ego  as  its 
own  product  ;  all  determination  of  the  Ego  is  seen  to  be  self- 
determination. 

Thus  Fichte  overcomes  the  difficulty  in  the  proposition,  "  The 
Ego  posits  itself  as  determined  by  the  Non-Ego."  The  limita- 
tion of  the  Ego  by  the  Non-Ego  is  really  a  limitation  by  itself. 
The  Non-Ego  is  simply  the  product  which  comes  into  being  in 


34  FICHTE'S  FUNDAMENTAL    PRINCIPLE, 

this  process  of  self-limitation.  The  entire  realm  of  conscious- 
ness, in  its  objective  as  well  as  its  subjective  aspect,  is  seen  to  be 
grounded  in  the  activity  of  the  Ego.  There  is  one  point,  how- 
ever, which  the  theoretical  Wissenschaftslehre  leaves  unexplained  ; 
this  is  the  Anstoss.  Why  is  it  that  the  Ego  is  driven  back  upon 
itself  and  that  thus  its  activity  assumes  the  opposite  direction  ? 
This  question  the  theoretical  Wissenschaftslehre  is  powerless  to 
answer ;  for  explanation  we  must  turn  to  the  practical  Wissen- 
schaftslehre. 

The  practical  Wissenschaftslehre,  as  we  have  said,  starts  with 
the  proposition,  "■  The  Ego  posits  itself  as  determining  the  Non- 
Ego."  This  involves  an  antithesis  between  the  Ego  as  intelli- 
gence and  the  Ego  as  absolute.  The  Ego  regarded  as  absolute 
is  seen  to  be  wholly  self-sufficient.  It  is  the  self-posited,  the 
self-dependent  —  the  Ego  of  the  first  Ginindsatz.  But  the 
Ego  regarded  as  intelligence,  while  in  one  sense  self-depend- 
ent, in  another  sense  is  not  so.  If  it  is  intelligence,  then  it 
is  indeed  the  source  of  its  determinations  ;  perception,  concep- 
tion, reasoning,  are  the  products  of  its  own  activity.  The  whole 
external  world,  if  it  is  to  exist,  must  be  developed  by  the  Ego 
from  within  itself,  cannot  conceivably  be  the  product  of  an  exter- 
nal force.  But  that  the  Ego  shall  be  intelligence,  that  there 
shall  be  an  external  world,  seems  to  be  posited,  not  by  the  Ego 
itself,  but  by  something  outside  it.  To  quote  Fichte's  own 
words,  **  The  mode  and  manner  of  representing  ( Vorstelleii)  in 
general,  is  certainly  through  the  Ego  ;  but  that  the  Ego  shall 
represent  at  all  is  determined,  as  we  have  seen,  not  by  it  but  by 
something  outside  it.  That  is,  we  are  not  able  to  think  the  rep- 
resentation possible  in  any  other  way  than  by  the  presupposition 
that  the  undetermined,  infinite,  outward-going  activity  of  the  Ego 
should  receive  a  check.  Hence  the  Ego,  as  intelligence  ingenei-al, 
is  dependent  upon  an  undetermined  and  as  yet  indeterminable  Non- 
Ego  [that  is,  the  Anstoss'\  and  only  through  and  by  means  of 
such  a  Non-Ego  is  it  intelligence."  ^  We  have  then  an  opposi- 
tion between  the  absolute  Ego,  which  is  wholly  self-dependent, 
and  the  Ego  as  intelligence,  which  is  self-dependent  as  to  its  liow, 

IS.  W.,  I,  248. 


THE   IDEA    OF   THE  EGO.  35 

while  for  its  that  it  depends  upon  the  Anstoss.  This  is  the  fun- 
damental antithesis  which  the  practical  Wissenschaftslehre  has  to 
solve. 

Here  again  Fichte  gives  us  a  long  and  involved  discussion, 
which  we  can  condense  into  a  comparatively  brief  statement.  In 
the  first  place  it  should  be  understood  that  the  opposition  which 
we  have,  is  an  opposition  iiithin  the  Ego.  The  Ego  as  intelli- 
gence and  the  Ego  as  absolute  (or  as  Fichte  often  calls  them, 
the  finite  and  the  infinite  Ego)  are  really  not  two,  but  one ;  the 
opposition  is  between  two  aspects  of  the  one  Ego.  Now  since 
an  absolute  opposition  within  the  one  Ego  is  impossible,  since 
the  Ego  cannot  be  in  the  same  sense  finite  and  infinite,  we  must 
suppose  that  in  one  sense  it  is  infinite  and  in  another  finite.  How 
can  this  be  ?  How  can  the  apparent  inner  contradiction  be  re- 
moved ? 

The  key  to  the  solution  of  the  difficulty  is  to  be  found  in  the 
concept  of  the  ideal.  **  The  Ego  is  infinite  "  in  that  it  "  strives 
to  be  infinite,"  ^  that  it  sets  up  for  itself  an  infinite  ideal ;  it  is 
finite  in  that  it  never  fully  attains  the  ideal.  If  we  interpret  the 
Ego  in  this  way,  if  we  regard  not  the  Is  {das  Sein),  but  the  Is-io- 
be  (das  Sollen)  as  the  clue  to  its  nature,  we  shall  get  rid  of  our 
difficulty  with  the  Anstoss.  We  saw  that  the  Anstoss  determines 
not  the  /low,  but  the  t/iat  of  the  Ego  as  intelligence  ;  that  is,  we 
had  to  assume  the  Anstoss  in  order  to  answer  the  question  why 
there  is  an  external  world,  why  the  infinite  Ego  should  not  re- 
main locked  within  its  calm  self-sufficiency  instead  of  manifesting 
itself  in  the  finite  consciousness.  The  only  answer  which  the  theo- 
retical Wissenschaftslehre  could  give,  was  an  appeal  to  the  An- 
stoss.  The  infinite  activity  of  the  Ego  is  checked,  and  its  rebound 
upon  itself  brings  into  being  the  external  world  and  the  finite 
subject.  But  this  explanation  does  not  suffice  ;  for  it  leaves  the 
Anstoss  as  something  foreign  to  the  Ego,  as  a  veritable  Ding  an 
sick.  If  we  are  to  fulfil  the  task  of  philosophy,  to  exhibit  all 
phases  of  experience  as  manifestations  of  a  unitary  principle,  we 
must  somehow  get  the  Anstoss  within  the  Ego,  must  show  that 
the  Ego  itself  furnishes  the  that  of  the  external  world.     This  the 

IS.  w.,  I,  270. 


36  FICHTE'S  FUNDAMENTAL   PRINCIPLE. 

concept  of  the  ideal  enables  us  to  do.  The  limitation  of  the 
Ego  is  a  self-limitation.  And  the  Ego  limits  itself,  not  because 
some  external  influence  urges  it  to  do  so,  but  because  of  an 
inward  impelling  force,  the  Idea  of  the  Ego.  The  Ego  limits 
itself  in  order  that  it  may  become  an  Ego,^  limits  itself  because 
only  in  and  through  self-limitation  can  it  attain  the  ideal  of  ego- 
hood.  The  absolute  Ego,  the  mere  infinite  activity,  is  not  really 
an  Ego;  it  is  ''  x\o\ki\Xi%  for  itself '  and  is  therefore  "nothing."^ 
In  order  that  it  may  be  an  Ego  —  that  is,  in  order  that  it  may 
really  be  at  all  —  it  must  set  bounds  to  itself,  must  determine 
itself;  and  the  outcome  of  its  self-determination  is  the  world  of 
conscious  individuality,  the  world  in  which  Ego  and  Non-Ego 
seem  opposed  to  each  other. 

Here  we  have  exhibited  the  teleological  aspect  of  Fichte's 
philosophy.  The  explanation  of  the  problems  of  thought  is  to 
be  found  in  the  concept  of  the  ideal.  This  world  is,  because  the 
Idea  of  the  Ego  is  ;  it  comes  into  being  through  the  creative 
power  of  the  Idea.  The  Ought-to-be  is  the  basis  and  explana- 
tory ground  of  the  Is. 

In  this  doctrine  we  have  a  fuller  development  of  a  tendency 
which  appears  in  Kant,  but  which  in  his  case  is  held  in  check  by 
other  tendencies.  In  the  Kritik  der  reinen  Vernunft  the  Ideas 
of  God,  freedom,  and  immortality  are  declared  to  be,  not  constit- 
utive, but  merely  regulative  principles.  In  the  Kritik  der  prak- 
tischen  Vernunft  this  position  is  somewhat  modified  by  the  supreme 
importance  which  is  attributed  to  the  moral  law.  In  his  exalta- 
tion of  the  practical  reason  Kant  gives  a  suggestion  which  strongly 
appealed  to  Fichte  and  which  doubtless  had  much  to  do  with  the 
development  of  his  doctrines.  Kant  himself,  however,  holding 
steadfastly  to  his  theory  of  the  fundamental  opposition  between 
the  content  and  form  of  experience,  does  not  attempt  to  make 
the  moral  law  a  constitutive  principle  for  the  explanation  of  this 
experience.  And  in  like  manner,  in  the  Kritik  der  Urtheilskraft, 
he  makes  the  principle  of  teleology  merely  regulative.  It  was 
reserved  for  Fichte  to  work  out  the  suggestion  of  the  Kritik  der 
praktischen  Vernunft,  to  show  that  in  the  concept  of  the  ideal  we 
have  the  explanatory  ground  of  the  world-process. 
IS.  W.,  I,  276.  2 s.  w.,  1,264. 


THE  IDEA    OF   THE  EGO.  37 

It  should  be  noted,  however,  that  the  Idea  of  the  Ego,  which 
Fichte  takes  as  his  ultimate  principle,  is  regarded  by  him  as 
unattainable.  In  this  respect  he  fully  agrees  with  Kant ;  the  ideal 
is  infinite  and  therefore  can  never  be  realized  by  any  finite  being 
or  system  of  finite  beings.  ''  The  highest  unity  we  shall  find  in 
the  Wissenschaftslehre  ;  not  however,  as  something  which  is,  but 
as  something  which  ought  to  be  produced  through  us  and  yet  can- 
7iot  be."  ^  "The  unity  of  the  pure  spirit  is  for  me  unattainable 
ideal ;  final  purpose,  but  one  which  never  becomes  actual."  ^ 
But  although  Fichte  believes  that  the  ideal  can  never  be  realized, 
there  is  still  an  important  difference  between  his  conception  of  its 
relation  to  consciousness  and  that  which  was  held  by  Kant.  In 
the  preceding  chapter  we  expressed  this  difference  by  saying  that 
while  Kant  conceives  the  relation  as  negative,  Fichte  insists  that 
it  is  positive.  This  means  for  one  thing  that  Fichte  believes  in 
the  possibility  of  progress,  believes  that  we  can  approximate  to 
our  ideal  even  though  we  can  never  reach  it.  The  perfect  unity 
of  subject  and  object  is  the  goal  of  an  infinite  process  and  hence 
can  never  be  realized.  Nevertheless  the  process  is  a  true  progress, 
a  movement  toward  the  goal.^ 

1  GrmidL  d.  ges.   ^.,  S.  W.,  I,  loi. 

2  Uber  die  Wurde  des  Menschen,  S.  W.,  I,  416,  note. 

3  The  following  citations  will  support  this  statement : 

' '  The  highest  goal  of  the  striving  of  reason  ...  is  only  Idea  ;  it  cannot  be  thought 
definitely,  and  it  will  never  be  actual ;  but  we  are  simply  to  approximate  to  it  through 
an  infinite  progress  "  [Zzveite  Einleihing  in  die  Wissenschaftslehre,   S.   W. ,  I,  516). 

The  ideal  *'  is  an  infinitely  distant  goal,  never  to  be  attained ;  hence  our  task  can 
only  be  to  show  how  one  must  act  in  order  to  approach  to  this  goal "  (Z>z>  Sitten- 
lehre,  1 798,  S.  W.,  IV,  131). 

"  The  final  purpose  of  the  rational  being  is  of  necessity  infinitely  distant ;  it  is  a 
goal  which  he  can  never  attain,  but  to  which,  in  consequence  of  his  spiritual  nature, 
he  must  constantly  approximate"  ( O/.  cit.,  vS.  W.,  IV,  149.  The  passages  in 
which  this  and  the  two  preceding  statements  occur,  are  quoted  more  at  length  below  : 
r/.  pp.  38ff.,48f.,  50- 

These  passages  show  clearly  that  Fichte  believes  in  the  possibility  of  progress. 
One  might,  however,  raise  the  question  whether  he  has  any  right  to  speak  of  our 
approximating  to  an  infinitely  distant  goal.  If  we  say  that  the  point  which  has  been 
reached  at  a  given  stage  in  the  progress  is  separated  from  the  end  by  an  infinite  dis- 
tance, and  if  we  conceive  of  this  infinite  distance  as  a  quantity  greater  than  any 
assignable  quantity,  then  in  one  sense,  we  must  certainly  admit,  no  approximation  is 
possible.  For  however  far  we  may  travel,  we  shall  still  be  separated  from  the  goal 
by  an  infinite  distance.     This  might  in  itself  suggest  that  the  conception  of  infinity  as 


38  FICHTE'S  FUNDAMENTAL   PRINCIPLE. 

But  more  than  this  is  impHed  in  Fichte's  conception  of  the  rela- 
tion between  human  experience  and  its  ideal.  When  we  say  that 
the  relation  is  positive  rather  than  negative,  we  mean  not  simply 
that  consciousness  may  gradually  approach  its  ideal ;  we  mean 
also  that  in  a  sense  it  already  is  the  ideal.  The  Idea  of  the  Ego 
is  not  transcendent,  but  immanent  —  not  so  much  a  goal  outside 
thought  which  attracts  it,  as  a  moving  principle  within,  which 
impels  it  forward.  **  The  Ego  is  only  that  which  it  posits  itself 
as  being.  *  It  is  infinite  '  means  *  It  posits  itself  as  infinite,  deter- 
mines itself  by  the  predicate  of  infinitude.*  "  ^  '*  The  idea  of  such 
an  infinity  to  be  completed  hovers  before  us  and  is  contained  in 
the  innermost  depths  of  our  nature."  ^ 

In  the  Zweite  Einleitung  there  is  a  passage  which  throws  much 
light  upon  the  conception  of  the  Ego  as  Idea  and  its  relation  to 
finite  consciousness.  We  must  carefully  distinguish,  Fichte  tells 
us,  between  two  conceptions,  "the  Ego  as  intellekUielle  An- 
schauung,  from  which  the  Wissenschaftslehre  starts,  and  the  Ego  as 

quantitative  is  not  an  altogether  satisfactory  one,  that  it  is  at  best  one-sided  and  mis- 
leading. Without  trying  to  develop  this  thought,  however,  we  may  content  ourselves 
with  pointing  out  that  the  very  nature  of  measurement  involves  reference  to  the  finite, 
rather  than  to  the  infinite,  — in  the  sense  in  which  we  are  here  using  the  terms,  — but 
that  this  does  not  compel  us  to  reject  the  concept  of  measurement  as  invalid  or  mean- 
ingless. Progress  implies  measurement,  and  measurement  in  turn  implies  finitude. 
But  for  all  that,  progress  may  be  real  —  real  just  in  so  far  as  measurement  and  the 
measured  (the  finite)  are  real.  Thus  from  the  point  of  view  of  the  goal,  which  is 
infinitely  removed,  no  approximation,  no  progress,  is  possible  ;  but  from  the  point  of 
view  of  the  finite  subject,  progress  is  possible.  Any  finite  distance  is  indeed  negligible 
as  compared  with  an  infinite  distance,  but  it  is  none  the  less  an  element  of  the  real 
world. 

This  is  practically  the  way  in  which  Fichte  himself  solves  the  difficulty.  In  the 
Sittenlehre  of  1 798  there  is  an  interesting  passage  in  which  he  discusses  this  very 
question.  **  How,  men  ask,  can  one  come  nearer  to  an  infinite  goal?  Does  not 
every  finite  quantity  disappear  into  nothingness  when  set  over  against  infinity?  But 
when  men  bring  forward  this  difficulty,  one  might  suppose  that  they  were  talking 
about  infinity  as  a  thing-in- itself,  /approximate /or  myself.  But  I  can  never  grasp 
infinity ;  hence  I  always  have  my  eyes  fixed  upon  a  definite  goal,  to  which  without 
doubt  I  can  come  nearer.  But  after  it  has  been  attained,  then,  because  of  the  con- 
sequent enlargement  of  my  whole  nature  and  thus  of  my  insight,  my  goal  may  be 
pushed  just  so  much  farther  beyond  me  ;  and  thus  from  this  genera/  point  of  view,  I 
never  come  nearer  to  the  infinite  "  (S.  W.,  IV,  150). 

1  Grundl.  d.  ges.  IV.,  S.  W.,  I,  214.  This  passage  is  quoted  at  greater  length 
below,  p.  44. 

2  Op.  cit.,  S.  W.,  I,  270. 


"      THE   IDEA    OF   THE  EGO.  39 

Idea,  with  which  it  ends.  In  the  Ego  as  intellektuelle  Anschauung 
there  lies  merely  the  form  of  egohood,  the  act  which  returns  into 
itself,  which  indeed  also  becomes  its  own  content.  ...  In  this 
form  the  Ego  is,  only  for  the  philosopher^  and  it  is  by  grasping 
this  conception  that  one  rises  to  the  philosophical  point  of  view. 
The  Ego  as  Idea  [on  the  other  hand]  is  present  {yorhanden)  for 
the  Ego  itself,  which  the  philosopher  studies.  .  .  .  The  Ego  as  Idea 
is  the  rational  being,  first  in  so  far  as  this  being  has  perfectly 
manifested  in  himself  the  universal  reason,  in  so  far  as  he  is  actually^ 
rational,  and  nothing  but  rational,  in  so  far  then  as  he  has  ceased 
to  bean  individual — for  it  is  only  through  the  limitations  of 
sense  that  he  is  an  individual.  Again  [the  Ego  as  Idea  is  the 
rational  being],  in  so  far  as  this  being  has  fully  realized  reason^ 
outside  himself  in  the  world,  which  thus  also  is  posited  in  this^ 
Idea.  The  world  remains  posited  in  this  Idea  as  world  in  general^ 
as  substrate  governed  by  certain  definite  laws  of  mechanisms 
and  organisms  ;  but  these  laws  throughout  their  whole  range  are 
fitted  to  express  the  final  purpose  of  reason.  The  Idea  of  the 
Ego  has  only  this  in  common  with  the  Ego  as  Anschauung,  that 
in  neither  of  them  is  the  Ego  conceived  as  individual ;  it  is  not  so 
conceived  in  the  latter  because  in  it  egohood  is  not  yet  nar- 
rowed down  (bestiinmi)  to  individuality  ;  nor  in  the  former  be- 
cause in  it,  through  development  according  to  universal  laws, 
individuality  has  disappeared.  But  the  two  differ  in  this,  that  in  the 
Ego  as  Anschauung  we  have  only  the  form  of  the  Ego  and  take  no 
account  of  a  proper  content  {Material)  for  this  Ego,  —  a  content 
which  is  thinkable  only  through  the  Ego's  thinking  of  a  world, — 
whereas  in  the  Ego  as  Idea  the  complete  matter  {Materie)  of 
egohood  is  thought.  From  the  first  [the  Ego  as  Anschammg'] , 
all  philosophy  starts,  finding  in  it  its  fundamental  concept.  To 
the  second  [theoretical]  philosophy  does  not  extend ;  only  in  its 
practical  part  can  this  Idea  be  set  up  as  the  highest  goal  of  the 
striving  of  reason.  The  first,  as  we  said,  is  original  Anschauung 
and  becomes  concept  in  the  way  which  we  have  already  suffi- 
ciently described  [that  is,  through  philosophical  reflection] .  The 
second  is  only  Idea  ;  it  cannot  be  thought  definitely,  and  it  will 


40  FICHTE'S  FUNDAMENTAL   PRINCIPLE. 

never  be  actual  ;  but  we  are  simply  to  approximate  to  it  through 
an  infinite  progress."  ^ 

In  this  passage  we  have  the  most  complete  expression  that 
Fichte  gives  us  of  his  conception  of  the  Ego  as  self-developing 
form.     The  Ego  as  intellekUielle  Anschaiiung^  the  absolute  Ego 

IS.  W.,  I,  515  f. 

2  It  is  hardly  necessary  to  point  out  that  Fichte  uses  the  term  intellektuelle  Anschau- 
ung  in  a  different  sense  from  that  in  which  Kant  employed  it.  With  Fichte  the 
phrase  seems  to  have  two  significations,  which  are,  however,  closely  connected. 
Sometimes,  as  in  the  passage  just  quoted,  intellektuelle  Anschaumig  seems  to  be 
thought  of  as  the  form  which  has  not  yet  unfolded  its  content,  as  the  still  undifferentiated 
unity  which  is  the  basis  of  experience  ;  here  it  is  identical  with  the  absolute  Ego  of 
the  Grundlage.  At  other  times,  however,  Pichte  speaks  of  it  as  the  act  by  which 
we  become  conscious  of  this  underlying  unity  (See,  e.g.,  Ziveite  Einleitung,  S. 
W.,  I,  463,  and  Versuch  einer  neuen  Darstelhing  der  Wissenschaftslehre,  S.  W.,  1, 
526  fF. ).  In  neither  case  is  the  term  used  in  the  Kantian  sense  ;  and  in  one  place 
Fichte  himself  points  out  that  the  phrase  has  with  him  a  different  meaning  from  that 
which  Kant  gives  it.  "  In  the  Kantian  terminology,"  he  says,  "all  perception  is 
directed  toward  a  being,  something  which  is  posited,  something  which  persists.  In- 
tellectual perception  would  therefore  be  immediate  consciousness  of  a  non-sensuous 
being,  immediate  consciousness  of  the  thing-in-itself,  and  that  too  through  mere 
thinking  ;  thus  it  would  be  a  production  of  the  thing-in-itself  through  the  concept. 
.  .  .  But  the  Wissenschaftslehre  .  .  .  knows  .  .  .  that  this  is  an  utterly  irrational 
conception.  .  .  .  Intellectual  perception  in  the  Kantian  sense  is  for  it  an  Unding, 
which  escapes  from  our  grasp  as  soon  as  we  try  to  think  it  and  which  is  not  even 
worthy  of  a  name.  The  intellectual  perception  of  which  the  Wisserischajtslehre 
speaks,  is  directed  not  toward  a  being,  but  toward  an  acting,  and  it  is  not  even 
mentioned  by  Kant,  except,  if  you  will  have  it  so,  in  the  phrase  *  pure  appercep- 
tion.'"  But  its  parallel  really  exists  in  Kant's  categorical  imperative.  "Our 
consciousness"  of  the  categorical  imperative  is  "intellectual  perception"  {Ziveite 
Einleitung,  S.  W.,  I,  471  f. ). 

From  this  passage  it  appears,  as  Thiele  points  out  ((?/.  cit.,  173,  182),  that  Fichte 
4does  not  recognize  the  higher  form  of  Kant's  doctrine  of  intellectual  perception. 
"What  he  has  in  mind  here  is  intellektuelle  Anschauung  as  knowledge  of  things-in- 
:. themselves.  And  since  the  thing-in-itself  is  for  him  an  Unding,  we  can  readily  see 
-why  he  applies  this  name  to  Kant's  intellectual  perception.  That  the  concept  of  in- 
tellektuelle Anschauung  must  be  formed  on  the  analogy  of  our  own  self-consciousness 
..he  clearly  recognizes,  but  he  fails  to  see  that  this  very  conception  is  found  in  the 
.Kritik  d^r  reinen  Vernunft.  Certainly  Kant's  intellektuelle  Anschauung,  x^^^x^tdt. 
tas  a  se!f-(C®Frsci'Ousn€SS  in  whose  very  act  of  unity  the  manifold  content  is  given,  is  not 
xQXiUnSing  for  Fichte.  Its  parallel  in  the  Wissenschaftslehre,  however,  is  not  the  Ego 
a*  itnSellektuelle  Anschauung,  but  the  Ego  as  Idea. 

Thiele,  not  content  with  defending  Kant  against  Fichte' s  criticisms,  makes  the 
countercharge  that  Fichte  himself  has  never  risen  to  the  highest  conception  of  intel- 
lektuelle Anschauung  [Op.  cit.,  17S  ff. ).  This  charge,  it  seems  to  me,  indicates 
some  misunderstanding  of  the  relation  between  Kant  and  Fichte.  It  is  true  that  for 
Fichte  intellectual  perception  does  not  represent  the  perfect  unity  of  form  and  con- 


THE   IDEA    OF   THE   EGO. 

of  the  Gnindlage,  is  form  whose  content  has  not  yet  become  ex- 
phcit  ;  hence  Fichte  speaks  of  it  as  mere  form.  But  it  is  evident 
that  the  content  which  it  gains  in  the  process  of  development 
does  not  come  to  it  from  without.  As  Fichte  himself  says,  **  the 
form  of  egohood,  the  act  which  returns  into  itself  .  .  .  becomes 
its  own  content."  In  short  w^e  have  here  the  germs  of  Hegel's 
conception  of  the  Idea  which  realizes  itself  through  successively 
higher  stages,  the  universal  which  develops  by  becoming  more 
concrete. 

In  this  doctrine,  human  experience  seems  to  have  an  interme- 
diate position  between  the  form  which  has  as  yet  no  explicit  con- 
tent and  the  fully  developed  form,  in  which  the  content  has  been 
perfectly  explicated.  This  enables  us  to  understand  the  dualism 
which  is  so  apparent  in  experience.  In  the  process  of  develop- 
ment the  content  is  set  over  against  the  form,  from  which  it  has 
proceeded  and  with  which  it  is  really  identical.  This  opposition 
of  form  and  matter  is  essential  if  their  higher  unity  is  ever  to  be 
made  manifest.  In  order  that  the  apparently  empty  identity  may 
show  itself  as  identity  in  difference,  the  difference  must  be  empha- 
sized. In  order  that  the  Ego  may  be/d?;-  itself  d,nd  thus  be  a  true 
Ego,  it  must  oppose  to  itself  a  Non-Ego.  Thus  human  conscious- 
ness, in  spite  of  its  seeming  dualism,  is  a  necessary  stage  in  the 
realization  of  the  ideal  unity  of  content  and  form. 

We  have  now  before  us  in  its  general  outlines,  Fichte's  con- 
ception of  his  fundamental  principle.  In  the  earlier  part  of  the 
Gnindlage  it  is  described  as  the  absolute  Ego,  but  as  the  argu- 

tent,  but  rather  form  whose  content  is  only  implicit.  But  in  the  Ego  as  Idea  we 
have,  as  has  just  been  said,  the  conception  which  corresponds  to  the  highest  phase  of 
Kant's  doctrine.  Apparently  Thiele  would  reply  to  this  that  according  to  Fichte  the 
Idea  is  not  and  cannot  be  realized.  "  In  the  Ought,'"  he  says,  *'  the  opposition  be- 
tween positing  (knowing)  and  posited  (the  known)  is  still  stronger"  ((9/.  <r/V., 
179).  Believing,  as  he  does,  that  Kant  finds  in  the  'I  think'  an  actual  unity  of 
form  and  content,  he  is  disposed  to  censure  Fichte  because  no  such  perfect  unity  is 
recognized  by  the  Wissenschaftslehre  as  actual.  In  the  Appendix,  Note  B,  I  have 
given  my  reasons  for  dissenting  from  Thiele's  interpretation  of  Kant's  *  I  think.'  If 
these  are  accepted,  one  must  admit,  it  seems  to  me,  not  only  that  Fichte's  conception 
of  the  Ego  as  Idea  is  a  close  parallel  to  the  highest  form  of  Kant's  intellektuelle 
Anschauung,  but  also  that  Fichte,  in  representing  the  relation  between  human  ex- 
perience and  its  ideal  as  positive  rather  than  negative,  reaches  a  higher  position  than 
that  held  by  Kant. 


42  FICHTE'S  FUNDAMENTAL   PRINCIPLE, 

ment  advances,  we  see  that  this  conception  is  not  adequate  to 
explain  the  facts  of  experience.  If  the  ultimate  principle  had 
no  other  aspect  than  that  self-contained  independence  which  is 
symbolized  by  the  absolute  Ego,  then  the  nature  of  conscious- 
ness, with  its  opposition  of  Ego  and  Non-Ego,  could  be  made 
intelligible  only  by  the  assumption  of  the  Anstoss  and  the  conse- 
quent admission  of  dualism.  But  when  the  concept  of  the 
absolute  Ego  is  transformed  into  that  of  the  Ego  as  Idea,  the 
difficulty  with  regard  to  the  Anstoss  disappears.  The  fundamental 
principle  is  now  seen  to  be,  not  a  mere  undetermined  form  —  as 
such  it  would  be  nothing  and  explain  nothing  —  but  a  form 
which  develops  its  content  through  the  act  of  self-limitation. 
Not  the  undetermined,  but  the  self-determined,  is  the  true 
infinite. 

We  may  now  return  to  the  question  that  we  were  considering 
in  the  early  part  of  the  chapter  —  the  question,  that  is,  whether 
Fichte  conceives  his  ultimate  principle  as  mere  form,  or  as  a 
unity  of  form  and  content.  In  our  discussion  of  the  passage  in 
the  Et'ste  Einleitnng  we  were  disposed  to  maintain  that  there  is 
nothing  in  it  to  prevent  us  from  assuming  that  he  regards  his 
principle  as  such  a  unity.  But  we  pointed  out  at  the  time  that 
the  question  has  another  aspect,  which  appears  in  connection  with 
the  doctrine  of  the  Ego  as  Idea. 

Our  study  of  the  Grundlage  has  shown  us  that  the  unitary 
principle  which  is  described  in  the  Erste  Einleitung  is  an  ideal 
principle.  In  the  realm  of  the  actual  we  always  find  opposition  ; 
both  in  the  intellectual  and  in  the  moral  life,  subject  and  object 
are  set  over  against  each  other,  and  in  actual  experience  this 
opposition  can  never  be  fully  overcome.  But  in  all  our  intel- 
lectual endeavor,  in  all  our  moral  striving,  we  are  guided  by  the 
ideal  of  unity.  This  is  the  true  ground  of  consciousness  ;  this 
it  is  which  brings  into  existence,  which  makes  actual,  the  world 
of  the  finite  being  and  his  infinite  striving.  And  now  that  we 
have  before  us  this  conception  of  the  Ego  as  Idea,  the  question 
whether  the  fundamental  principle  is  a  perfect  unity  of  subject 
and  object  meets  us  in  a  new  guise.  The  ultimate  ground  of  all 
reality  is  not  something  which  is  actually  existent,  but  an  ideal 


THE   IDEA    OF   THE   EGO.  43 

that  is  to  be  realized.  Hence  the  question  as  to  the  unity  of  the 
principle  now  becomes  the  question,  what  sort  of  unity  is  it 
toward  which  the  world-process  is  striving  ?  How  does  Fichte 
conceive  the  ideal  itself?  Is  it  pure  form,  or  is  it  a  unity  of  form 
and  content  ?  As  long  as  there  is  a  world  of  conscious  beings 
(and  since  the  goal  is  infinitely  distant,  there  will  always  be  such 
a  world),  so  long  there  will  be  both  subject  and  object.  But 
if  the  unattainable  goal  could  be  attained,  what  would  it  be  ? 
Would  it  be  mere  form,  devoid  of  content,  or  would  it  be  an 
organic  unity  of  form  and  matter  ? 

If  we  study  the  works  of  the  first  period  with  reference  to  this 
question,  we  seem  to  find  in  them  traces  of  two  different  con- 
ceptions of  the  ideal.  Sometimes,  apparently,  Fichte  thinks  of 
it  as  mere  form  and  at  other  times  as  a  union  of  form  and  con- 
tent. In  the  Gnindlage,  as  we  have  seen,  the  dualism  of  subject 
and  object,  which  at  first  appears  as  an  opposition  of  Ego  and 
Non-Ego,  soon  develops  into  an  opposition  between  the  Ego  as 
infinite  and  the  Ego  as  finite.  Now  if  we  believe  that  finite  and 
infinite  are  aspects  which  are  essentially  opposed,  then  the  unity 
which  we  regard  as  the  ideal  of  thought  must  be  conceived  as 
purely  formal ;  but  if  on  the  other  hand  we  maintain  that  the 
opposition  is  not  irreconcilable,  our  ideal  becomes  an  organic 
unity  of  content  and  form.  In  the  one  case  the  goal  of  the  end- 
less progress  is  conceived  as  the  annihilation  of  content,  the  com- 
plete absorption  of  the  finite  into  the  infinite  ;  in  the  other,  as  the 
perfect  interpenetration  of  form  and  content,  as  the  finite  which 
has  developed  into  the  infinite,  the  infinite  which  is  fully  realized 
in  the  finite. 

There  are  some  indications  in  the  Gnindlage  of  a  tendency 
to  adopt  the  first  alternative  —  to  emphasize  the  opposition  of 
finite  and  infinite  and  thus  to  suggest  that  the  unattainable  ideal 
of  experience  is  empty  form.  "Both  Ego  and  Non-Ego,  as  put 
upon  the  same  plane  {gleichgesetst)  and  opposed  to  each  other, 
through  the  concept  of  mutual  limitation,  are  something  (acci- 
dents) in  the  Ego  as  divisible  substance,  are  posited  by  the  Ego 
as  the  absolute  subject,  which  is  incapable  of  Hmitation,  to  which 
nothing  is  like  and  nothing  is  opposed."  ^     And  again  :  "  In  so 

iS.  W.,  I,  119. 


44  FICHTE'S  FUNDAMENTAL   PRINCIPLE. 

far  as  the  Ego  is  limited  by  the  Non-Ego,  it  is  finite ;  but  in 
itself,  as  it  is  posited  by  its  own  absolute  activity,  it  is  infinite. 
These  two  aspects,  the  infinity  and  the  finitude,  must  be  united. 
But  such  a  union  is  inherently  impossible.  For  a  long  while  the 
strife  is  settled  by  mediation  ;  the  infinite  limits  the  finite.  But 
at  length,  when  the  utter  impossibility  of  the  desired  union  is 
seen,  the  finitude  must  be  utterly  destroyed  {aiifgehoben).  All 
boundaries  must  disappear  ;  the  infinite  Ego  alone  must  remain 
as  One  and  as  All."  ^ 

These  passages  give  the  best  expression  which  I  have  found 
in  the  Grundlage  of  the  tendency  to  oppose  the  finite  and  the  in- 
finite aspects  of  the  Ego.  On  the  other  hand  we  have  several  em- 
phatic statements  in  favor  of  the  higher  conception  of  the  ideal. 
"  These  two  [the  finite  and  the  infinite  aspects  of  the  Ego]  must 
be  one  and  the  same.  Briefly  put,  this  means  :  no  infiitity^  no  liini- 
tation  ;  no  limitation,  no  infinity  ;  infinity  and  limitation  are  united 
in  one  and  the  same  synthesis.  If  the  activity  of  the  Ego  did  not 
go  out  toward  infinity,  then  the  Ego  could  not  limit  this  its 
activity  ;  it  could  not  set  bounds  for  it,  as  it  nevertheless  is 
to  do.  .  .  .  Furthermore  if  the  Ego  did  not  limit  itself,  it  would 
not  be  infinite.  The  Ego  is  only  that  which  it  posits  itself  as 
being.  *  It  is  infinite,'  means  '  It  posits  itself  as  infinite,  deter- 
mines itself  by  the  predicate  of  infinitude.'  Thus  it  limits  itself 
(the  Ego)  as  substratum  of  the  infinitude."  '^  "  Without  this  ref- 
erence "  to  an  object  *'  there  would  be  no  object  for  the  Ego,  but 
the  Ego  would  be  all  in  all  and  for  this  very  reason  .  .  . 
nothing."^  "The  absolute  Ego  is  simply  like  itself;  all  within 
it  is  one  and  the  same  Ego  and  belongs  (if  we  may  express  our- 
selves so  improperly)  to  one  and  the  same  Ego  ;  there  is  nothing 
here  to  distinguish,  no  manifold ;  the  Ego  is  all  and  is  nothing, 
because  it  is  nothing /<?r  itself,  because  no  positing  and  no  posited 
can  be  distinguished  in  it."  ^ 

Thus  we  see  that  both  interpretations  of  the  ideal  seem  to  find 
support  in  the  Grundlage,  that  some  passages  suggest  that  Fichte 
thought  of  the  goal  of  the  infinite  process  as  empty  form,  while 

IS.  W.,  I,  144.  2s.  w.,  I,  214. 

3S.W.,  I,  261.  *s.w. ,1,264. 


THE  IDEA    OF   THE  EGO.  45 

others  seem  to  show  that  he  conceived  it  as  the  organic  unity  of 
form  and  content.  At  this  point  we  may  pause  for  a  moment  to 
compare  his  position  with  that  of  Kant.  In  the  preceding 
chapter,  we  saw  that  in  the  Kritik  der  reinen  Verminft  Kant  con- 
ceives of  iiitellekiuelle  Anschauung  as  a  unity  of  form  and  matter 
but  that  his  doctrine  has  two  main  phases.  In  one  of  these  {in- 
telle ktuelle  Anschammg  diS  passive  apprehension  of  things-in-them- 
selves)  the  unity  is  artificial ;  in  the  other  (intellekttielle  Anschauung 
as  a  pure  self-consciousness  which  is  its  own  content)  it  is  or- 
ganic. In  both  cases,  however,  finite  consciousness,  with  its 
inherent  dualism,  is  utterly  opposed  to  the  ideal,  can  never 
approximate  to  it  in  the  least  degree.  In  the  Kritik  ker  prak- 
tischen  Vernu7ift  somewhat  different  tendencies  were  revealed. 
In  the  moral  world  Kant  seems  to  recognize  the  possibility  of  an 
approximation  ;  but  he  conceives  the  ideal,  we  saw,  either  as 
pure  form  or  (possibly)  as  an  artificial  union  of  form  and  matter. 
Hence  the  advance  which  we  seem  to  find  in  the  second  Kritik 
is  made  only  by  lowering  the  concept  of  the  ideal. 

When  we  compare  these  results  with  what  we  have  thus  far 
learned  of  Fichte's  doctrine,  we  see  that  the  Griindlage  does  not 
offer  a  complete  parallel  either  to  the  Kritik  der  reinen  Vernunft 
or  to  the  Kritik  der  praktischen  Verjtiinft.  In  two  respects 
Fichte's  position  in  the  Grundlage  represents  an  advance  beyond 
that  of  his  predecessor.  In  the  first  place  he  does  not  believe, 
as  Kant  does,  that  human  experience  is  altogether  unlike  its 
ideal,  cannot  approximate  to  it  in  the  least  degree.  And  in  the 
second  place  we  see  no  disposition  to  conceive  of  the  ideal  as  an 
artificial  union  of  form  and  matter.  But  though  in  these  two 
respects  he  avoids  the  errors  into  which  Kant  falls,  yet  his  posi- 
tion is  not  above  criticism.  For  when  we  ask  whether  the  ideal 
is  mere  form  or  an  organic  union  of  form  and  content,  his  answer 
is  not  so  clear  and  unhesitating  as  might  be  desired  ;  on  the 
contrary  he  seems  to  waver  between  the  two  positions. 

On  the  whole,  it  will  probably  be  admitted  that  the  second 
conception  is  the  more  prominent  one  in  the  Gnmdlage.  Further 
evidence  in  favor  of  this  second  conception  is  found  in  the  very 
emphatic  statement  in  regard  to  the  ideal,  in  the  passage  which 


46  FICHTE'S  FUNDAMENTAL   PRINCIPLE, 

we  have  already  quoted  from  the  Zweite  Einleitung}  Here 
Fichte  says  expHcitly  that  the  Idea  of  the  Ego  is  not  mere  form, 
but  that  it  must  be  thought  as  possessing  '*  the  complete  matter 
of  egohood."  Again  in  the  Recension  des  ^nesidemus  there  is 
an  interesting  passage,  which,  although  not  quite  free  from  am- 
biguity, seems  on  the  whole  to  be  in  favor  of  this  second  con- 
ception. "  The  Ego  in  the  intellektiielle  Anschaimng  \s  .  .  .  abso- 
lutely self-subsistent  and  independent.  But  the  Ego  in  the  empiri- 
cal consciousness,  as  intelligence,  is  only  in  relation  to  something 
known  (ein  Intelligibles^,  and  in  so  far  it  exists  as  dependent. 
Now  this  Ego  which  is  thus  opposed  to  itself  must  constitute, 
not  two  Egos,  but  only  one,  and  this  is  impossible  in  the  degree 
in  which  it  is  required  ;  for  dependent  and  independent  are  in  con- 
tradiction to  each  other.  But  since  the  Ego  cannot  give  up  its 
characteristic  of  absolute  self-subsistence,  there  arises  a  striving 
[on  its  part]  to  make  the  thing  known  dependent  upon  it,  so 
that  thus  it  may  bring  the  Ego  as  intelligence  into  unity  with  the 
self-positing  Ego.  And  this  is  the  meaning  of  the  expression, 
*The  reason  is  practical.'  Reason  is  not  practical  in  the  pure 
Ego,  nor  in  the  Ego  as  intelligence  ;  it  is  practical  only  in  so  far 
as  it  strives  to  unite  these  two  aspects.  .  .  .  This  union,  an 
Ego  which  through  its  self-determination  determines  at  the  same 
time  all  the  Non-Ego  (the  Idea  of  the  Deity),  is  the  final  goal  of 
the  striving.  .  .  .  This  striving  cannot  cease  until  the  goal  is 
attained."  ^ 

Here  the  Idea  of  the  Ego  is  described  in  almost  the  same 
words  which  Kant  so  often  applies  to  the  intellektiielle  Aii- 
schmiung^  "  An  Ego  which  through  its  self-determination  de- 
termines at  the  same  time  all  the  Non-Ego  "  surely  cannot  be 
regarded  as  empty  form  ;  clearly  the  ideal  is  here  conceived  as  a 
unity  of  form  and  content.  The  only  difficulty  in  the  passage  is 
that  Fichte  speaks  of  the  impossibility  of  uniting  the  two  aspects 
of  the  Ego  because  of  their  contradiction.  This  might  suggest 
that  he  inclines  here  to  Kant's  theory,  that  with  all  our  striving, 

I  See  above,  pp.  38  ff.  2  s.  W.,  I,  22  f. 

^  E.  g.,  *'  An  understanding  in  which,  through  its  self-consciousness,  all  the  man- 
ifold was  also  given,  would  perceive  "  (B,  135). 


THE  IDEA    OF   THE  EGO,  47 

we  never  make  any  real  progress  toward  the  goal.  But  since 
this  would  be  wholly  at  variance  with  all  his  other  utterances 
on  the  subject  of  progress,  we  must  seek  a  different  explanation 
of  the  statement.  Either  we  must  say  that  it  is  not  to  be 
taken  quite  literally,  that  Fichte  does  not  regard  the  contradic- 
tion as  absolute,  or  we  must  suppose  that  it  is  the  expression  of 
that  other  tendency  which  we  have  found  in  him  —  to  distin- 
guish sharply  between  the  two  aspects  of  the  Ego.  In  the  latter 
case  we  must  say  that  the  two  opposed  conceptions  of  the  Ego 
here  find  expression  in  the  same  passage  ;  but  we  shall  see  that 
this  is  not  the  only  instance  of  such  inconsistency  in  Fichte's 
writings. 

If  we  turn  now  to  the  Sittenlehre  of  1798,  we  find  again  indi- 
cations of  the  two  opposed  tendencies  in  Fichte's  thought.  Here, 
as  elsewhere,  there  is  no  trace  of  a  disposition  to  conceive  the 
ideal  as  an  artificial  union  of  form  and  matter.  Clearly  it  would 
be  impossible  for  Fichte  to  accept  Kant's  doctrine  of  the  siimmum 
bonum  as  a  mechanical  union  of  happiness  and  virtue,  for  the 
simple  reason  that  he  utterly  rejects  the  conception  of  God  as  the 
Ruler  of  the  universe.  He  conceives  of  God,  at  least  in  the 
works  of  the  first  period,  to  which  our  attention  is  at  present  con- 
fined, ^  not  as  transcendent  being,  but  as  the  immanent  principle 
of  all  conscious  life.  The  influence  of  Kant's  ethical  doctrine  is 
shown  rather  in  the  tendency  to  think  of  moral  progress  as  the 
triumph  of  form  over  content.  But  here  too  there  are  traces  of 
the  higher  conception  of  the  ideal  as  perfect  unity  of  form  and 
matter. 

In  the  Sittenlehre,  as  in  the  Kritik  der praktischen  Vernunft,  the 
dualism  of  experience  takes  the  form  of  an  opposition  between 
desire  and  the  moral  law.  The  natural  impulse  is  directed 
toward  enjoyment ;  the  higher  impulse  toward  the  self-determining 
activity  of  reason.  "  In  so  far  as  man  directs  his  efforts  toward 
mere  enjoyment  he  is  dependent  upon  a  given,  namely  upon  the 
presence  of  the  object  of  his  impulse.     Thus  he  is  not  sufficient 

1  In  limiting  this  statement  to  the  works  of  the  first  period,  I  do  not  mean  to  imply- 
that  Fichte  later  conceived  of  God  as  a  transcendent  being ;  the  restriction  is  made 
simply  because  it  is  sometimes  said  that  he  does  so  conceive  of  God  in  the  later  writ- 
ings.    The  correctness  of  this  statement  will  be  considered  in  the  next  chapter. 


48  FICHTE'S  FUNDAMEATAL   PRINCIPLE. 

unto  himself;  the  attainment  of  his  purpose  depends  also  upon 
nature.  But  in  so  far  as  man  reflects  and  thereby  becomes  sub- 
ject of  consciousness,  .  .  .  he  becomes  an  Ego,  and  there  is  man- 
ifested in  him  the  tendency  of  reason  to  determine  itself  abso- 
lutely through  itself,  as  subject  of  consciousness,  as  intelligence 
in  the  highest  sense  of  the  word."  ^  What  now  is  the  relation 
between  these  two  impulses  ?  Are  they  to  be  regarded  as  mutu- 
ally exclusive,  or  does  their  apparent  opposition  rest  upon  an 
underlying  unity  ?  Sometimes  Fichte  seems  to  hold  that  the 
opposition  is  fundamental.  But  if  it  is,  then  the  harmony  that  is 
demanded  by  the  moral  law  can  be  reached  only  by  the  annihi- 
lation of  the  lower  impulse.  The  impulse  toward  self-activity  is 
to  reign  supreme  ;  natural  desire  must  be  thwarted,  negated, 
blotted  out.  **  Only  the  pure  absolute  activity  ...  is  the  true 
Ego.  To  it  the  impulse  is  opposed  as  something  foreign  ;  [the 
impulse]  belongs  indeed  to  the  Ego,  but  it  is  not  the  Ego.  That 
activity  is  the  Ego."  ^  The  pure  impulse  "  does  not  aim  at  en- 
joyment, of  zvhatever  sort  it  may  be,  but  rather  at  regarding  all 
enjoyment  as  of  slight  value.  It  makes  enjoyment  as  enjoy- 
ment, contemptible.  It  aims  solely  at  the  asserting  of  my  dig- 
nity, which  consists  in  absolute  self-subsistence  and  self-suffi- 
ciency." ^ 

In  another  passage  Fichte  tells  us  that  the  two  impulses  are 
not  essentially  opposed,  and  yet  even  here  one  may  have  some 
doubt  whether  he  really  has  in  mind  the  conception  of  the  per- 
fect unity  of  form  and  matter.  *'  My  impulse  in  so  far  as  I  am 
a  part  of  nature,  my  tendency  in  so  far  as  I  am  pure  spirit,  are 
they  two  different  impulses  ?  No  ;  from  the  transcendental 
point  of  view  both  are  one  and  the  same  original  impulse  (  Ur- 
trieb),  which  is  my  essential  nature  ;  only,  this  impulse  is  seen 
from  two  different  sides.  In  other  words,  I  am  subject-object ; 
and  my  true  being  consists  in  the  identity  and  inseparability  of 

»s.  w.,  IV,  130. 

2  S.  W.,  IV,  140.  It  should  be  noticed  that  the  statements  which  seem  to  commit 
Fichte  to  the  theory  that  the  ideal  is  mere  form  do  not  imply  that  it  is  essentially  un- 
like consciousness.  Here,  e.  g.,  Fichte  insists  that  the  formal  aspect  of  conscious- 
ness is  its  true  nature. 

3S.  W.,IV,  142.  The  italics  are  mine.  Cf.  the  equally  strong  statement  by 
Kant  (H.,  V,  76),  quoted  above,  p.  11. 


THE  IDEA    OF   THE  EGO.  49 

these  two  aspects.  If  I  look  at  myself  as  object,  completely  de- 
termined by  the  laws  of  sensuous  perception  and  of  discursive 
thought,  then  that  which  is  really  my  sole  impulse  becomes  for 
me  natural  impulse,  because  from  this  point  of  view  I  myself  am 
nature.  If  I  look  at  myself  as  subject,  then  this  impulse  becomes 
for  me  a  purely  spiritual  one,  the  law  of  self-dependence.  All 
the  phenomena  of  the  Ego  depend  solely  upon  the  interaction  of 
these  two  impulses,  which  is  really  only  the  interaction  of  one  and 
the  same  impulse  ivith  itself.  Thus  at  last  we  have  the  answer  to 
the  question,  how  so  complete  an  opposition  as  that  which  exists 
between  these  two  impulses  can  be  found  in  a  being  that  is  to  be 
absolutely  one.  Both  impulses  are  really  one  ;  but  the  whole  of 
egohood  rests  upon  the  fact  that  they  appear  as  different ;  that; 
which  makes  the  separation  between  them  is  reflection.  .  .  . 
Both  impulses  [as  we  have  said]  constitute  one  and  the  same 
Ego.  Then  both  must  be  united  in  the  sphere  of  consciousness. 
We  shall  see  that  in  this  union  the  higher  impulse  must  give 
up  the  purity  of  its  activity  (its  freedom  from  determination  by 
an  object),  while  the  lower  must  give  up  enjoyment  as  its  aim. 
The  result  of  the  union  will  be  objective  activity,  whose  final  pur- 
pose is  absolute  freedom,  absolute  independence  of  all  nature. 
This  is  an  infinitely  distant  goal,  never  to  be  attained  ;  hence  our 
task  can  only  be  to  show  hoiv  one  must  act  in  order  to  approach 
to  this  goal.  If  one  considers  only  the  higher  faculty  of  desire, 
one  has  a  mere  metaphysics  of  ethics,  which  is  formal  and  empty. 
Only  through  the  synthetic  union  of  the  higher  with  the  lower 
faculty  of  desire,  have  we  a  theory  of  ethics  {Sittenlehre),  which 
must  be  real."  ^ 

The  interpretation  of  this  passage  is  not  an  easy  task.  In  the 
main  it  seems  to  argue  against  the  Kantian  conception  of  moral- 
ity. The  moral  law  and  natural  desire  are  not  in  fundamental 
opposition  ;  they  appear  as  contradictories,  but  in  reality  they  are 
only  two  different  aspects  of  an  underlying  unity.  But  although 
this  certainly  seems  to  be  the  general  drift  of  the  passage,  there 
are  one  or  two  sentences  that  suggest  another  interpretation. 
The  ideal  to  which  we  are  to  approximate,  Fichte  tells  us,  is 

»S.  W.,  IV,  i3of. 


50  FICHTE'S  FUNDAMENTAL   PRINCIPLE. 

"absolute  independence  of  all  nature."  The  meaning  of  the 
statement  is  not  perfectly  clear,  but  one  must  admit  that  it  at  least 
suggests  the  thought  that  if  the  ideal  were  ever  to  be  realized  we 
should  have  the  complete  annihilation  of  the  lower  impulse,  and 
consequently  what  gives  the  objective  principle  its  importance  is 
the  fact  that  the  ideal  never  can  be  realized.  If  this  interpretation 
be  correct,  one  must  also  suppose  that  in  distinguishing  between 
the  Metaphysik  dcr  Sitten  and  the  Sittenlehre,  Fichte  means  that 
the  latter  deals  with  our  actual  moral  experience  and  the  former 
with  the  nature  of  the  moral  ideal. 

There  is  a  similar  uncertainty  with  regard  to  another  discus- 
sion.^ "  The  natural  impulse,"  Fichte  tells  us,  is  directed  merely 
"  toward  enjoyment  for  the  sake  of  enjoyment ;  the  pure  impulse 
toward  absolute  independence  ...  of  the  natural  impulse, 
toward  freedom  for  the  sake  of  freedom."  Now  if  the  two  im- 
pulses are  thus  opposed,  the  ideal  of  morality,  it  would  seem,  can 
consist  only  in  the  annihilation  of  natural  desire.  Fichte  himself 
puts  it  thus  :  the  "  causality  "  of  the  pure  impulse  "  can  produce 
no  positive  action  (except  the  inner  one  of  self-determination), 
but  vci^x^Xy  inaction  {Unterlassung).  .  .  .  All  who  have  adopted 
this  purely  formal  conception  of  morality  can  come,  if  they 
are  consistent,  to  nothing  else  but  a  continuous  self-abnega- 
tion,  utter  annihilation  and  disappearance  [of  selfhood].  Thus 
the  mystics  teach  that  we  must  lose  ourselves  in  God."  At  first 
Fichte  seems  dissatisfied  with  this  conception  of  morality.  If  the 
liigher  impulse  is  really  to  be  supreme,  he  says,  the  causality  of 
-freedom  must  not  be  merely  restrictive  and  negative.  Freedom 
.must  be  positive,  the  ground  of  a  real  action.  Now  all  actual 
^willing  is  directed  toward  objects  ;  but  in  the  world  of  objects  — 
the  sense-world  —  I  can  act  only  by  satisfying  some  natural  im- 
pulse.^ Hence  the  free  will,  in  order  to  become  actual,  must  take 
natural  desire  as  its  content.  We  must  not  indeed  fall  into  the 
error  of  supposing  "■  that  the  natural  impulse  as  such  is  the  source 
of  will.  /  will,  not  nature ;  but  so  far  as  the  content  [of  the 
volition]    is  concerned,   I   can  will  nothing  except  that  which 

IS.  W.,  IV,  147  ff. 

2  "  Every  possible  concept  of  an  end  is  directed  toward  the  satisfaction  of  a  natural 
impulse  "  (p.  148). 


THE  IDEA    OF   THE  EGO.  5 1 

nature  also  would  will,  had  nature  the  power  of  willing."  Thus 
we  are  involved  in  difficulty.  Reason  demands  that  the  material, 
as  well  as  the  formal,  ground  of  action  shall  be  found  in  the  moral 
law  ;  but  "  as  a  matter  of  fact,  I  never  do  and  never  can  perform 
an  action  which  is  not  demanded  by  the  natural  impulse."  The 
only  way  of  solving  this  difficulty  is  to  say  **  that  the  matter  of 
the  act  must  in  one  and  the  same  action  conform  both  with  the 
pure  and  with  the  natural  impulse.  .  .  .  Just  as  the  two  impulses 
are  united  in  the  Urtrieb  [the  ultimate  principle],  so  must  they 
be  united  in  the  real  action." 

The  most  natural  inference  from  such  statements  is  that  Fichte 
does  not  regard  the  two  impulses  as  fundamentally  opposed ; 
but  when  he  goes  on  to  explain  his  position,  the  correctness  of 
the  inference  becomes  doubtful.  In  declaring  that  the  matter  of 
the  two  impulses  must  be  the  same,  we  mean,  he  tells  us,  some- 
thing like  this  :  "  The  purpose,  the  concept,  of  our  acting  looks 
toward  complete  freedom  from  nature  ;  but  that  the  action  is 
still  in  harmony  with  natural  impulse  is  the  result,  not  of  our 
freely  formed  concept  of  it,  but  of  our  limitation.  The  sole  de- 
termining ground  of  the  matter  of  our  actions  is  [the  purpose] 
to  shake  off  our  dependence  upon  nature,  although  the  indepen- 
dence which  is  demanded  is  never  attained.  The  pure  impulse 
aims  at  absolute  independence ;  the  action  is  in  conformity  with 
it  if  it  also  aims  at  independence,  that  is,  if  it  forms  part  of  a 
series  through  whose  continuance  the  Ego  must  become  independent. 
Now  .  .  .  the  Ego  can  never  become  independent  so  long  as  it 
is  to  be  an  Ego.  Thus  the  final  purpose  of  the  rational  being  is 
of  necessity  infinitely  distant ;  it  is  a  goal  which  he  can  never 
attain,  but  to  which,  in  consequence  of  his  spiritual  nature,  he 
must  constantly  approximate.  .  .  .  The  error  of  the  mystics  con- 
sists in  this,  that  they  represent  the  goal  (which  is  really  infinite, 
which  cannot  be  attained  in  any  period  of  time)  as  capable  of 
being  attained  in  time.  The  complete  annihilation  of  the  indi- 
vidual and  his  absorption  into  God,  into  the  absolutely  pure  form 
of  reason,  is  certainly  the  ultimate  goal  of  the  finite  reason  ;  only 
it  is  not  possible  in  any  period  of  time." 

But  though  the  moral  ideal  seems  here  to  be  conceived  as  the 


52  FICHTE'S  FUNDAMENTAL  PRINCIPLE. 

annihilation  of  natural  desire,  yet  Fichte  points  out  that  in  approx- 
imating to  it  we  must  use  this  desire  as  means  ;  moral  action  con- 
sists in  a  choice  among  our  natural  impulses.  In  every  moral  act 
'*  there  is  something  which  is  in  harmony  "  with  the  ethical  end  ; 
this  something  "is  at  the  same  time  .  .  .  demanded  by  the 
natural  impulse  ;  but  it  by  no  means  follows  that  everything  that 
the  natural  impulse  demands  is  conformable  "  to  the  law.  If  we 
represent  by  A,  B,  C,  etc.,  the  series  of  events  as  it  would  be  if 
the  natural  impulse  were  the  sole  determining  ground,  then  "by 
the  moral  choice  of  the  individual  only  a  part  of  B,  perhaps, 
is  .  .  .  made  actual."  Hence  the  series  is  not  the  same  as 
it  would  be  if  nature  were  left  to  herself  B  is  changed,  and 
"  thereby  the  natural  impulse  which  succeeds  B  is  different" 
from  what  it  would  otherwise  have  been.  Thus  "  in  every  pos- 
sible choice  the  two  impulses  meet ;  only  so  can  morality  become 
actual."  Now  in  this  actual  morality  the  higher  impulse  is  not 
the  pure  impulse  ;  its  end  {i.  e.y  its  conscious  or  proximate  end) 
is  not  "absolute  independence,"  but  a  " particular  action."  It 
"  gets  its  matter  from  the  natural  impulse  ;  i.  e.,  the  natural  im- 
pulse, which  is  synthetically  united  with  it  and  fused  into  one 
with  it,  is  directed  toward  the  same  action  —  at  least  in  part  — 
toward  which  it  is  directed.  On  the  other  hand,  its  form  is  de- 
rived solely  from  the  pure  impulse.  ...  Its  ultimate  end  ...  is 
complete  independence." 

Here  again  we  have  a  passage  that  is  not  easy  to  interpret. 
That  there  is  some  confusion  of  thought  is  probable ;  but  on  the 
other  hand  it  may  be  urged  that  there  is  also  much  sound  psy- 
chology. So  far  as  actual  moral  life  is  concerned,  Fichte  sees 
clearly  that  it  depends  constantly  upon  desire,  that  if  there  were 
no  desire  there  would  be  no  action.  Hence  moral  action  must 
be,  not  the  negation  of  all  desire,  but  the  fulfilment  of  one  desire 
rather  than  another.  This  seems  to  imply  that  in  the  completed 
moral  life,  desire  would  not  have  been  annihilated,  but  rather  per- 
fectly conformed  to  the  law.  Thus  the  ideal  would  be  an  organic 
unity  of  form  and  content. 

That  this  conception  of  the  ideal  is  logically  involved  in  what 
Fichte  says  about  actual  morality,  seems  clear.     If  morality  in- 


THE  IDEA    OF   THE  EGO.  53 

volves  the  harmonizing  of  desire  and  the  law,  and  if  it  is  at  the 
same  time,  as  Fichte  says  it  is,  an  approximation  to  the  ideal, 
then  the  ideal  must  be  the  perfect  union  of  desire  and  the  law. 
But  although  what  is  said  of  actual  moral  life  seems  to  imply- 
that  we  are  to  think  of  the  goal  of  the  process  as  a  unity  of  form 
and  content,  it  is  not  certain  that  Fichte  does  so  conceive  it  in 
this  discussion.  On  the  contrary,  when  he  speaks  of  the  goal 
itself,  his  words  suggest  that  he  is  thinking  of  it  as  pure  form  ;  the 
end  toward  which  we  are  striving  is  said  to  be  the  complete  anni- 
hilation of  the  individual,  the  absorption  of  the  finite  by  the  infinite. 
Now  it  is  obvious  that  if  we  think  of  the  ethical  ideal  thus,  we 
cannot  without  contradiction  describe  the  moral  life  as  Fichte 
here  describes  it.  If  the  ideal  is  pure  form,  then  one  of  two 
things  must  be  true  —  either  that  actual  moral  progress  con- 
sists in  the  gradual  annihilation  of  desire,  or  that  as  a  matter  of 
fact  there  is  no  moral  progress,  that  approximation  to  the  goal 
is  impossible.  The  second  of  these  alternatives  Fichte  would 
surely  reject.  He  insists  always  that  the  real  and  the  ideal  do 
not  constitute  two  utterly  distinct  realms,  but  rather  that  the 
ideal  is  the  guiding  principle  in  the  development  of  the  real. 
We  must,  then,  adopt  the  first  alternative  and  say  that  \{  the  ideal 
is  purely  formal,  the  progress  of  morality  means  the  gradual 
crushing  out  of  natural  desire. 

Apparently,  then,  what  Fichte  says  about  the  ideal  does  not 
agree  very  well  with  his  account  of  the  nature  of  actual  morality. 
In  the  one  case  he  seems  to  teach  that  the  ideal  is  empty  form, 
and  in  the  other  he  sets  forth  a  theory  which  logically  involves 
the  doctrine  that  it  is  a  unity  of  form  and  content.  In  short, 
we  find  in  the  Sittenlehre,  as  we  have  found  elsewhere,  indications 
of  two  different  conceptions  of  the  Idea  of  the  Ego. 

It  remains  to  consider  whether  this  apparent  contradiction  can 
be  resolved,  or  whether  it  must  simply  be  accepted.  In  our 
attempt  to  answer  this  question  we  should  be  on  our  guard 
against  undue  desire  to  make  Fichte  perfectly  self-consistent.  It 
is  well  to  bear  in  mind  that  the  problem  of  the  nature  of  the 
ideal  was  not  so  well  defined  for  him  as  it  is  for  us.  There  are 
a  few  questions  upon  which  he  is  very  clear.     He  never  wavers 


54  FICHTE'S  FUNDAMENTAL   PRINCIPLE, 

in  his  belief  that  there  is  a  unitary  principle  in  which  all  the 
oppositions  of  human  experience  may  be  resolved ;  and  he  is 
equally  confident  that  we  find  the  clue  to  the  nature  of  this  prin- 
ciple in  our  own  consciousness,  that  consciousness  implies  a 
deeper  unity  than  any  which  is  manifest  in  it.  It  is  also  safe  to 
say  that,  at  least  in  the  first  period,  he  conceives  of  this  unity 
both  as  the  ideal  toward  which  consciousness  is  working  and  as 
the  moving  principle  in  the  development.  But  while  he  seems 
clear  upon  these  three  points,  his  doctrine  of  the  nature  of  the 
ideal  is  not  so  well  worked  out.  Apparently  he  does  not  realize 
that  there  are  two  theories  between  which  he  must  choose,  does 
not  definitely  raise  the  question  whether  the  ideal  is  pure  form 
or  unity  of  form  and  content.  Hence  it  is  that  some  of  his  state- 
ments suggest  one  of  these  doctrines,  while  some  seem  to  com- 
mit him  to  the  other,  and  that  occasionally  the  opposed  state- 
ments are  even  found  in  the  same  passage. 

But  although  we  need  not  try  to  make  Fichte  perfectly  con- 
sistent, it  may  be  possible  to  show  that  one  of  these  theories  more 
truly  represents  his  thought  than  the  other.  There  is  one  point, 
as  yet  unnoticed,  which  suggests  that  the  opposition  between  the 
two  tendencies  is  less  serious  than  we  might  at  first  suppose. 
We  have  seen  that  the  world  of  consciousness  is  regarded  by 
Fichte  as  a  necessary  stage  in  the  realization  of  the  ideal.  Now 
consciousness,  as  he  conceives  it,  is  inevitably  dualistic  ;  it  is 
possible  only  through  the  opposition  of  a  Non-Ego  to  the  Ego. 
But  if  we  admit  this,  we  must,  according  to  him,  admit  two 
other  propositions.  In  the  first  place  we  must  say  that  conscious- 
ness exists  only  in  the  individual,  the  finite  being.  For  the  Ego 
to  which  a  Non-Ego  is  opposed,  is  the  Ego  as  finite  intelligence, 
the  Ego  as  individual,  particular,  determined.  In  the  second 
place  we  must  admit  that  in  the  fully  realized  ideal,  conscious- 
ness will  have  disappeared  ;  if  consciousness  is  impossible  without 
opposition,  then  when  the  opposition  has  been  fully  overcome, 
consciousness  as  such  can  no  longer  exist. 

The  bearing  of  this  upon  the  problem  before  us  is  evident.  If 
the  attainment  of  the  goal  means  the  disappearance  of  conscious- 
ness, and  thus  of  the  Ego  as  finite  individual,  it  is  not  hard  to 


THE  IDEA    OF   THE  EGO.  55 

understand  why  Fichte  should  speak  of  the  ideal  as  the  absorp- 
tion of  the  finite  into  the  infinite.  It  is  at  least  conceivable  that 
in  his  descriptions  of  the  infinitely  distant  goal  he  wished  to  sug- 
gest merely  the  transmutation  of  individual  consciousness,  and 
not  the  disappearance  of  all  content.  When  he  says  that  the 
finite  must  be  absorbed  into  the  infinite,  he  may  mean,  not  that 
the  goal  is  pure  form,  but  simply  that  it  is  a  unity  in  which  the 
differences  are  perfectly  harmonized.  Since  for  him  individuality, 
consciousness,  finitude,  depend  upon  the  existence  of  oppositions 
which  are  not  perfectly  harmonized,  he  tells  us  that  the  attain- 
ment of  the  goal  involves  the  disappearance  of  individuality,  the 
lapse  of  consciousness,  the  absorption  of  the  finite.  But  this  is 
not  necessarily  to  say  that  the  goal  is  mere  form.  For  although 
conscious  individuality  will  have  disappeared,  because  the  end  for 
which  it  existed  has  been  attained,  yet  it  is  not  as  if  it  had  never 
been.  The  end  of  the  process  \s>  not  identical  with  the  beginning ; 
the  unity  which  has  harmonized  and  resolved  its  differences  is 
not  the  same  as  the  unity  which  has  never  known  difference. 

It  is  possible,  I  think,  to  interpret  Fichte  in  this  way,  to  main- 
tain that  when  he  seems  to  conceive  the  goal  as  blank  identity, 
his  chief  purpose  is  to  emphasize  the  thought  that  its  attain- 
ment would  involve  the  disappearance  of  the  finite  individual  and 
thus  of  consciousness  in  his  sense  of  the  word.  And  if  this 
were  granted,  we  might  try,  with  the  help  of  this  conception,  to 
harmonize  the  various  statements  that  he  makes  with  regard  to 
the  relation  between  human  consciousness  and  its  infinitely  dis- 
tant goal.  The  ideal,  we  might  say,  is  always  conceived  as  the 
unity  of  form  and  content,  never  as  empty  form.  The  passages 
that  seem  to  suggest  the  latter  interpretation  are  to  be  under- 
stood as  asserting  simply  the  ultimate  overcoming  of  finite  indi- 
viduality, not  the  disappearance  of  content  as  such.  It  would  be 
possible,  I  say,  to  interpret  Fichte  thus,  but  I  am  not  disposed 
to  go  quite  to  this  length.  It  seems  to  me  far  better  to  admit 
the  existence  of  the  two  contradictory  tendencies  in  his  thought. 
For  while  the  suggested  interpretation  disposes  fairly  well  of  the 
inconsistencies  in  his  descriptions  of  the  ideal,  we  should  still 
have  to  explain  the  passages  in  which  he  speaks  of  the  funda- 


56  FICHTE'S  FUNDAMENTAL   PRINCIPLE. 

mental  opposition  between  the  two  aspects  of  the  Ego.  These 
seem  to  suggest  that  he  does  sometimes  tend  to  think  of  the  ideal 
as  mere  form,  or  at  least  that  he  did  not  see  very  clearly  that  it 
must  be  a  unity  of  form  and  content.  As  we  have  said,  it  is 
doubtful  whether  he  ever  really  faced  the  question  which  we 
have  been  considering,  whether  he  saw  the  problem ;  and  while 
we  are  justified  in  saying  that  the  conception  of  organic  unity  is 
more  consistent  with  the  general  principles  of  his  philosophy,  we 
may  still  admit  that  the  notion  of  blank  identity  also  had  some 
hold  upon  his  thought.  This  is  probably  due  in  large  measure 
to  the  influence  of  the  Kritik  der  praktiscJien  Vermuift^  with  its 
ascetic  conception  of  morality. 

The  only  point,  then,  upon  which  I  am  disposed  to  insist,  is 
that  we  should  not  interpret  Fichte  as  teaching  uniformly,  or 
even  predominantly,  that  the  goal  of  the  infinite  process  is  blank 
identity,  but  that  we  should  rather  recognize  that  he  usually 
rises  to  the  higher  conception  of  a  unity  which  includes  and 
preserves  all  differences  without  thereby  ceasing  to  be  a  perfect 
unity. 

There  is,  however,  one  more  question  that  suggests  itself  in 
this  connection,  the  question,  namely,  whether  the  assertion  of 
the  ultimate  disappearance  of  individuality  does  not  logically 
involve  the  doctrine  that  the  ideal  is  purely  formal.  Can  we  say, 
as  Fichte  does,  —  e.  g.,  in  the  passage  already  quoted  from  the 
Zzveite  Einleitting}  —  that  in  the  Ego  as  Idea  "individuality  has 
disappeared,"  and  yet  that  in  it  we  have  "  the  complete  matter  of 
egohood  "  ?  This  is  an  aspect  of  the  problem  which  calls  for 
careful  consideration. 

That  the  doctrine  of  the  purely  formal  nature  of  the  ideal  is 
logically  involved  in  the  assertion  of  the  ultimate  disappearance 
of  individuality,  is,  if  I  mistake  not,  the  purport  of  the  interesting 
criticism  of  Fichte' s  Idea  which  is  made  by  Professor  Seth 
Pringle-Pattison.  **  Morality,"  he  says,  "  becomes  illusory,  if  it 
is  represented  as  the  pursuit  of  a  goal  whose  winning  would  be 
suicidal  to  morality  itself,  and  to  all  conscious  life.  .  .  .  We 
may  well   .   .   .   withdraw  our  eyes  from  the  goal,  if  we  are  not  to 

'  See  above,  pp.  38  ff. 


T//E  IDEA    OF   THE  EGO.  57 

lose  heart  for  the  race.  Fichte's  account,  in  short,  leaves  no 
permanent  reality  in  the  universe  whatever.  The  world  is  hung, 
as  it  were,  between  two  vacuities  —  between  the  pure  or  Absolute 
Ego,  on  the  one  hand,  which  is  completely  empty  apart  from  the 
finite  individuals  whom  it  constitutes,  and  '  the  Idea  of  the  Ego,' 
on  the  other,  which  is  admittedly  unattainable,  and,  if  attainable, 
would  be  a  total  blank,  the  collapse  of  all  conscious  life."  ^ 

It  may  be  that  I  am  wrong  in  interpreting  Professor  Pringle- 
Pattison  as  I  have  done ;  but  at  any  rate  the  objection  which  I 
suppose  him  to  be  raising  is  one  which  might  naturally  enough 
be  raised,  and  which  it  will  therefore  be  well  to  consider.  What 
Fichte  himself  would  say  upon  this  point,  we  may  infer,  I  think, 
from  some  statements  that  he  made  in  attempting  to  defend  him- 
self against  the  charge  of  atheism.  The  article  which  furnished 
the  immediate  occasion  of  the  attack  upon  his  orthodoxy  is  en- 
titled Uber  den  Griind  unseres  Glaubens  an  eine  gottliche  Welt- 
regieining  (1798).  In  this  work  he  describes,  in  somewhat 
popular  form,  his  conception  of  the  ultimate  principle  as  the  ideal 
of  human  experience.  The  principle  is  designated  as  *  God,'  but 
it  is  clear  that  the  term,  as  here  used,  is  synonymous  with  *  the 
Idea  of  the  Ego.*  The  belief  in  a  divine  government  of  the 
world,  Fichte  tells  us,  cannot  be  justified  from  the  ordinary  point 
of  view,  which  takes  the  world  as  thing-in-itself,  independent  of 
consciousness,  and  yet  conceives  of  God  as  its  creator.  But  from 
the  transcendental  point  of  view,  in  which  the  sense-world  is 
regarded  as  the  manifestation  of  a  spiritual  principle,  as  having 
existence  only  in  relation  to  the  self,  the  belief  in  a  divine  world- 
order  is  intelligible.  The  moral  consciousness,  the  consciousness 
of  the  self  as  principle  of  activity,  is  our  starting-point.  The 
sense-world  has  meaning  only  as  the  sphere  in  which  this  activity 
displays  itself;  it  exists  simply  that  the  ideal  may  become  real, 
or  as  Fichte  puts  it,  that  the  moral  world-order  may  be  estab- 
lished. "■  Our  world  is  the  material  of  our  duty,  presented  to  us 
in  sensuous  form."^  According  to  this  view  God  is  not  sub- 
stance.    The  *'  living  and  working  moral  order  is  itself  God ;  we 

'  Hej;elianism  and  Personality  (2d  edition,  Edinburgh,  1893),  58  f. 
2  '*  Das  versinnlichte  Materiale  unserer  Pflicht "'  (S.  W.,  V,  185). 


58  FICHTE'S  FUNDAMENTAL   PRINCIPLE. 

need  no  other  God  and  can  conceive  no  other.  Reason  does  not 
justify  us  in  going  beyond  this  moral  world-order  and  assuming 
(by  an  inference  from  the  grounded  to  the  ground)  a  particular 
being  (Weseti)  as  its  cause."  ^ 

Now  this  divine  order  must  not  be  regarded  as  completely 
existent ;  it  is  a  progressively  developing  order  ;  it  is  gradually 
**  built  up  by  right-doing."  And  further,  if  we  conceive  God 
thus,  we  cannot  say  that  he  has  personality  and  consciousness. 
For  I  know  personality  and  consciousness  only  as  I  see  them  in 
myself,  the  finite  rational  being.  If  we  attribute  these  finite  pred- 
icates to  God,  we  make  of  him  a  being  like  ourselves.  "  The 
concept  of  God  as  a  particular  substance  is  impossible  and  con- 
tradictory." ^ 

As  is  well  known,  the  publication  of  this  article  subjected 
Fichte  to  the  charge  of  atheism.  Accordingly,  in  a  later  discus- 
sion, he  makes  an  effort  to  explain  his  meaning.  In  the  Gericht- 
liche  Verantwortung  gegen  die  Anklage  des  Atheismiis  he  reverts 
to  his  statement  that  we  may  not  ascribe  personality  and  con- 
sciousness to  God.  He  begs  his  readers  not  to  overlook  the 
distinction  on  which  this  assertion  rests.  **  I  am  speaking,"  he 
says,  "  of  our  own  conceptual  consciousness,  and  am  pointing  out 
that  its  concept  necessarily  involves  the  notion  of  limitations,  and 
that  therefore  this  concept  of  consciousness  cannot  be  applied  to 
God.  Only  in  this  respect,  only  in  respect  to  the  limitations  and 
the  conceivability  which  results  from  the  fact  of  limitation,  have 
I  denied  that  God  has  consciousness.  As  to  its  matter  —  I  am 
trying  to  express  the  inconceivable  as  well  as  I  can  —  as  to  its 
matter,  the  Godhead  is  pure  consciousness ;  it  is  intelligence, 
pure  intelligence,  spiritual  life  and  activity.  But  to  comprehend 
this  intelligence  in  a  concept  and  to  describe  the  way  in  which  it 
knows  itself  and  others  is  utterly  impossible."  ^ 

From  this  declaration  it  would  appear  that  Fichte  does  not 
himself  believe  that  the  lapse  of  individual  consciousness  would 
involve  the  disappearance  of  content.  The  opposition  of  subject 
and  object  is  essential  to  individuality  and  consciousness  as  he 
uses  the  terms  ;  hence  in  the  perfect  unity  which  is  the  goal  of  all 

IS.  W.,  V,  i86.  2S.  VV.,  V,  i88.  'S.  W.,  V,  266. 


THE  IDEA    OF   THE  EGO.  59 

our  striving,  individuality  and  consciousness  will  be  done  away. 
But  this  does  not  necessarily  imply  that  the  goal  is  a  total  blank. 
On  the  contrary,  Fichte  would  say,  it  means  that  the  goal  is  a 
higher  stage  than  consciousness,  a  stage  in  which  all  content  is 
somehow  preserved,  although  its  oppositions  have  been  recon- 
ciled. The  question  of  terminology  is,  of  course,  of  slight  im- 
portance. We  may,  if  we  like,  describe  this  perfect  unity  as  a 
higher  form  of  consciousness  ;  and  in  this  case  we  should  say 
that  unreconciled  oppositions  are  characteristic,  not  of  conscious- 
ness as  such,  but  of  its  lower  form,  of  human  consciousness. 
Fichte  himself,  as  we  have  seen,  prefers  to  keep  the  word  *  con- 
sciousness '  for  the  stage  of  unreconciled  oppositions,  and  hence 
cannot  speak  of  the  goal  as  a  higher  form  of  consciousness.  But 
this  does  not  justify  us  in  supposing  that  he  conceives  it  on  the 
analogy  of  the  unconscious.  To  think  of  it  thus  would  be  to 
make  it  dead  being,  whereas  Fichte  always  declares  that  the 
fundamental  principle  of  his  philosophy  is  life  and  activity.  Evi- 
dently his  meaning  is  that  in  so  far  as  it  differs  from  conscious- 
ness, it  is  not  lower,  but  higher.  Experience  is  steadily  work- 
ing toward  the  point  at  which  the  dualism  of  subject  and  object 
shall  be  surmounted.  If  this  point  were  ever  reached,  we  should 
see  beyond  the  dualism,  should  apprehend  subject  and  object  in 
their  true  relations.  Now  Fichte  gives  the  name  of  *  conscious- 
ness '  to  the  stage  in  which  we  do  not  see  beyond  the  opposition  ; 
hence  he  says  that  in  the  completed  ideal,  consciousness  will 
have  disappeared.  But  this  hardly  justifies  us  in  maintaining 
that  the  goal  of  the  process  is  a  blank  identity. 

I  am  aware  that  this  is  a  point  which  will  not  bear  much  labor- 
ing. One  accepts  it  or  one  does  not,  but  in  either  case  there  is 
little  room  for  discussion.  Many  will  doubtless  deny  Fichte's 
right  to  the  concept  of  what,  in  default  of  a  better  word,  we  may 
call  *  the  supra-conscious.'  According  to  their  view  there  are 
simply  the  alternatives  of  conscious  individuality,  as  we  know  it, 
which  involves  the  opposition  of  subject  and  object,  and  the  total 
blank,  pure  nothingness.  Fichte  maintains,  and  it  seems  to  me 
rightly,  that  there  is  a  third  possibility  —  a  unity  of  subject  and 
object  which  yet  is  not  a  blank,  but  which,  on  the  contrary,  is 
richer  and  fuller  than  the  stage  that  he  calls  consciousness. 


6o  FICHTE'S  FUNDAMENTAL   PRINCIPLE. 

It  must  be  remembered,  however,  that  this  third  possibiHty  is 
only  a  possibility  for  thought,  that,  according  to  Fichte's  doctrine, 
the  supra-conscious  is  an  ideal  that  can  never  be  fully  actualized. 
It  does  not  describe  for  us  a  world  which  now  is,  or  which  ever 
will  be,  actual ;  but  it  does  help  us  to  understand,  in  some  meas- 
ure, the  trend  of  the  world-process. 

It  is  matter  for  regret  that  Fichte  never  worked  out  his  doc- 
trine of  the  nature  of  individuality,  so  that  one  might  say  with 
some  confidence  what  he  means  by  declaring  that  the  **  ultimate 
goal  of  the  finite  reason  "  is  *'  the  complete  annihilation  of  the 
individual  and  his  absorption  into  God,"  '  or  that  the  "  unattain- 
able ideal"  is  the  inclusion  of  "all  individuals  ...  in  the  one 
great  unity  of  the  pure  spirit."  ^  Fortunately,  however,  we  may 
get  from  a  few  passages  in  the  works  of  the  second  period,  a  hint 
as  to  the  nature  of  individuality,  which  may  help  us  to  under- 
stand better  this  concept  of  the  ideal.  In  general,  we  have  lim- 
ited ourselves,  in  the  present  chapter,  to  the  writings  of  the  first 
period  ;  but  in  this  particular  case  it  seems  better  to  make  an 
exception  to  our  rule  and  to  avail  ourselves  at  once  of  whatever 
aid  the  later  writings  may  furnish.  The  passages  in  question  are 
of  such  a  nature  that  we  do  not  need  to  discuss  the  doctrine  of 
the  second  period  in  order  to  understand  them ;  and  they  are 
more  closely  connected  with  our  present  problem  than  with  any- 
thing that  we  shall  take  up  in  the  succeeding  chapter. 

In  the  works  of  the  second  period  in  which  Fichte  develops 
his  Geschichtsphilosophie^  emphasis  is  laid  upon  the  thought  that 
history  involves  the  constant  production  of  the  new."*  Whereas 
the  philosophy  of  the  French  Enlightenment  tended,  Fichte 
thought,  to  regard  history  as  moving  in  cycles,  so  that  in  any 
given  period  the  race  repeats  the  experiences  of  some  earlier 
period,^  he  himself  maintains  that  history  means  the  continual 

^  Die  Sittenlehre  (1798),  S.  W.,  IV,  151. 

2  Ober  die  WUrcie  des  Menschen,  S.  W.,  I,  416,  with  note. 

^  Die  Grimdz'ure  des ge^enwdrtigen  Zeitalters,  Die  Reden  an  die  deutsche  N'ation, 
and  others. 

*  This  point  has  been  well  brought  out  in  the  interesting  monograph  by  Natalie 
Wipplinger,  entitled,  Der  Entwickelungs-Begriff  bei Fichte  (Freiburger  Dissertation, 
Leipzig,  1900).     See  especially  pp.  73  ff. 

^  Cf.,  e.  g.,  Reden  an  die  deutsche  Nation,  5.  W.,  VII,  367  f. 


THE  IDEA    OF   THE  EGO.  6 1 

appearance  of  new  values,  the  realization  of  the  Idea  in  unique 
forms.  **  For  me,"  he  cries  out  in  the  Bestimnumg  des  Menschen, 
"  the  universe  is  no  longer,  as  formerly,  that  circle  returning  into 
itself,  that  play  of  ceaseless  self-repetition,  that  monster  which 
devours  itself  only  to  bring  itself  to  the  birth  again  ;  before  my 
gaze  it  is  now  spiritualized  and  bears  the  characteristic  stamp  of 
the  spirit  —  constant  progress  toward  the  more  perfect  in  a 
straight  line  which  goes  out  to  infinity."  ^ 

It  is  in  connection  with  this  doctrine  of  history  as  the  produc- 
tion of  the  new,  that  Fichte  gives  us  some  hints  with  regard  to 
the  nature  of  the  individual  which  are  of  importance  for  our  pur- 
pose. In  the  first  place,  the  mere  insistence  upon  the  thought 
that  the  Idea  of  the  Ego,  or  as  Fichte  more  often  designates  it 
in  the  later  writings,  the  divine  Idea,  is  continually  realizing  itself 
in  rinv  forms,  seems  to  show  that  the  goal  is  not  conceived  as  the 
disappearance  of  all  content.  But  this  general  consideration  is 
supplemented  by  some  definite  statements  as  to  the  nature  of 
individuality  which  suggest  that  the  progress  of  the  race  does  not 
consist  in  doing  away  with  individual  differences,  but  rather  in 
developing  them.  We  are  told  more  than  once  that  each  person 
has  his  peculiar  vocation,  which  no  one  save  himself  can  perform. 
"  Man  ought  to  be  and  do  something  ;  his  life  in  time  ought  to 
leave  behind,  in  the  world  of  spirit,  a  result  that  is  undying  and 
eternal.  The  life  of  every  particular  individual  is  to  have  a  par- 
ticular result,  .  .  .  demanded  of  him  alone."  ^  *'  I,  .  .  .  this 
particular  .  .  .  person,  am  here  and  am  come  into  existence 
for  this  purpose,  that  in  me  God's  eternal  decree  as  to  the  world 
may  be  thought  out  in  the  time-process  in  a  new  and  as  yet 
wholly  unknown  way."  ^ 

But  how  are  we  to  reconcile  this  thought  with  the  doctrine 
that  individuality  would  disappear  if  the  Idea  of  the  Ego  were 
ever  completely  actualized?  In  so  far  as  Fichte  answers  this 
question,  it  is  by  pointing  out  that  there  are  two  different  senses 
in  which  we  may  use  the  word  '  individuality.'  The  distinction 
is  brought  out  most  clearly  in  a  striking  passage  in  the  Grundzuge 

IS.  W.,  II,  317.  2  Das  Wesen  des  Gehhrten  (1805),  S.  VV.,  VI,  383  f. 

5(9/.  «•/.,  S.  W.,  VI,  386. 


62  FICHTE'S  FUNDAMENTAL   PRINCIPLE. 

des gegejiivdrtigen  Zeitalters.  In  many  places  in  this  work,  Fichte 
has  insisted  that  all  personal  interests  must  be  sacrificed  to  the 
one  great  purpose  of  the  realization  of  the  divine  Idea.  This  is 
quite  in  keeping  with  the  doctrine  of  the  Sittenlehre  of  1798, 
which  demands  as  strenuously  as  the  Kantian  ethics,  that  all 
individual  desires  shall  be  subordinated  to  the  moral  law.  But 
in  the  passage  in  the  Grundzuge  to  which  we  have  referred, 
Fichte  explains  his  meaning  thus.  If  the  critic  maintain  that 
"■  our  unconditioned  condemnation  of  all  individuality  cannot  be 
reconciled "  with  the  thought  that  individuality  is  something 
*'  beautiful  and  lovable,"  he  '*  has  simply  failed  to  notice  that  by 
individuality  we  mean  merely  the  personal,  sensuous  existence  of 
the  individual.  In  no  sense  do  we  deny,  on  the  contrary  we 
expressly  affirm  and  emphasize,  the  thought  that  the  one  eternal 
Idea,  in  every  individual  in  whom  it  breaks  forth  into  life,  reveals 
itself  in  a  wholly  new  form,  which  never  has  been  before.  And 
it  does  this  quite  independently  of  the  sensuous  nature,  through 
itself,  by  its  own  decree.  It  is,  then,  by  no  means  determined 
by  the  sensuous  individuality.  On  the  contrary,  it  negates  this 
sensuous  individuality,  and  solely  of  itself  determines  the  ideal 
individuality,  or  more  correctly,  originality."  ^ 

What  now  is  the  meaning  of  the  distinction  that  Fichte  makes 
in  this  passage  ?  If  I  understand  him,  it  is  this.  The  divine 
Idea,  as  self-realizing  principle,  manifests  itself  to  some  degree, 
attains  to  partial  actualization,  in  every  individual  life ;  but  it  is 
more  fully  realized  in  some  lives  than  in  others.  From  time  to 
time  there  appear,  among  the  children  of  men,  lives  which  are  so 
wholly  given  up  to  the  divine  Idea  —  so  completely  under  the 

1  S.  W.,  VII,  69.  With  this  may  be  compared  another  passage  in  the  same  work 
(p.  no),  in  which  Fichte  tells  us  that  in  order  to  be  perfect,  a  work  of  art  must  have 
a  "clarity  .  .  .  and  transparency  untroubled  by  individuality  or  anything  else  that 
is  not  pure  art.  .  .  .  The  individuality  of  the  artist,  by  means  of  which  we  can 
understand  his  work  more  intimately,"  is  *'  as  such,  never  a  sensuous,  but  an  ideal" 
individuality.  That  Fichte  makes  this  distinction  between  the  sensuous  and  the  non- 
sensuous  individuality,  has  been  pointed  out  by  Lask  {Fichtes  Idealismus  und  die 
Geschichte,  Tubingen  und  Leipzig,  1902,  203  ff. )  and  by  Maria  Raich  {Fichte,  seine 
Ethik  und  seine  Stellung  zum  Problem  des  Individualismus,  Tubingen,  1905,  152  ff. ). 
In  my  interpretation  of  the  relation  between  the  two  kinds  of  individuality  and  of  the 
meaning  of  Fichte' s  assertion  that  the  lower  individuality  must  be  suppressed,  I  think 
that  I  have  added  something  to  the  discussions  found  in  these  two  works. 


THE  IDEA    OF   THE  EGO.  63 

sway  of  their  ideals  —  that  they  are  in  a  pecuHar  sense  the  vehicle 
of  its  manifestation.  In  all  ages,  says  Fichte,  men  have  lived  and 
died  for  the  sake  of  ideas  ;  and  through  such  living  and  dying  has 
come  into  being  *'all  that  is  great  and  good  in  our  present-day 
civihzation."  ^  Now  when  a  human  life  surrenders  itself  thus  to 
the  Idea,  when  it  becomes  merely  the  mouthpiece  through  which 
the  universal  reason  may  speak,  then  we  have  always  a  man  of 
strongly  marked  characteristics,  a  unique  personality.  The  divine 
life,  in  its  infinite  fulness,  has  no  need  to  repeat  itself  in  any  of  its 
manifestations.  Rather  does  it  pour  itself  out,  through  each 
person  who  has  devoted  himself  to  it,  in  a  distinctive  form,  which 
never  has  been  before,  which  never  will  be  again.  Thus  the  self- 
manifestation  of  absolute  reason  in  a  human  life  does  not  involve 
the  suppression  of  individual  difference.  On  the  contrary,  it  is 
precisely  the  man  whose  Hfe  most  perfectly  embodies  the  Idea, 
who  has  the  richest,  most  distinctive  personality.  But  if  it  be 
true  that  the  indwelling  of  the  Idea  creates  individuality,  what  is 
the  sort  of  individuality  whose  doing  away  is  the  condition  of  all 
progress  ?  It  is  individuality  in  the  sense  of  absorption  in  one's 
petty  personal  interests.  An  individuality  which  finds  its  reason 
for  being  in  personal  enjoyment,  in  the  gratification  of  its  own 
desires,  this  is  the  *  sensuous  *  kind,  whose  suppression  is  abso- 
lutely necessary  to  progress.  Upon  this  point  Fichte  is  uncom- 
promising :  the  utter  subordination  of  personal  ease  and  enjoy- 
ment to  ideal  considerations,  the  surrender  of  the  whole  self  to 
the  guidance  of  the  Idea  —  this  'annihilation,'  as  he  calls  it,  of 
the  lower  individuality  is  the  indispensable  condition  of  the  attain- 
ment of  the  higher.^  Herein  consists  the  paradox  of  personality  : 
'  He  that  loseth  his  individuality  shall  find  it.' 

'^  Die  Grundzuge  des  gegenwdrtigen  Zeitalters^  S.  W.,  VII,  41. 

^  Cf.  the  following  passages:  "The  Idea  .  .  .  pours  itself  out  into  the  personal 
life  of  him  [who  has  surrendered  himself  to  it],  destroying  all  his  sensuous  im- 
pulses and  desires;  and  the  man  is  artist,  hero,  scientist,  or  saint"  {^Die  Grund- 
zuge des  gegenwdrtigen  Zeiialters,  S.  W.,  VII,  II9).  **The  love  for  the  Idea  dwells 
in  him  and  constitutes  his  personality.  .  .  .  The  eternal  divine  Idea  here  comes  into 
existence  in  particular  human  individuals.  This  existence  of  the  divine  Idea  in  them 
encompasses  itself  with  inexpressible  love.  Then  we  say,  speaking  according  to  the 
appearance,  *  This  man  loves  the  Idea  and  lives  in  the  Idea,'  whereas  in  truth  it  is  the 
Idea  itself  which  lives  and  loves  itself,  in  his  stead  and  in  his  person,  and  his  person 
in  no  sense  exists  or  lives  in  and  for  itself,  but  is  merely  the  appearance,  in  sensuous 


64  FICHTE'S  FUNDAMENTAL  PRINCIPLE. 

It  is  important  to  distinguish  at  this  point  between  what  Fichte 
means  by  the  surrender  of  the  self  to  the  absolute  reason  and 
what  is  ordinarily  called  altruism.  To  the  best  of  my  knowl- 
edge, Fichte  nowhere  makes  this  distinction  very  clear,  and  much 
of  what  he  says  about  the  suppression  of  individuality  may  seem 
to  involve  the  denial  of  such  a  distinction.  Nevertheless,  I  think 
we  shall  see  that  his  doctrine  of  the  two  kinds  of  individuality 
really  requires  us  to  say  that  the  self-surrender  to  the  Idea  and 
the  conscious  devotion  of  one's  life  to  the  service  of  the  race  are 
not  perfectly  synonymous  phrases. 

It  is  true,  as  we  have  just  admitted,  that  Fichte  sometimes 
speaks  as  if  there  were  no  difference  between  these  two  concep- 
tions. ^.  ^.,  he  describes  the  Idea  as  "the  living  and  active 
thought  .  .  .  which  is  never  directed  toward  the  single  person, 
but  always  includes  the  race."  ^  Again,  he  says,  "  Reason  aims 
at  the  one  life,  which  appears  as  the  life  of  the  race.  If  from  the 
human  life  we  take  away  reason,  there  remains  only  individuality 
and  the  love  of  individuality:  The  rational  life,  then,  consists  in 
this,  that  the  person  forget  himself  in  the  race,  identify  his  life 
with  that  of  the  whole,  and  sacrifice  his  life  to  the  whole.  The 
irrational  life,  on  the  other  hand,  consists  in  this,  that  the  person 
think  of  nothing  but  himself,  love  nothing  but  himself,  .  .  . 
identify  his  whole  life  merely  with  his  own  personal  well-being. 

form,  of  this  existence  of  the  Idea.  ...  In  the  true  scholar  the  Idea  has  won  a 
sensuous  life  which  has  completely  annihilated  and  absorbed  his  personal  life.  He 
does  not  love  the  Idea  more  than  all  else  —  he  loves  nothing  but  it.  .  .  .  It  alone  is 
the  source  of  all  his  joys  and  pleasures,  it  alone  is  the  moving  principle  of  all  his 
thoughts,  endeavors,  and  actions"  {^Das  Wesen  des  Gelehrten^  1805,  S.  W,,  VI, 
356).  When  the  Idea  "  attains  to  life"  in  a  human  being,  *' it  works  irresistibly 
through  its  own  inner  life,  not  through  the  individual's.  .  .  .  Every  one  whom  it  has 
really  seized  upon,  it  drives  forward  against  the  will  and  desire  of  the  personal,  sen- 
suous nature  in  him,  using  him  as  a  passive  instrument.  .  .  .  Wholly  of  itself  and 
without  needing  assistance  from  the  intention  of  the  person  himself,  it  ceaselessly 
acts  and  develops  itself  till  it  has  won  the  living  and  influential  form  which  it  can  win 
in  this  case"  {Op.  cii.,  S.  W.,  VI,  377). 

That  a  work  of  genius  often  seems  to  its  creator  the  product  of  a  power  which  is 
not  his  own,  is  vouched  for  by  the  testimony  of  many.  Cf.,e.g.,  George  Eliot's 
statement  to  her  husband.  **  She  told  me,"  he  says,  '*  that,  in  all  that  she  considered 
her  best  writing,  there  was  a  *  not-herself,'  which  took  possession  of  her,  and  that  she 
felt  her  own  personality  to  be  merely  the  instrument  through  which  this  spirit,  as  it 
were,  was  acting"  {George  Eliot^s  Life^  edited  by  J.  W.  Cross,  Chap.  XIX). 

^  Die  Grundziige  des  gegenwdriigen  Zeitalters,  S.  W.,  VII,  1 1 9. 


THE  IDEA  'OF   THE  EGO.  65 

.  .  .  There  is  only  one  virtue  —  to  forget  yourself  as  person  — 
and  only  one  vice  —  to  think  of  yourself"  ^ 

But  though  Fichte  seems,  in  these  and  other  passages,  to 
identify  the  true  life  with  altruistic  conduct,  this  is  not  his  whole 
meaning.  The  true  life  consists  in  the  surrendering  of  personal 
interests  for  the  sake  of  that  which  we  recognize  as  a  *  Higher 
than  Happiness,'  whatever  guise  this  *  Higher'  may  wear.  The 
poet  whose  love  for  his  art  leads  him  *'  to  scorn  delights  and  live 
laborious  days,"  may  have  no  definite  purpose  of  serving  his 
fellow-men  ;  probably,  so  far  as  his  intent  goes,  he  does  not  live 
for  mankind — just  as  he  does  not  live  for  himself — but  solely 
for  his  art.  And  yet,  if  he  but  serve  his  art  with  purity  of  pur- 
pose, we  see  in  him  precisely  that  devotion  of  the  personal  life  to 
an  ideal  which  Fichte  lauds  so  highly.  It  is  not  essential  that 
one  should  think  of  others ;  the  essential  is  that  one  should  for- 
get self  And  there  is  no  question  that  the  devotion  of  one's  Hfe 
to  the  service  of  some  great  ideal  often  involves  a  certain  detach- 
ment from  the  life  of  the  community.  To  work  consciously  for 
the  sake  of  humanity  may  often  be  to  defeat  the  highest  aims  of 
art  and  science. 

And  yet  we  cannot  suppose  that  there  is  any  real  contradic- 
tion between  the  service  of  the  ideal  and  the  service  of  one's  fel- 
low-men. Surely  it  is  by  our  fidelity  to  our  ideals  that  we  most 
certainly  further  the  progress  of  the  race.  What  Fichte  would 
say,  I  think,  is  that  whenever  a  life  has  surrendered  itself  to  the 
guidance  of  the  Idea,  it  does  inevitably  contribute  to  the  prog- 
ress of  the  race,  whether  there  be  any  definite  purpose  to  do  so 
or  not.  That  the  conscious  devotion  of  the  individual  may  be 
to  aesthetic  or  intellectual  ideals  rather  than  to  the  service  of 
humanity,  is  occasionally  suggested  by  Fichte  himself.  "  The 
life  of  the  race  is  expressed  in  the  Ideas.  .  .  .  The  formula  which 
we  used  above,  '  to  identify  one's  life  with  the  race,'  may  also  be 
expressed^  *  to  identify  one's  life  with  the  Ideas.'  For  the  Ideas 
are  directed  to  the  race  as  such  and  to  its  life  ;  and  thus  the 
rational  —  and  hence  right,  good,  and  true  life  —  consists  in  this, 
that  one  forget  oneself  in  the  Ideas,  that  one  desire  and  know  no 


(9/.  «V.,  S.  W.,  VII,  34  f,     Cf.  36  f. 


66  FICHTE'S  FUNDAMENTAL   PRINCIPLE. 

other  joy  than  that  which  comes  from  them  and  from  sacrificing 
all  the  other  joy  in  life  for  their  sake."  ^  And  again  :  "  They 
identified  .  .  .  their  personal  life  and  their  joy  with  the  Idea, 
and  through  this  Idea  with  the  race."  ^ 

It  may  be  remarked  also  that,  according  to  the  doctrine  of  the 
Wissenschaftslehre.iho.  human  race  is  not,  strictly  speaking,  an  end 
in  itself,  but  a  means  to  the  realization  of  the  end.  The  end  is 
the  actualization  of  the  Idea  of  the  Ego,  or,  in  other  words,  the 
realizing  of  absolute  values.  The  human  race  and  human  history 
are  the  means  to  the  attainment  of  this  end.  Hence,  strictly 
speaking,  the  devotion  of  oneself  to  the  Idea,  the  constant  effort 
to  realize  the  supreme  values  through  the  medium  of  one's  per- 
sonal life,  is  the  fundamental  attitude,  and  devotion  to  the  service 
of  humanity  a  subordinate  form  of  it. 

It  seems  to  me,  then,  that  we  are  not  justified  in  saying  that 
by  the  higher  individuality  Fichte  means  the  conscious  surrender 
of  all  personal  interests  for  the  sake  of  humanity,  but  that  we 
must  rather  say  that  he  means  the  domination  of  the  individual 
life  by  some  great  idea.  That  this  conception  does  not  ade- 
quately describe  the  individuality  of  all  the  great  ones  of  the 
earth,  must  be  admitted.  There  are  many  instances  of  genius 
—  that  of  Goethe  is  one  of  the  most  striking  —  in  which  self- 
feeling  seems  to  have  been  developed  to  a  remarkable  degree, 
and  which  could  not  without  some  forcing  be  described  as  the 
domination  of  the  personality  by  the  Idea.  But  at  any  rate 
there  can  be  no  question  that  our  interpretation  of  Fichte's  con- 
ception corresponds  much  more  nearly  to  what  we  mean  by 
genius  than  the  interpretation  which  identifies  the  higher  indi- 
viduality with  the  conscious  service  of  the  race. 

These  suggestions  as  to  the  nature  of  individuality,  which  we 
have  found  in  the  works  of  the  second  period,  may  help  us  to 
understand  in  part  what  Fichte  may  have  meant  in  the  first  period 
by  the  annihilation  of  individuality.  Probably  the  chief  thing  that 
he  meant,  was  that  overcoming  of  the  petty  personal  pomt  of  view 
which  is  at  once  the  condition  and  the  result  of  high  endeavor. 

^  Die  Grundzii'Te  des  gegmzvdrti-^en  Zeit alters,  S.  W.,  VII,  37. 
2  0/.  «■/.,  S.  W.,  VII,  45<'- 


THE   IDEA    OF   THE  EGO,  67 

The  forgetting  of  one's  private  interests  in  the  pursuit  of  a  great 
ideal  is  precisely  what  he  calls,  in  one  of  the  passages  already 
quoted  from  the  Grundzuge  des  gegenwdrtigen  Zeit alters,  the 
"annihilation  of  the  sensuous  individuality."^ 

But  can  we  suppose  that  this  is  all  that  he  means  ?  Does  not 
his  doctrine  that  individuahty  and  consciousness  imply  oppo- 
sition, require  us  to  say  that  the  infinitely  distant  goal  is  not 
merely  the  complete  subordination  of  self-regarding  impulses, 
but  the  disappearance  of  consciousness  itself?  In  a  sense  we 
must  certainly  say  this ;  but,  as  has  been  already  urged,  we  are 
not  bound  to  suppose  that  the  disappearance  of  consciousness, 
in  Fichte's  sense  of  '  consciousness,'  involves  its  disappearance 
in  every  sense.  It  is  probable  that  for  Fichte  the  goal  means 
what  most  of  us  would  call  a  higher  form  of  consciousness  — 
an  experience  in  which  all  sense  of  opposition  and  foreignness 
has  vanished,  in  which  self-feehng  — the  feehng  of  self  as  a  unit, 
an  isolated  individual  —  has  disappeared.  While  we  cannot  say 
with  any  definiteness  what  this  higher  form  may  be,  yet  cer- 
tain states  which  we  do  experience  give  us  a  clue  to  its 
nature.  In  aesthetic  rapture,  in  religious  ecstasy,  in  the  highest 
forms  of  intellectual  activity,  there  is  often  a  submergence  of  the 
distinct  consciousness  of  self,  a  blurring  of  the  line  of  division 
between  subject  and  object,  which  gives  us  a  suggestion  of  what 
Fichte  may  mean  by  the  disappearance  of  consciousness  as  the 
goal  of  all  our  striving.  Certainly  we  must  admit  that  in  such 
experiences  the  oppositions  of  life  are  overcome  to  a  much 
greater  degree  than  ordinarily  ;  and  certainly  also  we  must 
admit  that  these  moments  represent  the  height  of  our  attain- 
ment and  may  therefore  be  taken  as  furnishing  faint  glimpses 
of  the  infinitely  distant  goal,  toward  which  the  world-process 
is  tending. 

We  have  now  finished  our  study  of  Fichte's  conception  of  the 
ultimate  principle  as  it  is  found  in  the  earlier  works.  One  or 
two  questions  which  might  naturally  enough  have  been  treated 
here,  will  be  considered  instead,  as  a  matter  of  convenience,  in 
the  following  chapter.     The  discussion  in  Chapter  III,  it  may  be 

»  "  Die  sinnliche  Individualitat  vernichtend. "     (S.  W.,  VII,  69.) 


r^^\  >?  '^^ 


68  FICHTE'S  FUNDAMENTAL   PRINCIPLE. 

hoped,  will  throw  additional  light  upon  Fichte's  conception  of 
the  ultimate  principle  as  the  Idea  which  is  gradually  realizing 
itself  in  the  world,  and  upon  the  problem  of  the  relation  between 
this  Idea  and  the  process  of  its  self-realization. 


CHAPTER  III. 
The  Works  of  the  Second  Period  :  Being  and  Existence. 

In  the  preceding  chapter  we  discussed  in  some  detail  the  con- 
ception of  the  ultimate  principle  as  it  is  found  in  Fichte's  earlier 
writings.  Our  present  task  is  to  compare  this  conception  with 
that  which  appears  in  the  later  works.  The  question  of  the  rela- 
tion between  the  two  forms  of  Fichte's  philosophy  is  one  which 
has  often  been  discussed  and  upon  which  widely  different  opinions 
have  been  held.  Some  have  maintained  that  in  the  later  writings 
we  find  a  complete  abandonment  of  the  fundamental  doctrines  of 
the  earlier,  while  others  declare  that  there  is  no  essential  differ- 
ence between  the  two  periods.  When  there  is  so  great  disagree- 
ment in  a  matter  of  interpretation,  one  often  finds  that  the  truth 
lies  somewhere  between  the  extreme  views  ;  and  with  regard  to 
the  relation  between  the  two  phases  of  Fichte's  philosophy,  this 
seems  to  be  the  case.  That  there  is  a  difference  between  the  pre- 
vailing doctrines  of  the  two  periods  must,  I  think,  be  admitted  ; 
but  that  the  difference  is  not  so  far-reaching  as  many  have  sup- 
posed, is  equally  evident. 

One  of  the  works  which  are  most  commonly  supposed  to  show 
the  change  in  Fichte's  system  is  the  Darstellung  der  Wissen- 
schaftslehre  aus  dem  Jahre  1801}  In  this  treatise  the  term  *  Ego,' 
which  appears- so  frequently  in  the  Grtiftdlage,  is  usually  replaced 
by  the  word  *  knowing '  or  *  absolute  knowing.'  Fichte  describes 
this  knowing  as  a  perfect  union  of  being  and  freedom.  First,  it 
is  absolutely  what  it  is ;  in  this  aspect  it  is  fixed,  changeless, 
complete  within  itself —  absolute  being.  Again,  it  is  absolutely 
because  it  is  ;  it  exists  simply  through  itself,  without  the  aid  of  any- 
thing external ;  this  is  its  aspect  of  absolute  freedom.^  Neither 
of  these  aspects,  taken  by  itself,  can  give  us  absolute  knowing  : 

1  This  work,  though  written  in  l8oi,  was  not  published  until  1845,  when  it  ap- 
peared in  Vol.  II  of  the  Sdmmtliche  Werke. 
2S.  W.,  II,  24.  27,  38. 

69 


70  FICHTES  FUNDAMENTAL  PRINCIPLE. 

for  it  "  is  not  resting  being,  nor  on  the  other  hand  is  it  freedom  ; 
.  .  .  but  it  is  the  mutual  interpenetration  and  fusion  of  both."  ^ 
Moreover,  the  unity  is  an  organic  one.  We  should  not  regard 
the  two  elements  as  standmg  "  in  a  relation  of  mere  contiguity," 
as  constituting  "  a  formal  and  negative  unity,  a  Nichtverschieden- 
heity  On  the  contrary,  they  must  fuse  so  perfectly  as  to  be  indis- 
tinguishable. "  It  is  precisely  in  this  absolute  fusion  that  the 
essence  of  knowing  as  such,  or  the  absolute  knowing,  con- 
sists. ...  In  this  inseparable  union,  this  perfect  interpenetration, 
both  elements  lose  their  distinctive  character  and  stand  before  us 
as  one  essence  and  an  entirely  new  essence."  ^ 

This  description  of  absolute  knowing  as  an  indissoluble  union 
of  being  and  freedom  seems  to  correspond  to  the  earlier  doctrine 
of  the  Ego  as  the  unity  of  the  subjective  and  objective  aspects  of 
consciousness.  '  Being '  corresponds  to  the  '  given,'  the  content 
of  knowing  ;  *  freedom  '  to  the  uniting  activity,  the  form  of  know- 
ing. ''  If  we  look  at  absolute  knowing  with  reference  to  its  inner 
immanent  .  .  .  essence,  we  see  it  as  absolute  being  ;  if  with  refer- 
ence to  its  inner  immanent  production,  we  see  it  as  absolute  free- 
dom." But  knowing  itself  is  neither  the  one  nor  the  other.  If 
we  take  it  as  either  one  alone,  we  are  looking  at  it  abstractly. 
"  In  knowing  .  .  .  the  duality  is  fused  into  unity"  ;  ^  content  and 
form  are  one. 

In  like  manner,  the  relation  between  absolute  and  particular 
knowing  seems  to  be  the  same  as  that  which  we  found,  in  the 
earlier  works,  between  the  individual  consciousness  and  its  ulti- 
mate principle.  Particular  knowing  is  the  realization  of  absolute 
knowing.  As  absolute,  knowing  is  never  actual ;  it  has  actuality 
only  in  so  far  as  it  is  a  *'  knowing  of  something,"  i.  <?.,  in  so  far  as 
it  involves  a  distinction  between  subject  and  object.  Conscious- 
ness is  an  inadequate  realization  of  that  perfect  unity  of  subject 
and  object  —  or,  to  use  the  terminology  of  the  Darsteihmg,  of 
freedom  and  being  —  which  is  never  completely  actual. 

The  following  passages  will  justify  the  description  which  we 
have  given  of  the  train  of  thought  of  the  Darstellung : 

"  Our  actual  and  possible  knowing  is  in  all  cases,  not  an  abso- 

is.  W.,  II,  19.  2S.  w.,  II,  17.  »s.  w.,  II,  24. 


BEING  AND   EXISTENCE.  7 1 

lute,  but  only  a  relative  knowing,  determined  and  limited  in  one 
way  or  another.  .  .  .  Absolute  knowing  comes  or  can  come  to 
consciousness  only  as  form,  or,  in  another  way  of  looking  at  it, 
only  as  a  matter  or  object,  of  actual  knowing."  ^ 

"All  our  actual  knowing  is  a  knowing  of  something  —  of  this 
something,  which  is  not  that  second  or  third  something."  But 
*'it  could  not  be  a  knowing  of  something  unless  it  were  a  know- 
ing in  general,  merely  and  absolutely  as  knowing.  In  so  far  as 
it  is  a  knowing  of  something  [/.  e.,  this  knowing  of  this  some- 
thing] ,  it  differs  from  itself  [as  manifested]  in  every  other  know- 
ing of  every  other  something  ;  but  in  so  far  as  it  is  knowing,  it  is 
like  itself  and  absolutely  the  same  in  all  knowing  of  something, 
although  this  knowing  of  something  may  go  on  to  infinity 
and  in  so  far  may  vary  through  all  infinity.  Whenever  we  speak 
of  absolute  knowing,  the  reader  is  called  upon  to  think  of  knowing 
as  the  one  which  is  self-identical  in  all  particular  knowing,  and 
through  which  the  latter  is  not  this  knowing,  but  just  knowing^  ^ 

So  far  the  Darstellinig  of  1801  seems  to  be  in  harmony  with 
the  prevailing  view  of  the  first  period.     Knowing  is,  absolutely 

in  and  for  itself ;  it  is  absolutely  what  it  is  and  absolutely  because 
it  is.  Apparently,  then,  it  is  self-sufficient  and  self-explanatory. 
If  we  should  strike  out  a  few  passages  here  and  there  in  the 
Darstelhing,  we  should  have  a  consistent  exposition  of  the  theory 
that  the  absolute  principle  is  the  ideal  unity  which  is  immanent 
in  the  individual  consciousness.^  There  are,  however,  a  few  state- 
ments which  put  the  matter  in  a  different  light  and  which  seem  to 
show  a  tendency  to  think  of  the  first  principle  more  abstractly. 
For  although  knowing  is  absolute,  still,  Fichte  tells  us,  it  is  not  the 
Absolute.  "It  is  clear  from  the  mere  concept  of  absolute  know- 
ing that  it  is  not  the  Absolute.  Every  word  that  is  added  to  the 
expression  *  the  Absolute,'  destroys  the  absoluteness.  .  .  .  The 
Absolute  is  neither  knowing  nor  being,  nor  is  it  either  identity  or 
indifference  of  these  two  ;  it  is  simply  the  Absolute."  * 

'S.  W.,  II,  13.  2S.  W.,II,  14. 

'  To  be  sure,  Fichte  does  not  emphasize  here  so  strongly  as  in  the  Grundlage  the 
thought  of  the  ideal  character  of  the  Ego  ;  still  his  statement  that  absolute  knowing 
is  never  completely  actualized,  seems  to  suggest  the  same  interpretation  which  we  gave 
for  the  earlier  work. 

*S.  W.,  II,  12  f. 


72  FICHTICS  FUNDAMEJSirAL   PRINCIPLE. 

These  words  certainly  suggest  a  doctrine  somewhat  different 
from  that  of  the  earher  writings.  In  the  first  period,  Fichte 
takes,  as  his  supreme  principle,  the  unity  which  is  immanent  in 
consciousness.  In  the  quotation  before  us,  however,  he  seems 
to  posit  a  transcendent  principle  :  absolute  knowing,  which  is  im- 
plicit in  every  act  of  thought,  and  which  corresponds  to  the  Ego 
of  the  Grundlage^  is  declared  not  to  be  the  Absolute.  The  ulti- 
mate principle,  it  seems,  lies  back  of  and  beyond  absolute  know- 
ing. This  apparent  disposition  to  substitute  a  transcendent  for 
an  immanent  principle  is  not  confined  to  the  Darstellimg ;  there 
are  traces  of  it  in  nearly  all  the  writings  of  the  second  period. 
The  terminology  varies  in  different  works/  but  everywhere  there 
seems  to  be  a  tendency  to  postulate  an  Absolute  behind  the  ab- 
solute Ego.     The  following  passages  will  serve  as  examples  : 

The  origin  of  absolute  knowing  is  to  be  sought  in  *'  something 
which  is  not  knowing  at  all,"  and  which  **  we  may  perhaps  call 
being y  ^ 

'*  Nothing  exists  outside  God  .  .  .  except  knowing ;  and  this 
knowing  is  the  divine  existence  itself.  .  .  .  God  not  only  is  {ist\ 
inwardly  and  concealed  within  himself,  but  he  also  exists  (ist  da) 
and  expresses  himself."  ^ 

"  What  is  outside  God  dissolves  into  mere  perception  {Anschau- 
tmg),  image  {Biid),  knowing  .  .  .  and  in  it  there  is  not  the 
slightest  trace  or  gleam  of  true  formal  being,  which  remains 
wholly  in  God."  * 

"  Only  one  is  entirely  through  himself —  God.  .  .  .  Through 
his  being  is  all  possible  being  given.  Neither  within  him  nor 
-without  him  can  a  new  being  arise.  If  then,  in  spite  of  this, 
.:knowing  is  to  be  and  yet  is  not  to  be  God  himself,  it  can  only 
.be  .  .  .  God  himself,  but  outside  himself,  God's  being  outside 
'.his  being,  his  expression.  .  .  .  Such  an  expression  is  an  image 
or  schema.''  ^ 

1  The  ultimate  principle  is  usually  designated  as  *  God,'  *  Being,'  or  *  the  Abso- 
lute'; 'knowing,'  'absolute  knowing,'  *  the  concept,'  *  the  divine  Idea,'  are  terms 
that  are  apparently  equivalent  to  the  Ego  of  the  earlier  works. 

^Dig  IVissenschaftsldire  (1813),  N.  \V.,  II,  3. 

3  Die  Anweisung  zum  sdigen  Leben  (1806),  S.  W.,  V,  448  f. 

^  Die  Thafsachen  des  Bewusstseins  (1810),  S.  W.,  II,  686. 

^  DieWissenschaftslehre  in  ihrem  allgemeinen  Umrisse  (1810),  S.  W.,  II,  696. 


BEING  AND   EXISTENCE.  73 

**  The  concept  is  the  grotmd  of  the  zvorld.  .  .  .  All  being 
which  the  Sittenleh^e  can  know,  is  the  being  that  is  grounded  in 
the  concept."  Now  the  Wisserischaftslehre  shows  that  this  con- 
cept, which  seems  absolute  and  which  "■  the  Sittenlehre  must 
.  .  .  take  as  absolute,"  is  really  the  **  copy  of  a  higher  being," 
that  it  is  "  the  image  of  God!'  ^ 

•*  The  Absolute  can  have  only  an  absolute  .  .  .  manifestation, 
and  this  is  the  absolute  knozving.  The  Absolute  itself,  however, 
is  not  a  being  nor  is  it  a  knowing  ;  nor  is  it  identity  or  indiffer- 
ence of  the  two  ;  but  it  is  merely  —  the  Absolute  ;  and  every 
added  word  is  evil."  ^ 

One  of  the  most  striking  passages  of  all  appears  in  the  Wis- 
senschaftslehre  of  1 804.  Fichte  complains  here  that  all  his  critics 
have  misunderstood  the  nature  of  his  first  principle.  **  The  Wis- 
senschaftslehre^'  he  says,  '*  has  been  interpreted  as  a  purely  ideal- 
istic system,  which  takes  .  .  .  the  absolute  Ego  for  the  Absolute 
and  tries  to  deduce  everything  else  from  it.  No  writer  who  is 
known  to  me,  friend  or  foe,  has  risen  to  a  higher  conception  "  of 
the  system.  ^ 

It  is  the  existence  of  passages  like  these  that  has  led  some 
students  of  Fichte  to  regard  his  later  works  as  representing  a 
radical  change  of  doctrine.  Some  have  even  gone  so  far  as  to 
declare  that  in  the  second  period  he  thinks  of  the  ultimate  prin- 
ciple, not  as  activity,  but  as  fixed,  resting  being.  The  incorrect- 
ness of  this  latter  interpretation,  it  seems  to  me,  has  been  con- 
clusively shown  by  Loewe.*  The  term  *  being,'  he  maintains,  is 
used  in  the  various  expositions  of  the  Wissenschaftslehre  in  two 
different  senses.^  When  Fichte  says,  in  the  earlier  works,  that 
mere  being  can  never  serve  as  an  ultimate  principle  of  explana- 
tion, he  has  in  mind  being  as  opposed  to  activity —  mere  lifeless 
being,  the  thing-in-itself.     But  in  the  later  works,  where  he  often 

1  Das  System  der  Sittenlehre  (1812),  N.  W.,  Ill,  3  f. 

2  Letter  to  Schelling  (1802),  Fichte^ s  Leben  und  literarischer  Briefwechsel,  2te 
Aufl.,  II,  367. 

3N.  W.,  II,  193. 

*  Die  Philosophie  Fichtes  nach  dent  Gesatnmtergebnisse  ihrer  Entwickelung  (Stutt- 
gart, 1862),  29  fif.,  50  fF. 

^Loewe  really  recognizes  three  uses  of  the  word  ((9/.  cit.,  72).  But  for  our 
purposes  it  is  not  necessary  to  consider  more  than  two. 


74  FICHTES  FUNDAMENTAL   PRINCIPLE. 

applies  the  word  '  being '  to  his  fundamental  principle,  he  takes 
pains  to  tell  us  that  this  being  is  at  the  same  time  life  and  activity. 

Loewe  supports  his  interpretation  by  many  citations  from  the 
writings  of  both  periods.  He  has  done  his  work  so  thoroughly 
that  we  need  not  stop  to  go  over  the  ground  again.  We  may 
simply  pause  to  notice  a  few  of  the  passages  from  the  later  writ- 
ings which  show  that  the  *  being '  which  is  identified  with  the 
Absolute  is  not  the  '  being'  against  which  Fichte  inveighs  in  the 
earlier  works.  In  a  letter  to  Schelling,  written  in  1801,  Fichte 
says,  "  If  we  wish  to  give  the  name  being  to  that  which  even  the 
insight  that  we  have  now  gained,  cannot  penetrate,  .  .  .  then 
God  is  pure  being.  But  this  being,  in  itself,  is  not,  so  to  speak, 
compression  ;  it  is,  throughout,  agility,  transparency,  light.  .  .  . 
It  is  being,  only  for  the  finite  reason,  but  not  in  itself"  ^  Again, 
in  the  Wissenschaftslehre  in  ihrem  allgemeinen  Umrisse  (18 10), 
we  read,  "  God  is  not  the  dead  concept,  .  .  .  but  he  is  in  him- 
self pure  life."  ^  In  the  Bericht  iiber  den  B e griff  der  Wissenschafts- 
lehre (1806),  we  are  told:  "  The  Absolute  is  only  in  immediate 
life,  and  except  immediate  life  there  is  no  other  being."  ^  And 
in  Das  Wesen  des  Gelehrten  (1805),  are  the  words,  '*  Being,  abso- 
lutely as  being,  is  living  and  active  of  itself,  and  there  is  no  other 
being  than  life.  In  no  sense  is  it  dead,  stationary,  resting  within 
itself.  .   .  .  The  only  life  is  the  life  of  God  or  of  the  Absolute."  * 

In  the  face  of  these  emphatic  statements  and  others  which 
Loewe  cites,  we  certainly  cannot  say  that  the  fundamental  prin- 
ciple is  conceived  in  the  later  works  as  being  rather  than  activity. 
But  although  this  may  be  granted,  yet  the  passages  which  we 
have  quoted  from  the  Darstelliing  der  Wissenschaftslehre  and 
other  works,  seem,  if  taken  by  themselves,  to  show  that  Fichte 
now  thinks  of  his  principle  as  something  higher  than  absolute 
knowing.  And  if  this  is  really  the  case,  if  he  now  tries  to  explain 
consciousness,  not  by  a  unity  implicit  within  it,  but  by  an  external 
principle,  then  we  must  grant  that  the  change  of  doctrine,  though 
not  so  great  as  some  have  believed,  is  still  considerable. 

Some  writers  indeed  there  are,  who  maintain  that  there  is  no 

J  Leben  und  Briefwechsel,  2te  Aufl.,  II,  345.  23.  W.,  II,  696. 

3S.  W.,  VIII,  370.  *S.  W.,  VI,  361. 


BEING  AND   EXISTENCE.  75 

difference  of  any  consequence  between  the  two  periods.  Fort- 
lage,  e.  g.,  says  that  the  only  change  which  Fichte  makes  in  the 
later  writings  is  one  of  terminology,  and  that  he  was  led  to  it  by 
the  charge  of  atheism.^  In  the  article  which  provoked  the  attack 
upon  his  orthodoxy,  Fichte  identifies  God  with  the  moral  world- 
order.  This  position,  says  Fortlage,  was  liable  to  misappre- 
hension :  in  the  popular  mind,  the  world-order  is  regarded  as 
subordinate  to  the  world-substance,  of  which  it  is  supposed  to  be 
an  attribute.  When  Fichte  became  aware  that  his  statements 
had  been  misunderstood,  he  changed  his  terminology  and  spoke 
of  God  as  the  absolute  bemg,  whose  existence  is  absolute  knowing. 
But  the  alteration  was  merely  in  mode  of  statement ;  his  concep- 
tion of  God  remained  the  same  throughout  his  system. 

With  Fortlage's  main  contention,  that  there  is  no  change  except 
in  terminology,  I  cannot  quite  agree.  Nor  does  it  seem  to  me 
that  the  change  of  phraseology  is  to  be  explained  wholly,  or  even 
mainly,  by  the  charge  of  atheism.  It  is  not  unlikely  —  and  this, 
I  think,  is  the  element  of  truth  in  Fortlage's  interpretation  — 
that  the  theological  controversy  in  which  Fichte  became  in- 
volved, opened  his  eyes  to  the  fact  that  he  had  been  greatly 
misunderstood  and  led  him  to  alter  some  of  his  modes  of  ex- 
pression. But  in  so  far  as  the  change  in  terminology  does  not 
represent  an  alteration  of  some  sort  in  his  thought,  its  chief 
cause  is  rather  to  be  found  in  the  charge  of  subjective  idealism 
and  solipsism.  The  almost  complete  abandonment  of  the  word 
'  Ego,'  even  in  the  more  technical  writings  of  the  second  period, 
seems  to  me  the  most  important  change  in  mere  terminology,^ 
and  this  it  is  more  natural  to  connect  with  the  charge  of  solipsism 
than  with  that  of  atheism. 

My  most  serious  disagreement  with  Fortlage,  however,  is  that 
I  believe  the  difference  between  the  two  periods  to  be  more  than 
a  difference  in  mode  of  expression.  It  seems  to  me  that  there  is 
at  least  a  noticeable  shifting  of  emphasis.  Thoughts  which  in 
the  earlier  writings  are  quite  in  the  background,  become  promi- 

1  Genetische  Geschichte  der  Philosophie  seit  Kant  (Leipzig,  1852),  136  fif, 

2  The  other  important  changes  —  the  references  to  the  Absolute  and  the  designat- 
ing of  God  as  being —  are  not  mere  changes  in  terminology,  as  we  shall  try  to  show 
presently. 


76  FICHTKS  FUNDAMENTAL   PRINCIPLE. 

nent  in  the  later  ones ;  and  doctrines  which  are  implicitly  present 
in  the  first  period,  arise  into  clearer  consciousness  in  the  second. 
The  difference  between  the  earlier  and  later  forms  of  Fichte's 
philosophy,  as  we  shall  try  to  show,  is  by  no  means  so  great  as 
at  first  glance  it  seems  to  be  ;  but  it  is  a  real  difference.  What 
its  nature  is,  we  shall  now  try  to  learn. 

In  the  passage  from  the  Darstellung  and  the  similar  ones 
which  we  have  quoted  from  other  works,  the  Absolute  and  abso- 
lute knowing  seem  to  be  regarded  as  two  distinct  principles.  I 
hope  to  be  able  to  show,  however,  that  Fichte  does  not  really 
think  of  them  in  this  way.  And  if  we  believe  that  he  conceives 
them  rather  as  two  aspects  of  one  principle,  the  most  obvious 
way  of  describing  the  difference  between  the  two  periods,  is  to 
say  that  in  the  first  he  seems  disposed  to  emphasize  the  temporal 
aspect  of  the  ultimate  principle,  whereas  in  the  second  he  dwells 
upon  its  timeless  aspect.  Apparently  he  came  to  feel  that  the 
earlier  expositions  of  his  philosophy  were  inadequate  because 
they  gave  undue  prominence  to  the  conception  of  the  principle 
as  realizing  itself  in  time.  In  the  later  writings,  therefore,  he 
took  pains  to  point  out  that  it  has  a  timeless  aspect  as  well.^ 
Unfortunately  the  words  in  which  he  seeks  to  express  this 
thought  are  not  always  well  chosen.  What  he  means  to  show, 
is  that  to  describe  the  fundamental  principle  merely  as  an  Idea 
which  can  never  be  fully  realized,  is  at  best  to  describe  it  inade- 
quately, to  call  attention  to  one  side  of  its  nature  and  to  ignore 
another,  equally  important,  side.  But  in  his  effort  to  do  this,  he 
often  seems  to  separate  the  two  aspects  by  a  sharp  line  of  division, 
to  make  of  them  two  distinct  principles,  one  of  which  is  primary 
and  the  other  secondary.  Absolute  knowing,  or  the  manifesta- 
tion of  the  Absolute,  which  represents  the  temporal  aspect,  is 
often  sharply  distinguished  from  the  Absolute  itself,  the  timeless 
aspect. 

The  result  of  this  unfortunate  mode  of  expression  is  that  Fichte 

'  It  should  be  noted,  however,  that  his  interest  in  the  philosophy  of  history  is  con- 
fined almost  wholly  to  the  second  period  ;  and  in  this  respect  the  later  works  may  be 
said  to  pay  much  attention  to  the  conception  of  the  realization  of  the  ultimate  principle 
in  the  time-process. 


I 


BEING  AND   EXISTENCE.  77 

has  often  been  misunderstood.  Many  have  believed  that  in  the 
first  period  his  ultimate  principle  is  immanent  in  consciousness, 
while  in  the  second  he  goes  beyond  the  Ego  of  the  earlier  works 
and  postulates  a  transcendent  principle  as  its  ground.  In  partial 
opposition  to  this  interpretation,  we  shall  try  to  show  that  he 
does  not  mean  to  describe  absolute  knowing  and  the  Absolute 
as  two  distinct  principles,  but  rather  as  two  aspects  of  one.  At 
the  same  time  the  fact  that  he  tends,  in  the  second  period,  to 
emphasize  the  timeless  aspect  much  more  strongly  than  in  the 
first,  may  justify  us  in  dissenting  somewhat  from  the  opinion  of 
those  who  maintain  that  there  is  no  change  of  any  consequence 
in  the  later  doctrine.  There  is,  to  say  the  least,  a  marked  shift- 
ing of  emphasis. 

In  the  writings  of  the  first  period,  as  we  have  seen,  stress  is 
laid  upon  the  thought  that  the  Idea  of  the  Ego  is  not,  and  never 
can  be,  fully  realized,  that  it  is  the  goal  of  an  unending  progress. 
What  actually  is,  then,  what  exists,  is  the  world  of  finite  con- 
sciousnesses. But  now,  in  this  world,  shot  through  and  through, 
as  it  is,  by  the  opposition  of  subject  and  object,  we  none  the  less 
see  a  partial  realization  of  the  ideal  unity.  Our  world  is  a  world 
in  which  values  are  realized  —  intellectual,  moral,  aesthetic  values. 
How  is  this  ?  Why  is  it  that  eternal  values  are  actualized  in  this 
world  of  time,  that  the  infinite  process  is  also  an  infinite  progress? 
The  answer  is  found  in  Fichte's  conception  of  the  nature  of  the 
Idea.  The  Idea  of  the  Ego,  as  he  conceives  it,  is  not  simply  our 
ideal,  a  psychological  fact ;  in  this  case  the  only  values  that  were 
realized,  would  be  subjective  ones.  Again,  it  is  not  merely  an 
objective  norm,  with  which  we  may  compare  reality  in  order  to 
determine  its  worth  ;  on  this  supposition  the  presence  of  value  in 
the  world  of  reality  would  still  be  unexplained.  Once  more, 
it  is  not  something  fixed  and  stationary  outside  the  world- 
process,  which  guides  that  process  by  the  force  of  attraction  ; 
strictly  speaking,  this  conception  has  no  meaning  when  one  frees 
it  from  spatial  implications.  The  Idea  of  the  Ego  is  none  of  these 
three.  Fichte's  conception  is  rather  that  the  supreme  value  is 
itself  a  moving  power,  a  principle  of  activity.  The  reason  why 
values  are  realized  in  this  world  of  ours,  is  that  the  Idea  of  the 


7^  FICHTKS  FUNDAMENTAL   PRINCIPLE. 

Ego,  the  absolute  value,  realizes  itself,  and  the  form  that  its  self- 
realization  takes,  is  the  world-process.  God  is  at  once  the 
supreme  value  and  the  indwelling  principle  of  the  world-process. 
He  is  the  moral  world-order,  which  is,  however,  an  ordo  ordi- 
nans  ;  ^  not,  strictly  speaking,  a  world-order  that  is  built  up  by  us, 
but  one  that  builds  itself  in  and  through  us. 

But  if  this  is  true,  then  we  cannot  rest  satisfied  with  the  state- 
ment that  all  that  is,  is  this  world-process,  in  which  values  are 
progressively  realized.  If  the  Idea  were  merely  a  norm  by  which 
we  measured  the  progress,  then  we  could  say  that  nothing  is 
except  the  process  itself  But  if  the  Idea  is  the  indwelling  force, 
by  virtue  of  which  alone  there  is  a  process,  if  it  is,  as  Fichte 
maintains,  the  world-ground,  then  there  is  a  sense  in  which  we 
may  say  that  it  is,  and  that  because  it  is,  the  world  is. 

In  this  sense,  then,  we  may  speak  of  the  Sein  of  the  Idea  — 
i.  e.,  of  the  absolute  value  as  itself  a  mode  of  reality  —  and  of 
its  Dasein  —  z.  e.,  of  its  progressive  actualization  in  time.  Now 
if  we  consider  the  Idea  simply  as  absolute  value,  leaving  out  of 
account  the  thought  of  its  actualization,  we  are  dealing  with  it  as  a 
non-temporal  reality  ;  it  is  of  the  essence  of  value  that  it  is  time- 
less in  its  nature.  Hence  the  Sollen,  which  is  the  ground  of  all 
existence,  the  motive  power  in  all  process  and  change,  is,  when 
considered  in  itself,  changeless  and  eternal. 

It  must  have  been  somewhat  in  this  way  that  Fichte  was  led  to 
make  the  distinction,  which  appears  so  prominently  in  some  of  his 
later  writings,  between  the  self-manifestation  of  the  Absolute  and 
its  own  inner  life  —  between  what  he  often  calls  its  Fursich  and  its 
Ansich.  The  one  is  the  ultimate  principle  considered  as  in  time, 
the  absolute  life,  unfolding  itself  in  ever  new  and  higher  forms. 
The  other  is  the  same  principle  considered  in  its  own  inner  nature, 
without  reference  to  the  fact  of  its  self-manifestation  and  there- 
fore without  reference  to  time  ;  hence  Fichte  speaks  of  it  as  a 
timeless  reality  and  tells  us,  in  words  which  at  first  glance  seem 
far  removed  from  the  spirit  of  the  earlier  Wissenschaftslehre,  that 

J"  **  The  moral  world-order ,  or  —  if  one  cannot  accustom  oneself  to  the  word  in  the 
sense  of  ordo  ordinans,  absolute,  eoque  ipso  creans  —  moral  principle,  creative  moral 
force — whatever  we  are  to  call  it,  at  any  rate  God  is,  exists  {existiert)^  in  himself 
only  as  such  order  "  (Z«  '' Jacobi  an  Fichte;'  1799,  N.  W.,  Ill,  392). 


BEING  AND  EXISTENCE.  79 

in  it  is  no  change  or  movement,  that  it  never  becomes,  but 
simply  is. 

The  transition  from  the  first  to  the  second  way  of  looking  at 
the  principle  is  most  clearly  shown  in  a  discussion  found  in  the 
Thatsachen  des  Bewusstseins  (1810).  In  this  work,  Fichte  begins 
with  an  examination  of  the  lowest  stages  of  consciousness  and 
gradually  develops  the  doctrine  of  the  Idea  or  the  final  purpose, 
as  the  ground  of  the  world's  existence.  "  Life  exists,"  he  con- 
cludes, "not  for  its  own  sake,"  but  in  order  that  the  end  may  be 
realized.  Hence  it  does  not  "exist  through  itself;  that  is,  the 
ground  of  its  existence  is  not  in  itself,  but  in  another,  in  the  final 
purpose."  Now  we  cannot  say  that  the  end  ''is  as  a  fact  (yfak- 
tisch  ist)  in  the  sphere  of  phenomena,"  but  only  that  "  it  shall  be 
and  become  in  this  sphere  through  life  itself.  If  the  final  pur- 
pose is,  it  is  only  through  life  [that  is,  it  has  actuality  only  in 
so  far  as  it  is  realized  in  the  world-process]  ;  and,  on  the  other 
hand,  life  itself,  in  its  own  existence,  is  only  through  the  being 
of  the  final  purpose  [that  is,  the  ground  of  the  process  is  a  Sol- 
len,  a  demand  that  what  is  not,  shall  be] ....  Thus  the  being 
of  life  is  not  something  absolute  :  its  ground  has  been  discovered  ; 
it  is  created  and  determined  by  the  final  purpose."  ^ 

So  far  we  have  the  doctrine  with  which  we  are  familiar  in 
Fichte's  earlier  works.  But  the  argument  now  takes  a  new  turn. 
In  the  world  of  phenomena,  as  we  have  just  seen,  the  ideal  is 
not ;  it  simply  becomes.  In  itself,  however,  in  abstraction  from 
this  world,  it  does  not  become ;  it  simply  is.  "  The  absolute 
final  purpose  is,  and  it  is  altogether  complete  [ganz  und  durchaus 
fertig)  and  self-determined  ;  it  is  what  it  is,  wholly  through  itself^ 
.  .  .  It  is ;  it  does  not  become,  and  nothing  becomes  in  it."  ^ 
We  see  that  this  must  be  so,  as  soon  as  we  consider  carefully  the 
concept  of  becoming  ;  for  an  absolute  becoming,  in  which  there 

IS.  w.,  II,  658  f. 

*  But  although  the  end  is,  wholly  through  itself,  there  is  still  a  necessary  connec- 
tion between  it  and  the  world.  **  In  the  very  concept  of  a  final  purpose  is  contained 
the  necessity  "  that  it  fulfil  itself.  **  It  will  be  realized  "  [the  italics  are  mine],  and 
it  finds  its  realization  in  life.  The  perfect  realization,  of  course,  is  never  attained. 
'*  The  absolute  final  purpose  never  becomes  [completely]  visible";  but  each  new 
world  is  a  fuller  manifestation  of  it  (pp.  659,  678  f.). 

3S.  W.,  11,659. 


8o  FICHTES  FUNDAMENTAL   PRINCIPLE, 

is  no  element  of  fixity,  is  manifestly  unthinkable.  Mere  becom- 
ing would  *'  vanish  into  nothingness."  "  In  all  this  infinite  be- 
coming there  is  a  being,  which  is  and  does  not  become,  which  is 
not  altered,  which  has  no  part  in  change."^ 

The  result  of  our  discussion,  then,  is  this  :  "  The  being  of 
life,  which  must  be  assumed  as  its  ground,  becomes  final  pur- 
pose merely  in  the  synthesis  with  the  becoming  as  the  form  of 
life.  Outside  this  synthesis,  beyond  this  form,  we  must  not 
speak  of  a  final  purpose,  but  only  of  a  being  pure  and  simple. 
The  final  purpose  is  thus  the  expression  of  being  in  becoming,  in 
order  that  being  may  be  made  visible."  ^ 

In  this  discussion  we  get  some  clue  as  to  the  motive  of  the 
change  which  we  find  in  Fichte's  later  writings.  The  feeling 
which  seems  to  be  uppermost  here  is  this  :  that  the  conception 
of  a  mere  temporal  process  is  meaningless,  that  all  change  implies 
the  unchanging,  every  temporal  a  non-temporal ;  and  therefore 
that  if  it  be,  from  one  point  of  view,  admissible  to  conceive  of 
the  ultimate  principle,  not  as  that  which  ?>,  but  as  that  which 
ought  to  be,  and  thus  to  identify  what  is  with  the  world  of  con- 
sciousness, in  which  the  Ought-to-be  never  fully  is,  still  this  is 
not  the  only  possible  point  of  view ;  that,  on  the  contrary,  the 
principle  has  its  own  being,  which  is  not  dependent  upon  or 
grounded  in  its  realization,  but  which  is  rather  to  be  conceived 
as  the  ground  of  this  realization. 

Now,  as  we  have  said,  Fichte  often  speaks  as  if  this  inner 
being  of  the  ultimate  principle  were  something  quite  distinct  from 
its  self-realization  in  the  world-process.  This  leads  to  the  appear- 
ance of  a  great  difference  between  the  doctrine  of  the  first  period, 
where  the  principle  is  conceived  almost  exclusively  in  its  aspect 
of  self-actualizing  Idea,  and  that  of  the  second  period.  That  the 
change  in  the  later  writings  is,  however,  not  so  great  as  it  might 
at  first  seem  to  be,  we  shall  try  to  prove  in  two  ways.  We  shall 
try  to  show,  in  the  first  place,  that  the  tendency  to  distinguish 
between  the  Absolute  and  its  manifestation,  which  is  so  notice- 
able in  the  second  period,  is  present  also,  though  in  less  degree 
and  in  a  different  form,  in  the  works  of  the  first ;  and  in  the  sec- 
1  S.  W.,  II,  68i  f.  «S.  W.,  II,  683. 


BEING   AND  EXISTENCE.  8 1 

ond  place,  that  Fichte  does  not  really  make  so  sharp  a  distinction 
between  the  Absolute  and  its  Dasein  in  the  later  writings  as  one 
might  be  disposed  to  think. 

We  turn  at  once  to  the  task  of  establishing  our  first  point.  As 
we  have  seen,  there  is  a  marked  disposition  in  the  later  writings 
to  insist  upon  the  timeless  nature  of  the  Absolute  and  to  dis- 
tinguish sharply  between  its  changless  inner  being  and  the  mani- 
festation of  this  being  in  the  temporal  process.  This  tendency  is 
a  distinctive  characteristic  of  the  second  period  ;  but  we  shall 
see,  I  think,  that  it  is  not  altogether  without  its  parallel  in  the 
first.  E.  g.,  with  the  passage  in  the  Darstellung  der  Wissen- 
schaftslehre  which  declares  that  we  may  not  ascribe  any  predi- 
cates whatever  to  the  Absolute,^  we  may  compare  the  following 
from  the  Grundlage  der  gesammten  Wissenschaftslehre :  "The 
absolute  Ego  of  the  first  Grundsatz  is  not  something  (it  has  no 
predicates  and  can  have  none)  ;  it  is  absolutely  what  it  is,  and 
this  cannot  be  further  explained."  ^  Again,  there  are  passages 
in  the  earlier  works  in  which  Fichte  even  designates  the  ultimate 
principle  as  '  being.'  E.  g.,  in  a  note  in  the  Grundlage^  in  which 
he  is  contrasting  his  philosophy  with  Stoicism,  he  says,  **  In  con- 
sistent Stoicism  the  infinite  idea  of  the  Ego  is  taken  for  the  actual 
Ego  ;  absolute  being  {absolutes  Sehi)  and  actual  existence  (wirk- 
liches  Dasein)  are  not  distinguished.  Hence  the  Stoic  sage  is 
self-sufficient  and  free  from  limitation.  To  him  are  attributed  all 
the  predicates  that  belong  to  the  pure  Ego  or  God.  According 
to  the  Stoic  ethics,  we  are  not  to  become  like  God,  but  we  our- 
selves are  God.  The  Wissenschaftslehre  carefully  distinguishes 
absolute  being  and  actual  existence  and  simply  takes  the  former 
as  ground,  in  order  to  be  able  to  explain  the  latter."^ 

This  second  passage  seems  to  show  that  even  in  the  Grund- 
lage of  1 794  Fichte  thought  it  not  unfitting  to  designate  the  Idea 
of  the  Ego  as  'being.'  The  existence  of  the  Idea,  the  actual 
world  of  consciousness,  is  process  ;  in  it  the  temporal  aspect  is 
prominent.  But  the  Idea  has  a  Sein  as  well  as  2.  Dasein,  a  time- 
less nature  as  well  as  a  temporal   realization.     The  thought  is 

'Quoted  above,  p.  71.  23,  W.,  I,  109. 

'  S.  W.,  I,  278,  note  ;  cf.  279. 


S2  FICHTKS  FUNDAMENTAL   PRINCIPLE, 

not  further  developed  here,  and  there  are  not  many  places  in  the 
earlier  works  in  which  Fichte  describes  the  ultimate  principle  as 
'  being.'  The  latter  fact  may  be  explained  in  part  by  reference 
to  Loewe's  distinction  between  the  two  uses  of  the  term  *  being.'  ^ 
In  the  earlier  writings  Fichte  ordinarily  identified  'being'  with 
the  thing-in-itself  and  thus  would  be  loath  to  apply  the  word  to 
his  principle. 

But  though  we  may  be  justified  in  saying  that  the  attribution 
of  being  to  the  ultimate  principle  is  not  wholly  confined  to  the 
later  writings,  we  are  far  from  wishing  to  maintain  that  the  differ- 
ence between  the  two  periods  is  one  of  mere  terminology.  On 
the  contrary,  it  is  evident  that  in  the  earlier  works  the  emphasis 
is,  throughout,  upon  the  temporal  aspect  of  the  ultimate  principle. 
What  we  wish  to  point  out  is  simply  that  even  in  the  first  period 
Fichte  could  not  have  believed  that  this  temporal  aspect  is  the 
only  one.  The  very  fact  that  he  follows  Kant  in  regarding  time 
as  simply  the  form  of  human  experience  ^  and  thus  only  a  means 
to  the  manifestation  of  the  Idea,  seems  to  suggest  that  this  cannot 
have  been  the  case. 

We  seem  justified,  then,  in  maintaining  that  the  doctrine  of  the 
second  period,  with  its  emphasis  upon  the  timeless  aspect,  is  not 
wholly  unrelated  to  Fichte's  earlier  mode  of  thought.  This  can 
also  be  brought  out  in  another  way.  In  the  preceding  chapter 
we  saw  that  there  are  traces,  in  the  earlier  works,  of  a  disposition 
Jto  insist  upon  the  unlikeness  between  consciousness  and  its  ulti- 
:mate  ground.  The  way  in  which  Fichte  sometimes  emphasizes 
Ihe  opposition  between  the  finite  and  infinite  aspects  of  the  Ego 
s(in  the  Grundlage  of  1794)  or  between  the  natural  impulse  and 
;the  impulse  toward  self-activity  (in  the  Sittenlehre  of  1798)  has 
already  been  dwelt  upon.  Now  it  seems  to  me  not  unjustifiable 
to  regard  this  as  evidence  of  the  same  general  tendency  which  we 

I  See  above,  pp.  73  f. 

*  Cf.  the  deduction  of  time  in  the  Grtmdriss  des  Eigenthumlichen  der  Wissenschafis- 
lehre  (l795),  S.  W.,  I,  405  ff.  Another  deduction,  belonging  to  the  second  period, 
is  found  in  the  Darstellung  der  lVissenschaftsleh)-e,  S.  W.,  II,  lOO  ff.  Both  deduc- 
tions are  exceedingly  difficult,  and  most  of  the  expositions  —  e.g.,  those  of  Kuno 
Fischer  and  Loewe  —  simply  repeat  Fichte's  involved  statement  without  explanation. 
The  only  exposition  that  I  know  which  gives  the  reader  any  assistance,  is  that  of  L^on 
{L'l  Philosophie  de  Fichte^  Paris,  1902,  pp.  109  ff.,  435  ff. ). 


L 


BEING   AND   EXISTENCE.  83 

find  so  prominent,  though  in  another  form,  in  the  later  writings. 
We  have  seen  that  this  tendency  is  held  in  check,  in  the  first 
period,  by  an  even  stronger  disposition  to  insist  upon  the  one- 
ness of  the  two  aspects  of  the  Ego  ;  and  we  have  maintained 
that  if  we  take  the  first  period  as  a  whole,  the  trend  of  thought  is 
obviously  toward  the  more  concrete  view  of  the  relation  between 
the  Idea  and  the  world  of  actual  existence.  But  the  fact  remains 
that  even  in  the  earlier  works,  Fichte  seems  sometimes  to  dis- 
tinguish rather  sharply  between  the  world  of  consciousness  and 
its  ultimate  ground.  It  seems,  then,  not  unreasonable  to  suppose 
that  his  later  insistence  upon  the  non-temporal  aspect  of  the  Idea 
and  his  disposition  to  separate  the  Ansich  from  the  Filrsich  are 
simply  a  new  form  of  a  tendency  that  was  present,  though  less 
markedly,  in  the  earlier  writings. 

From  this  brief  argument  in  support  of  our  first  point,  we  may 
now  pass  on  to  our  second  —  which  will  require  more  detailed 
discussion  —  and  may  try  to  show  that  even  in  the  later  works 
the  gulf  which  seems  to  have  been  set  between  the  Absolute  and 
its  manifestation  is  not  so  wide  as  one  might  at  first  think. 

We  have  already  considered  a  number  of  passages  from  the 
later  works,  in  which  Fichte  distinguishes  between  the  Sein  and 
the  Dasein  of  the  Absolute,  between  the  outer  life,  of  which  the 
Wissenschaftslehre  professes  to  give  an  exposition,  and  the  hidden 
inner  life,  which  it  can  indicate  to  us,  but  which  it  cannot  describe. 
We  are  now  to  see  that  there  are  many  passages  in  which  another 
tendency  appears,  in  which  Fichte  insists  upon  the  unity  of  these 
two  aspects  of  the  one  principle. 

In  the  discussion  in  the  Thatsachen  des  Bezvusstseins,  which  we 
have  already  examined  with  some  care,  there  is  one  important 
statement  that  has  not  yet  been  quoted.  As  soon  as  he  has 
reached  the  conception  of  God  as  the  ultimate  being,  whose  image 
is  the  being  of  life,  Fichte,  continues  thus  :  **  From  the  mere  con- 
cept [of  God]  we  can  say  nothing  more  about  him  than  that  he 
is  the  Absolute  and  that  he  is  not  perception  {Anschaumig)  or 
anything  else  that  inheres  in  the  perception  by  reason  of  its 
capacity  for  Hfe  {Lebendigkeit).  This,  however,  is  the  mere 
form  of  God's  being,  and  it  is  such  form  only  as  opposed  to  the 


84  FICHTKS  FUNDAMENTAL   PRINCIPLE. 

being  of  the  appearance.  What  God  actually  is,  of  and  in 
himself,  appears  in  the  perception.  This  expresses  him  com- 
pletely, and  he  is  in  it  as  he  is  inwardly,  in  himself.  This  per- 
ception, however,  is  not  in  its  turn  perceived  ;  it  expresses  itself 
only  through  the  freedom  that  is  joined  with  it.  Thus  God's 
being,  as  it  is  in  God  himself,  reveals  itself  progressively  to  all 
infinity,  first  and  immediately  in  the  perception  of  the  eternal  final 
purpose.  Life,  therefore,  in  its  proper  being,  is  the  image  of  God, 
just  as  he  is  within  himself.  But  as  formal  life,  as  really  living 
and  active,  it  is  the  infinite  striving  really  to  become  this  image 
of  God,  which,  however,  it  never  can  become,  because  the  striving 
is  infinite."  ^ 

Similar  statements  are  found  in  other  works.  In  the  Ajtwei- 
sung  ziim  seligen  Leben  Fichte  says  :  "  The  real  life  of  knowing  \s 
then,  in  its  root,  the  inner  being  and  essence  of  the  Absolute 
itself  and  nothing  else.  Between  the  Absolute  or  God,  and 
knowing,  in  the  deepest  roots  of  its  life,  there  is  no  separation, 
but  the  two  completely  coincide."  ^  And  again  :  We  now  see 
"  that  being  and  existence  completely  coincide.  .  .  .  For  to  his 
[God's]  being  of  and  through  himself,  belongs  his  existence,  and 
this  existence  can  have  no  other  ground  ;  conversely,  to  his  exist- 
ence belongs  all  that  which  he  is  inwardly  and  through  his 
essence.  The  whole  distinction  between  Sem  and  Dasein,  which 
we  made  in  the  previous  discussion,  and  the  lack  of  connection 
between  the  two,  now  show  themselves  as  only  for  us  and  as  a 
consequence  of  our  limitation,  but  in  no  sense  as  in  themselves 
and  as  being  immediately  in  the  divine  existence."  ^ 

The  Darstellung  der  Wis  sense  haftslehre,  as  we  have  said,  is  one 
of  the  works  that  are  most  commonly  supposed  to  represent  the 
change  which  Fichte' s  doctrine  undergoes  in  the  second  period ; 
and  we  have  already  quoted  from  it  a  passage  in  which  he  distin- 
guishes sharply  between  the  Absolute  and  absolute  knowing.  Yet 
in  this  very  treatise  we  find  several  instances  in  which  he  seems  to 
be  implicitly  correcting  the  abstractness  of  his  view.  The  correc- 
tion is  made  in  two  ways.  In  the  first  place  he  sometimes  speaks 
as  if  being  and  freedom  —  the  two  characteristics  of  absolute  know- 

i  S.  VV.,  II,  684  f.  2  S.  W.,  V,  443.  3S.  w.,  V,  452. 


BEING  AND   EXISTENCE.  85 

ing  —  were  predicates  of  the  Absolute  itself.  "  Let  the  reader 
think  the  Absolute  merely  as  such.  ...  He  will  find,  we  main- 
tain, that  he  can  think  it  only  under  two  aspects :  first,  as  being 
absolutely  what  it  is,  resting  firmly  upon  and  in  itself,  without 
any  change  or  wavering,  completely  enclosed  within  itself ;  and 
secondly,  as  being  what  it  is,  absolutely  because  it  is,  of  itself  and 
through  itself,  without  any  foreign  influence;  for  there- can  be 
nothing  foreign  left  outside  the  Absolute,  but  all  that  is  not  the 
Absolute  itself,  disappears.  .  .  .  These  two  characteristics  of  the 
Absolute  must  completely  fuse  and  coincide  in  knowing."  ^  '*  The 
Absolute  is  neither"  being  nor  freedom,  ''but  it  is  both  as  abso- 
lutely one  ;  and  in  knowing,  at  least,  this  duality  is  fused  into 
unity."  ^  •'  Knowing  is  not  the  Absolute,  but  only  the  fusion  of  the 
two  predicates  of  the  Absolute  into  a  unity.  Hence  it  must  be 
absolute  as  for  itself,  but  in  this  absoluteness  it  is  only  secon- 
dary, not  primary."^  The  Absolute  "is  perhaps  nothing  else 
than  the  union  of  the  two  primal  qualities  in  the  formal  unity  of 
thinking."  "* 

These  passages  do  not  seem  in  all  respects  perfectly  harmo- 
nious, but  they  agree,  at  least,  in  suggesting  a  vital  connection  be- 
tween absolute  knowing  and  the  Absolute.  The  central  thought 
seems  to  be  that  the  Absolute^;;^/y  its  unity  only  in  and  through 
the  world-process  or  knowing.  If  this  is  so,  if  absolute  knowing 
is  the  unity  of  the  Absolute,  then  it  is  possible  to  understand  the 
connection  between  the  two.  The  world  of  consciousness  may 
now  be  regarded  as  the  progressive  coming  to  unity  of  the  Abso- 
lute, as  the  progress  from  an  undifferentiated,  to  a  higher,  unity 
by  means  of  difference.  The  One  in  its  Dasein  is  not  a  perfect 
unity :  absolute  knowing  is  never  completely  actual.  But  the 
perfect  unity  is  the  goal  of  the  process,  and' all  particular  know- 
ing is  a  partial  realization  of  it. 

If  we  interpret  the  passages  before  us  in  this  way,  we  have 
much  the  same  doctrine  that  is  prominent  in  the  first  period.  As  a 
logical  starting-point,  we  must  assume  an  Absolute,  an  undifferen- 
tiated unity,  the  absolute  Ego  of  the  Grundlage.  But  the  higher 
unity  can  be  realized  only  through  the  positing  and  overcoming 

'S.  W.,  II,  16  f.         2S.  W.,  II,  24.       3S.  W.,  II,  27.       ^S.  W.,  II,  30. 


86  FICHTE'S  FUNDAMEATAL   PRINCIPLE. 

of  difference,  /.  e.,  through  the  development  of  consciousness. 
If  the  differences  were  ever  fully  overcome,  the  ideal  of  perfect 
unity  —  absolute  knowing,  or,  in  the  earlier  terminology,  the  Idea 
of  the  Ego  —  would  have  been  realized;  the  Absolute  would 
have  come  to  its  unity  in  and  through  knowing. 

There  is  another  set  of  passages  in  the  Darstelhnig  which 
shows  in  a  different  way  the  effort  that  Fichte  makes  to  exhibit 
the  ultimate  principle  in  its  less  abstract  form.  We  have  already 
quoted  a  passage  ^  in  which  he  tells  us  that  we  cannot  attach  any 
predicates  to  the  Absolute  without  destroying  the  absoluteness. 
The  natural  inference  from  this  is  that  we  can  have  no  knowledge 
whatever  of  the  ultimate  principle.  In  a  later  discussion,  how- 
ever, Fichte  seems  to  say  that  there  is  a  sense  in  which  knowing 
may  be  said  to  give  us  the  Absolute.  The  Wissenschaftslehre 
is  the  "knowing  of  knowing."  In  it,  knowing  makes  itself  its 
object,  penetrates  the  mystery  of  its  being.  Hence  in  this  philo- 
sophical reflection  we  must  "  go  out  beyond  knowing  and  bring 
to  light  elements  which  indeed  .  .  .  are  implicit  in  it,  but  which 
cannot  be  present  for  it."  This  is  "  the  self-forgetting  and  self- 
annihilating  of  knowing."^  The  fundamental  characteristic  of 
knowing  is  its  ability  to  discover  its  own  origin.  Knowing  is 
egohood,  "  penetrability,  absolute  light  "  ;  it  is  essentially  "  Fiir- 
sichsein,  Innerlichkeit  des  Ursprunges^  By  virtue  of  its  power 
of  self-penetration,  it  can  go  back  upon  itself  until  it  reaches  its 
absolute  origin.  But  this  process  of  return  upon  self  is  a  process 
of  self-forgetting  and  self-annihilating.  Knowing  "  cannot  con- 
template its  absolute  origin  without  contemplating  its  boundary, 
its  not-being."^  Its  ground  must  be  something  other  than 
knowing,  must  be  not-knowing  or  being. 

Now  although  this  absolute  being  is  gained  by  the  negation 
of  knowing,  yet  Fichte  does  not  seem  always  to  conceive  the 
relation  between  the  two  as  negative.  "  Ptire  being,''  he  tells  us 
in  this  same  passage,  "is  pure  knowing,  thought  as  origin  for 
itself  and  thought  as  its  own  opposite,*  as  the  not -being  of  know- 

1  See  above,  p.  71.  2  S.  W.,  IT,  42.  3  S.  W.,  II,  63. 

♦The  text  reads,  "Das  reine  Wissen  gedacht,  als  Ursprun^  fiir  sich,  und  seinen 
Gegensatz  als  Nichtsein  des  Wissens,  weil  es  sonst  nicht  entspringen  konnte,  ist 
reines  Seiny  In  spite  of  the  grammatical  construction,  it  seems  clear  that  we  must 
take  Gegensatz  with  gedacht  als,  rather  than  with/j^r. 


BEING  AND   EXISTENCE.  Sy 

ing,  because  otherwise  [z.  e.,  if  it  did  not  proceed  from  its  not- 
being]  it  could  not  come  to  be.  (Or  we  may  say,  if  only  the 
reader  will  understand  it  aright,  that  the  standpoint  of  absolute 
knowing  is  absolute  creation  as  a  producing,  not  as  something 
produced.  Knowing  produces  itself  from  its  pure  possibility  as 
that  which  alone  is  prior  to  it,^  and  this  [possibility]  is  the  pure 
being.)  " 

This  passage  seems  to  indicate  a  doctrine  which  is  essentially 
that  of  the  Gnmdlage.  The  "  pure  possibility,  .  .  .  that  which 
alone  is  prior"  to  knowing,  may  be  held  to  correspond  with  the 
absolute  Ego  of  the  first  period.  And  the  context  certainly 
leads  one  to  infer  that  this  possibility  (pure  being)  is  what  Fichte 
has  elsewhere  called  the  Absolute.  Here,  then,  the  Absolute 
seems  to  be  conceived  as  no  more  remote  from  the  world  of  con- 
sciousness than  is  the  absolute  Ego  of  the  Griindlage.  But  we 
find  a  still  more  striking  resemblance  to  the  earlier  doctrine  in  a 
discussion  which  occurs  shortly  before  the  one  that  we  have  just 
been  considering.  **  Besides  the  concept  of  the  Absolute  which 
we  formed  at  the  beginning,  we  have  now,  through  our  later  in- 
vestigations, gained  a  still  clearer  notion  of  the  form  of  the  Ab- 
solute ;  namely,  that  in  relation  to  a  possible  knowing,  it  is  a 
pure  thinking,  which  is  completely  bound  to  itself,  which  never 
comes  out  from  itself,  to  ask  for  a  *  why  '  or  to  posit  a  *  because  * 
of  its  formal  or  material  being,  even  if  there  be  an  absolute  *  be- 
cause ' ;  a  thinking  in  which,  by  reason  of  this  absolute  negation 
of  the  'because,'  Wi^  for-itself  {ox  knowing)  is  not  yet  posited, 
and  which  thus  is  a  mere  pure  being  without  any  knowing, 
although  in  our  science  we  must  make  this  being  visible  (dies 
Sein  anschaidich  machen)  by  the  help  of  the  absolute  pure 
form  of  thinking.  Knowing,  then,  as  absolute  and  as  completely 
bound  in  its  origin  (Ursprunglichkeit),  must  be  designated  as  the 
one, .  .  .  self-similar,  unchangeable,  eternal,  indestructible,  abso- 

1  Here  again  an  emendation  of  the  text  seems  necessary.  The  original  reads, 
"  Dies  \sc.  Wissen]  erschafft  sich  eben  selbst  aus  seiner  reinen  Moglichkeit,  als  das 
einzig  ihr  vorausgegebene,  und  diese  eben  ist  das  reine  Sein."  I  have  emended  this 
to  read,  "  als  dem  einzig  ihm  vorausgegebenen."  One  might  also  say,  though  less 
well,  "als  das  einzig  ihm  vorausgegebene" — the  sense  remaining  the  same.  But 
the  change  from  ihr  to  ihm  is  absolutely  necessary. 


88  FICHTKS  FUNDAMENTAL   PRINCIPLE. 

lute  being  (or  God,  if  one  will  only  admit  that  this  term  contains 
some  suggestion  of  knowing  and  of  a  relationship  to  knowing). 
.  .  .  But  now  this  Absolute  is  to  be  an  absolute  knowing.  It  must 
therefore  be  for  itself,  which,  as  we  have  shown,  it  can  be  only 
factually  \i.  e.,  only  by  becoming  actual],  through  the  absolute 
realization  of  freedom.  ...  It  must  go  out  from  itself,  must  re- 
produce itself."  But  this  production  must  not  be  "  merely  a 
knowing  for  and  of  itself,  as  the  product  of  freedom,  for  this 
.  .  .  would  be  a  knowing  quite  detached  from  the  Absolute ;  it 
must  rather  be  ...  a  Fursich  of  the  Absolute  in  and  by  means 
of"  the  realization  through  freedom.  This  realization  "cannot 
tear  itself  away"  from  the  Absolute ;  if  it  did,  we  should  have, 
"  not  an  absolute  knowing,  but  only  a  free  and  contingent  know- 
ing, utterly  without  content  and  substance."  We  have,  then, 
"  a  perfectly  immediate,  nay  an  absolute  connection  "  between 
the  Absolute  and  its  realization.  Hence,  when  we  say  that  the 
realization  "  is  a  knowing,  a  Fursich,  we  no  longer  mean  simply 
that  it  is  a  something  produced  through  freedom  ;  we  mean  also 
that  it  is  a  knowing  which  is  united  with  the  Absolute  by  means 
of  that  absolute  connection  —  a  knowing  which  expresses  the 
Absolute."  ^ 

The  thought  that  Fichte  is  trying  to  develop  here  seems  to  be 
that  the  Absolute  and  its  manifestation  are  really  one.  The  '  be- 
ing '  of  which  we  hear  so  much  in  the  later  writings,  is  not  some- 
thing other  than  knowing,  something  distinct  from  the  Ego  ;  it 
is  knowing  conceived  as  source  of  itself,  or,  in  other  words,  it  is 
the  Ego  considered  as  fundamental  principle.  The  general  tenor 
of  the  passage  seems  to  suggest  that  the  Absolute  of  the  Darstel- 
lung  is  the  correlate  of  the  absolute  Ego  which  we  find  in  the 
Grundlage,  that  particular  knowing  corresponds  to  the  world  of 
consciousness,  and  absolute  knowing  to  the  Idea  of  the  Ego. 

The  Wissenschaftslehre  of  1804  is  one  of  the  most  important 
of  Pichte's  later  writings  and  one  which  throws  some  light  upon 
our  present  problem.  In  it,  as  in  the  Darstellung,  the  doctrine 
of  the  self-negation  of  knowing  plays  an  important  part.  Instead 
of  the  term  'knowing,'  however,  Fichte  now  uses  the  word  *  con- 

>S.  \V.,  II,  6off. 


BEING  AND   EXISTENCE.  89 

cept'  or  *  insight'  {Einsicht).  The  Absolute  he  usually  speaks 
of  as  the  '  living  Light,'  of  which  the  world  of  thought  is  the  man- 
ifestation. In  one  sense  we  cannot  get  beyond  the  manifestation 
of  the  Light ;  in  another  sense,  as  soon  as  we  speak  of  it  as  a  mani- 
festation, we  are  already  beyond  it.  The  Light  has  a  dual  ex- 
istence {Existenz) ;  an  outer,  objective  one,  in  and  for  our  thought, 
and  an  inner  one,  "  conditioned,  by  the  negation  of  the  concept."  ^ 
By  negating  our  insight,  we  may  get  a  description  of  this  inner 
life  :  it  is  "  that  which  we  cannot  in  any  way  see  into,  which  re- 
mains after  the  most  complete  and  penetrating  insight ;  it  is  das 
fiir  sick  bestehen  Sollende^  ^  This  is  the  result  gained  by  negat- 
ing the  insight.  Thus  we  learn  that  **  the  insight  can  see  into 
itself^  the  concept  can  conceive  itself."  In  doing  this,  "the 
concept  finds  its  boundary,  .  .  .  beyond  which  lies  the  one  pure 
living  Light."  2 

So  far,  the  relation  between  knowing  and  the  Absolute,  or  the 
concept  and  the  Light,  seems  to  be  regarded  as  negative  ;  but 
Fichte  goes  on  to  a  fuller  development  of  his  thought.  The 
discussion  *  is  long  and  complicated,  and  very  difficult  of  inter- 
pretation ;  but  the  argument  seems  to  be  as  follows.  If  we  say 
that  we  reach  the  Absolute  by  the  negation  of  the  concept,  two 
possible  points  of  view  at  once  suggest  themselves.  Either  we 
may  maintain  that  the  Ansich  which  has  thus  been  reached,  is 
the  Absolute  (this  is  the  realistic  theory)  ;^  or  we  may  say  that, 
since  it  is  reached  by  the  self-negation  of  the  concept,  the  con- 
cept itself  is  the  Absolute  (this  is  the  idealistic  theory).^  Both 
these  theories  are  one-sided.  In  each  we  have  a  factual,  rather 
than  a  genetic,  view;^  i.  e.,  we  are  dealing  with  our  thinking  of 
the  Ansich,  rather  than  with  its  self-co7istniction  in  us.^  On  the 
idealistic  view,  we  make  our  thinking  the  fundamental  principle. 
But  what  right  have  we  to  assume  that  simply  because  we  are 
conscious  of  this  thinking,  therefore  it  is  02ir  thinking?^  The 
truth  is  rather  that  the  living  Ansich  thinks  in  us.  On  the  real- 
istic view,  on  the  other  hand,  we  set  up,  as  absolute,  an  Ansich 
that  has  been  gained  by  the  negation  of  its  opposite.      Now  this 

»N.  W.,  II,  148.  2N.  W.,  II,  150.  3N.  W.,  II,  152.  «N.  W.,  II,  161-212. 
SN.  W.,  II,  174-176,  179,  201.  6  j^.  W.,II,  171-173.  7  N.  W.,  II,  181. 
8  N.  W.,  II,  191.  9  N.  W.,  II,  1S9,  201. 


90 


FICHTKS  FUNDAMENTAL   PRINCIPLE. 


could  not  be  the  ultimate  principle.  That  which  ''  is  determined 
by  the  negation  of  an  opposite  "  is  a  "  member  of  a  relation  " 
and  hence  is  no  true  Ansich,  no  Absolute.^  We  must  remove 
from  our  concept  all  such  negative  determination,  all  relativity. 
When  we  have  done  this,  "■  there  remains  the  positing  and  per- 
sisting and  resting  of  an  Ansich  taken  as  absolute,  ...  a  being 
which  for  its  being  needs  no  other  being.  .  .  .  The  whole  re- 
lation and  comparison  with  a  Nichtansich,  from  which  first  the 
form  of  the  Ansich  arises,  ...  is  utterly  meaningless  and  use- 
less." ^  In  this  first  form  we  objectified  the  pure  being,  as 
thought  must  always  do,  and  thus  we  had  its  outer  existence. 
Our  task  now  is  to  penetrate  to  its  inner  essence  ;  and  we  do 
this,  "  when  we  look  at  it  as  a  genetic  principle  for  its  appearance 
in  the  outer  existential  form."  ^ 

We  have  thus  reached  a  higher  unity  of  realism  and  idealism 
in  the  thought  of  the  Absolute  as  "  pure  being  "  in  "  abstraction 
from  all  relation."  This  being  is  wholly  '' of  itself ,  in  itself, 
through  itself  ...  It  is  an  esse  in  mero  actuj'  ^  the  perfect 
interpenetration  of  being  and  life.  "  There  is  no  duality  or  plurality 
at  all,  but  only  unity  ;  for  .  .  .  the  essence  of  being  consists  in 
a  self-enclosed  unity."  Now  "if  being  is  encompassed  by  its 
own  absolute  life  and  can  never  get  outside  its  own  life,  it 
.  .  .  can  be  nothing  else  than  a  self-enclosed  Ego,"  the  "  living 
Wirin  sichy  ^  We  have  here  a  new  insight  into  the  nature  of  our 
ultimate  principle.  Our  previous  insight  objectified  the  Absolute 
—  went  out  from  itself  to  a  being  which  it  described  as  an  inac- 
cessible Ansich.  From  our  present  point  of  view,  being  is  not 
objectified.  In  this  new  insight,  "we  ourselves  become  being." 
We  cannot  "  go  out  to  it,  because  we  are  it.  .  .  .  We  cannot  go 
out  from  ourselves  because  being  cannot  go  out  from  itself"  ^ 

This  discussion  is  perhaps  the  most  important  expression  in 
the  later  works  of  Fichte's  belief  in  the  closeness  of  the  relation 
between  consciousness  and  its  ultimate  ground.  Passages  like 
this  furnish  the  best  answer  that  can  be  made  to  the  objection 
raised  by  Harms,  that  Fichte's  Absolute  is  conceived  negatively. 


IN.  w.,  II,  202  f. 

*N.  W.,  II,  205  f. 


2N.  W.,  II.  203  f. 
5N.  W.,  II,  206  f. 


3N.  W.,  II,  204. 
6N.  W.,  II,  208. 


BEING  AND   EXISTENCE.  9 1 

According  to  this  critic,  Fichte  teaches  that  the  fundamental 
principle  is  reached  by  the  negation  of  knowing.  But,  says 
Harms,  in  thus  maintaining  that  ultimate  being  is  inconceivable 
and  unknowable,  Fichte  is  carrying  over  into  the  Absolute  what 
is  really  only  a  defect  of  human  thought.  In  reality,  being  "  is 
not  the  negation  of  knowing,  but  the  positing  of  the  known 
object ;  it  is  not  sine  noHone,  hut  prceter  notionem.^'  ^ 

If  we  take  Fichte' s  statements  literally,  it  cannot  be  denied  that 
there  are  some  which  seem,  at  first  thought,  to  justify  this  criti- 
cism. The  passages  in  which  he  tells  us  that  we  cannot  apply 
any  predicates  to  the  Absolute  and  in  which  he  says  that  it  is 
discovered  only  by  the  self-negation  of  knowing  are  cases  in 
point.  But  the  discussion  which  we  have  now  before  us  suggests 
a  different  interpretation.  Here  Fichte  distinctly  rejects  the  doc- 
trine of  a  negative  Absolute.  It  must  be  remembered  also  that 
after  developing,  in  the  earlier  part  of  this  work,  the  doctrine  of 
the  self-negation  of  knowing,  he  proceeds  from  this  very  point  to 
work  out  a  positive  conception  of  the  Absolute.  Hence  it 
seems  that  we  are  justified  in  regarding  the  first  doctrine  as 
provisional.  In  this  connection  we  may  also  quote  an  interesting 
passage  in  this  same  work,  in  which  Fichte  explains  what  he 
means  by  calling  his  principle  unknowable.  "  The  inconceiva- 
bility'' of  the  Absolute,  he  says,  "is  merely  the  negation  of  the 
concept,  the  expression  of  its  abrogation,  hence  a  characteristic 
proceeding  from  knowing  and  the  concept  and  carried  over  from 
them.  .  .  .  The  Absolute  is  not  in  itself  inconceivable ;  for  this 
does  not  mean  anything.  It  is  inconceivable  only  when  the  con- 
cept tries  to  comprehend  it."  ^  Thus,  in  speaking  of  the  princi- 
ple as  unknowable,  Fichte  asserts,  what  most  of  us  would  readily 
grant,  that  all  attempts  to  exhaust  the  Absolute  by  our  concepts 
are  foredoomed  to  failure.  But  this  is  not  to  say  that  we  have 
no  means  whatever  of  apprehending  the  nature  of  the  ultimate 
principle ;  on  the  contrary,  Fichte  believes  that  all  our  thinking 
and  all  our  acting  are  a  revelation  of  its  inmost  essence. 

The  results  of  our  examination  seem  to  show  that  in  the  Wis- 
senschaftslehre  of  1804,  as  in  the  Darstellung  der  Wissenschafts- 

^  Die  Philosophie  seit  Kant  (Berlin,  1876),  332.  2  N.  W,,  II,  117  f. 


92  FICHTES  FUNDAMENTAL   PRINCIPLE. 

lehre,  there  is  a  marked  tendency  to  emphasize  the  oneness  of  the 
Absolute  and  its  manifestation.  And  in  general,  we  seem  to 
have  found  considerable  evidence  in  favor  of  the  point  which  we 
have  been  trying  to  establish,  namely,  that  in  the  second  period 
the  obvious  tendency  to  dwell  upon  the  difference  between  con- 
sciousness and  its  ultimate  ground  is  to  a  considerable  extent 
counterbalanced  by  a  tendency  in  the  opposite  direction. 

But  before  we  can  say  that  we  have  fully  justified  our  inter- 
pretation, we  must  consider  one  more  aspect  of  the  question.  If 
we  take  the  conception  of  being  which  Fichte  gives  us  in  the 
second  period,  being  as  a  self-dependent,  all-embracing  whole,  if 
we  say  that  the  Absolute,  in  its  inmost  essence,  is  sufficient  unto 
itself,  has  no  need  to  be  supplied,  no  lack  to  be  made  good,  how 
are  we  to  understand  the  relation  between  this  self-enclosed 
Absolute  and  its  manifestation  as  temporal  process  ?  Why,  on 
Fichte' s  principles,  need  there  be  any  world  at  all,  any  system  of 
conscious  beings,  any  history  of  the  human  race  ?  Why  should 
the  timeless  reality  enter  thus  into  the  form  of  time  ?  Why 
should  it  give  up  the  changeless  calm  of  its  own  inner  life  and 
transform  itself^  into  this  restless,  turbulent  world-process,  this 
ceaseless  striving  for  a  goal  that  can  never  be  reached  ?  This  is 
an  important  question  for  Fichte's  philosophy,  and  it  is  clear 
that  he  himself  recognized  it  as  such. 

To  this  question  Fichte  seems  to  make  two  very  different  an- 
swers. Sometimes  he  tells  us  that  the  Absolute  manifests  itself 
through  a  necessity  of  its  own  inner  nature.  At  other  times  he 
speaks  as  if  there  were  in  it  no  ground  for  its  manifestation.  It 
does,  as  a  fact y  reveal  itself,  but  its  self- revelation  seems  to  have 
no  inner  connection  with  its  Sein.  On  the  contrary,  the  Dasein  is 
declared  to  rest  upon  an  act  of  freedom,  and  the  language  used, 

1  It  is  hardly  necessary  to  explain  that  the  expressions  '  give  up '  and  *  transform ' 
are  not  to  be  taken  literally.  The  relation  between  Sein  and  Dasein y  in  Fichte's 
theory,  is  not,  on  any  possible  interpretation,  a  temporal  one.  The  question,  more 
exactly  stated,  is  this  :  If  the  Absolute,  in  the  aspect  which  we  call  Sein^  is  all-suffi- 
cient, why  has  it  also  the  other  aspect  of  Dasein  ?  Our  answer  to  this  question  —  to 
anticipate  the  results  of  the  discussion  upon  which  we  are  about  to  enter  —  is  that,  in 
spite  of  his  assertions  to  the  contrary,  Fichte  does  not  really  regard  the  Sein  as  all- 
sufficient,  i.  e.y  that  it  is  for  him  only  one  of  the  two  complementary  aspects  of  the 
ultimate  principle. 


BEING  AND   EXISTENCE.  93 

often  suggests  that  by  *  freedom  '  is  meant  absolute  freedom,  liberty 
of  indifference.  The  actual  world,  we  are  told,  is  a  product  of 
freedom  and  necessity.  If  there  is  to  be  a  world,  there  must  be  in 
it  a  certain  order  and  sequence  —  it  must  be  governed  by  law. 
But  that  there  should  be  a  world,  that  the  Absolute  should  mani- 
fest itself  in  the  time-process,  is  by  no  means  necessary  ;  it  is  the 
result  of  a  free  activity.  This  seems  to  be  the  teaching  of  several 
passages  in  the  Darstellung  der  Wissenschaftslehre.  E.  g.,  "  We 
have  considered  .  .  .  knowing  as  pure  arising  out  of  nothing. 
Thus  we  have  regarded  it  positively  as  actual  arising.  .  .  .  This  is 
its  form.  But  in  the  matter  (^Materie)  of  the  arising  there  is  involved 
the  possibility  that  it  was  also  able  not  to  be.  Hence  the  being  of 
knowing,  in  distinction  from  the  absolute  being,  is  posited  as  con- 
tingent, as  something  that  could  just  as  well  not-be,  as  an  act  of 
absolute  freedom.  .  .  .  This  now  is  freedom  and  indeed  absolute 
freedom,  indifference  with  regard  to*  the  absolute  .  .  .  knowing 
itself.  .  .  .  Negatively  considered,  it  is  nothing  else  than  the 
thought  of  the  contingency  of  absolute  knowing.  (Observe  the 
apparent  contradiction  :  knowing  is  the  absolutely  contingent  or 
the  contingent  Absolute  —  the  aspect  of  contingency  ...  of  the 
Absolute  —  just  because  it  enters  into  [the  sphere  of]  quantity 
and  into  the  absolute  basal  form  of  quantity,  into  the  infinite 
time-series).  Positively  considered,  freedom  is  the  thought  of  the 
absoluteness  of  knowing,  the  thought  that  it  posits  itself  through. 
self- realizing  freedom."  ^  And  again  :  *'  Knowing,  with  refer- 
ence to  its  being  (its  existence,  its  being  posited),  is  by  no  means 
necessary,  but  has  its  ground  in  absolute  formal  freedom.  .  .  . 
^  there  is  a  knowing,  then  it  is  necessarily  free  (freedom  bound)  ; 
for  its  essence  consists  in  freedom.  But  that  there  is  a  knowing 
at  all,  depends  wholly  on  absolute  freedom,  and  hence  there  could 
just  as  well  be  none."  ^ 

The  same  view  seems  to  be  expressed  in  this  passage  from  the 
Wissenschaftslehre  of  1812:  "That  there  is  a  factual  world, 
depends  altogether  on  this,  that  the  freedom  of  the  appearance 
{Erscheimmg)  surrenders  itself  to  the  law.  ...  It  is  clear  that 
freedom  is  not  compelled  to  surrender  itself;  for  thus  it  would 
»S.  W.,  11,  157  f.  2s.  w.,  II,  52. 


94  FICHTES  FUNDAMENTAL   PRINCIPLE. 

not  be  freedom.  ...  It  is  only  after  freedom  has  surrendered 
itself  and  thus  has  destroyed  and  negated  itself  as  freedom,  that 
this  factual  law  steps  in."  ^ 

/  These  and  other  passages  are  quoted  by  Miss  Thompson  ^  in 
Support  of  her  interpretation  of  Fichte.  According  to  her  view, 
His  doctrine,  both  in  the  first  and  in  the  second  period,  is  that  the 
world  of  consciousness  owes  its  existence  to  an  act  of  absolute 
freedom.  In  her  own  words  :  **  A  free  will  which  as  freedom  is 
the  power  and  possibility  of  anything,  of  law  or  of  not-law,  of 
existence  or  of  non-existence,  wills  to  be,  or,  in  other  words,  to 
appear  as  law.  .  .  .  Hereupon  the  phenomenal  world,  the  totality 
of  consciousness,  becomes  visible.  .  .  .  Hence  the  phenomenal 
world  may  be  defined  as  Will-stuff  freely  becoming  law :  in  sub- 
stance it  is  Will,  in  form  it  is  Necessity.  Any  other  form  might 
be  assumed,  for  the  substance  is  absolutely  free  with  the  unthink- 
able freedom  of  indifference,  caprice.  But  it  chooses  to  renounce 
this  freedom  and  appear  as  the  world  of  consciousness  with  its 
laws."  3 

It  must  be  admitted  that  there  are  passages  which  seem  at  first 
thought  to  justify  this  interpretation.  Nevertheless  I  cannot 
believe  that  it  represents  Fichte's  real  position.  He  never 
meant  to  say,  I  think,  that  the  relation  between  the  Sein  and 
Dasein  of  the  Absolute  is  in  any  sense  an  arbitrary  one.  On  the 
contrary,  I  should  maintain  that  even  where  he  distinguishes 
sharply  between  these  two  aspects  —  and  that  he  often  does  this, 
I  have  not  attempted  to  deny  —  he  none  the  less  believes  in  their 
necessary  interrelation. 

In  the  Darstellung  der  Wissenschaftslehre  we  are  told,  not  only 
that  absolute  knowing  is  a  union  of  being  and  freedom,  but  also 
that  the  Absolute  itself  is  such  a  union.^     Now  if  it  be  true  that 

'N.  W.,  11,  430. 

'Anna  Boynton  Thompson:  The  Unity  of  Fichte' s  Doctrine  of  Knowledge, 
Boston,  1895. 

'  Op.  cit.y  p.  17.  It  is  hardly  necessary  to  add  that  Miss  Thompson  does  not  mean 
this  as  the  description  of  an  actual  event.  As  she  explains,  '*The  world  of  con- 
sciousness, in  its  complex  wholeness,  is  all  that  there  is."  Freedom  and  law  are  its 
"  two  logical  constituents"  (  Op.  cit.^  p.  18). 

*  S.  W.,  II,  24,  quoted  above,  p.  85.  'Being,'  in  the  Darstellung,  seems  to 
correspond  to  *  necessity. ' 


BEING  AND  EXISTENCE.  95 

being — the  element  of  necessity  —  is  contained  in  the  very  nature 
of  the  Absolute,  it  is  difficult  to  see  how  we  can  speak  of  the  real 
world  as  grounded  in  an  act  of  freedom,  —  in  the  sense  of  liberty 
of  indifference,  — how  we  can  suggest  that  there  might  equally 
well  have  been  an  utterly  different  world  from  this  one,  or  even 
no  world  at  all.  But  there  are  many  other  statements  of  Fichte's 
which  make  still  more  strongly  against  this  interpretation. 
Immediately  after  the  passage  which  we  quoted  from  the  Wis- 
senschaftslehre  of  1 8 1 2,  as  seeming  to  corroborate  Miss  Thomp- 
son's view,  Fichte  introduces  the  concept  of  the  Ought  in  such  a 
way  as  to  suggest  a  different  interpretation.  Freedom,  he  has 
told  us,  is  not  compelled  to  surrender  itself  to  the  law.  In  fact, 
there  is  no  law,  no  necessity,  until  freedom  has  already  made  the 
surrender.  Then  for  the  first  time  we  have  a  "factual  law." 
Now  it  \s>  only  **  by  the  factual  seeing  "  that  *'  the  perception 
{Anschammg)  of  the  Real  ^  ...  is  conditioned.  Suppose  now 
that  we  are  to  come  to  this  seeing,  that  the  Absolute  is  to  make 
itself  visible,  then  this  is  possible  only  on  condition  that  freedom 
surrender  itself  to  the  factual  law.  If  it  does  not  surrender  itself, 
there  is  no  perception  at  all  \i.  e.,  no  world  of  consciousness,  no 
actual  world] .  But  there  ought  to  be  perception.  Hence  free- 
dom ought  to  surrender  itself.  The  whole  factual  world  is 
grounded  upon  absolute  freedom  and  upon  a  law  for  freedom ; 
not,  to  be  sure,  so  far  as  we  have  yet  seen,  a  qualitative  and 
material  law  —  for  the  world  has  this  within  itself — but  upon 
a  merely /<?r;«^/ law  of  the  surrender.  .  .  .  What  have  we  now 
gained  ?  .  .  .  We  have  reached  the  point  of  connection  of  the 
two  worlds,  the  factual  and  the  supra-factual.  .  .  .  Our  last 
important-  discovery  was  a  freedom  either  to  remain  free  or  to 
surrender  itself  to  a  law  which  restricts  it. ,  We  have  now  deter- 
mined this  freedom  still  further  and  have  thus  removed  a  source 
of  error.  Freedom  [we  now  see]  is  in  no  sense  a  principle  that 
is  real  in  itself  \i.  e.,  a  factual  existence],  but  it  is  merely  the 
principle  [of  the  possibility]  of  various  forms  of  seeing.  In  itself 
it  is  by  no  means  the  Real,  but  it  is  only  the  capacity  of  appre- 
hending   (anschaueri)   the    Real,   which    proceeds    from    and    is 

^  •  The  Real '  means  here  '  the  Absolute.' 


96  FICHTE'S  FUNDAMENTAL   PRINCIPLE. 

grounded  upon  the  apprehensibility  of  the  Real.  This  principle 
IS  free,  as  the  ground  of  determination  of  various  modes  of  seeing. 
.  .  .  And,  further,  this  variety  of  the  seeing  is  determined  in  a 
twofold  way,  since  it  [the  principle]  either  surrenders  itself  to  an 
already  existing  necessity  or  tears  itself  away  from  such  a  neces- 
sity. Now  it  cannot  tear  itself  away,  and  see  by  means  of  this 
tearing  itself  away,  unless  it  has  first  surrendered  itself.  Hence 
freedom  is  subject  to  a  law  of  necessity,  which  is  grounded  in  its 
own  nature.  Thus  all  actual  seeing  is  conditioned  by  a  deter- 
mination of  absolute  freedom,  and  this  determination  necessarily 
begins  with  a  self-surrender,  since  the  opposed  determination  — 
the  tearing  itself  away  —  is  conditioned  by  the  surrender.  All 
seeing,  then,  .  .  .  rests  upon  this  act  of  freedom  as  the  ground 
of  its  actuality.  From  the  Absolute  itself,  the  Real,  proceeds 
only  the  visibility,  i.  e.,  .  .  .  freedom,  and  nothing  more.  If  now 
one  wishes  to  connect  the  actual  seeing  .  .  .  with  the  Real  by 
a  law,  one  can  only  say  :  *  The  Real  ozight  to  be  seen  ;  freedom 
ought  therefore  to  surrender  itself  to  the  factual  law.'  Absolute 
freedom  itself  is  viewed  as  subject  to  a  law  and  that  a  law  of  free- 
dom, a  mere  Ought.''  ^  *'  The  ground  of  determinate  actuality, 
then,  must  be  sought  in  freedom,  and  for  that  matter  in  a  law 
which  governs  freedom.  .  .  .  Freedom  cannot  surrender  itself  to 
the  higher  realm,  unless  it  has  first  surrendered  itself  to  the 
lower ;  for  to  surrender  oneself  to  the  higher  means  to  tear  one- 
self away  from  the  lower."  ^ 

From  this  it  seems  evident  that  a  passage  which  at  first  ap- 
peared to  offer  strong  evidence  in  favor  of  Miss  Thompson's 
interpretation  represents  only  a  provisional  view,  which  Fichte  at 
once  proceeds  to  modify.  And  the  modification  is  suggested  in 
two  ways.  In  the  first  place,  the  conception  of  freedom  which 
we  find  in  the  latter  part  of  the  discussion  differs  materially  from 
that  which  appears  in  the  earlier  part.  Whereas  at  first  Fichte 
seems  to  think  of  freedom  as  mere  liberum  arbitrium  indifferen- 
ticB,  the  conception  that  appears  later  is  the  Kantian  one,  of  moral 
freedom  as  freedom  from  the  dominion  of  the  lower  impulses,  as 
power  to  choose  the  higher,  as  ability  to  act  in  conformity  with 
1  N.  W.,  II,  431  f.  ^  N.  W.,  II,  433. 


I 


BEING   AND   EXISTENCE.  97 

the  moral  law.  We  seem  to  have  in  the  passage  a  doctrine 
in  which  are  united  the  two  conceptions  of  freedom  —  freedom, 
as  the  principle  of  activity  which  is  the  ground  of  the  world  of 
consciousness,  and  human  freedom,  as  the  ability  to  realize  the 
moral  ideal.  But  if  we  reflect  for  a  moment,  we  shall  see  that 
these  two  conceptions  are  by  no  means  contradictory,  that  on 
his  own  principles  Fichte  is  certainly  justified  in  thus  uniting 
them.  Freedom,  as  the  world-ground,  is  what  is  called  in  the 
Grundlage  of  1794  the  infinite  outward-going  activity  of  the 
Ego  —  the  unrestrained,  undefined  activity,  which,  because  it  is 
without  object  and  without  purpose,  is,  as  Fichte  so  often  tells 
us,  nothing  for  itself  and  therefore  nothing  at  all  —  is,  one  might 
say,  rather  the  possibility  of  activity  than  activity  itself  Such  a 
characterless  principle  may  not  unfitly  be  described  as  mere  free- 
dom, which  knows  no  law,  as  liberty  of  indifference.  But,  as  we 
saw  in  the  preceding  chapter,  Fichte  is  by  no  means  satisfied  to 
describe  his  ultimate  principle  in  this  way.  The  absolute  Ego  is 
a  provisional  conception,  and  it  is  later  replaced,  or  at  least  sup- 
plemented, by  the  concept  of  the  Ego  as  Idea,  which  creates 
obstacles  as  a  means  to  the  exercise  of  its  activity,  which  limits 
itself  in  order  to  realize  itself.  This  relation  between  the  concep- 
tions of  the  absolute  Ego  and  the  Ego  as  Idea  helps  us  to 
understand  the  doctrine  of  freedom  in  the  passage  under 
consideration.  For  human  freedom,  as  the  power  to  escape 
from  the  dominion  of  the  lower  impulse,  as  the  ability  to  real- 
ize, in  some  measure,  the  ideals  which  we  set  before  ourselves,  is 
simply  the  expression,  in  individual  form,  of  the  principle  which 
is  active  throughout  the  whole  course  of  human  history  and  which 
makes  of  this  history  a  continuous  overcoming  of  limitations. 
Hence  we  have  in  this  passage  precisely  the  same  transformation 
of  the  first  provisional  conception  of  freedom  that  we  found  in 
the  Grundlage.  True  freedom,  like  the  true  Ego,  is  possible 
only  through  the  presence  of  an  obstacle  to  be  overcome,  of  a 
lower  impulse  to  be  subdued.  Hence  true  freedom,  like  the  true 
Ego,  is  subject  to  law.  In  one  sense,  as  Fichte  says,  freedom  is 
free  either  to  realize  itself  or  not  to  realize  itself.  But,  in  another 
sense,  we  may  say  that  it  imist  realize  itself,  that  otherwise  it  is 


98  FICHTE'S  FUNDAMENTAL  PRINCIPLE. 

not  true  freedom  at  all ;  for  this  consists  in  tearing  oneself  away 
from  the  seductions  of  the  lower  in  response  to  the  call  of  the 
higher.  "  Hence  freedom  is  subject  to  a  law  of  necessity,  which 
is  grounded  in  its  own  nature."  In  spite  of  what  was  said  at  first 
of  the  freedom  to  remain  free  or  to  surrender  itself,  it  is  really 
involved  in  the  conception  of  freedom  that  it  surrender  itself 

We  have  said  that  the  modification  of  the  concept  of  free- 
dom is  suggested  in  the  passage  in  two  ways.  One  of  these  we 
have  just  considered;  what  is  the  other?  It  is  found  in  the 
assertion  that  the  Absolute  ought  to  manifest  itself  "  Es  soil  dazu 
[zu  einer  Anschauung]  kommen."  ^  "The  Real  ought  to  be 
seen ;  freedom  ought  therefore  to  surrender  itself  to  the  factual 
law."  Here,  Fichte  says,  "absolute  freedom  itself  is  viewed  as 
subject  to  a  law."  This  law,  however,  he  describes,  not  as  a  law 
of  necessity,  but  as  "a  law  of  freedom,  a  mere  Ought."  This 
seems,  at  first  glance,  to  suggest  a  rather  different  point  of  view 
from  the  one  that  we  have  just  been  considering.  There,  Fichte 
said  that  in  order  that  there  may  be  true  freedom,  there  must  be 
this  world  of  ours,  this  system  of  finite  consciousnesses,  in  and 
through  which  the  ideal  of  freedom  may  be  gradually  realized. 
On  this  view,  the  tendency  to  self-realization  is  involved  in  the 
very  nature  of  freedom,  so  that  from  this  nature  the  existence 
of  the  world  follows  necessarily.  Here,  however,  he  speaks  of 
the  law  to  which  freedom  is  subject  as  a  *  mere  Ought,*  which 
would  seem  to  suggest  that  although  there  ought  to  be  a  world, 
although  the  Absolute  ought  to  manifest  itself,  still  the  relation 
between  it  and  its  manifestation  is  contingent  rather  than  neces- 
sary —  rests  upon  an  arbitrary  act  of  freedom. 

So  it  seems  at  first  thought.  But  a  little  reflection  will  con- 
vince us  that  this  cannot  be  Fichte's  meaning.  No  one  would 
admit  more  readily  than  he  that  there  can  be,  for  the  Absolute, 
no  Ought  in  the  sense  of  an  external  command.  To  say  that 
"  the  Real  ought  to  be  seen,"  can  mean  only  that  the  tendency 
to  self-manifestation  is  involved  in  the  very  nature  of  this  Real. 
Thus  we  come  to  the  same  interpretation  which  we  formerly 
gained  by  a  different  method ;  and  the  entire  passage,  far  from 

IN.  W.,  II,  431- 


BEING   AND   EXISTENCE.  99 

being  an  argument  for  the  contingency  of  the  world's  existence, 
is  seen  to  be  an  expression  of  the  doctrine  that  this  existence  is 
necessarily  involved  in  the  nature  of  the  Absolute  itself. 

The  same  thought  is  emphasized  in  many  other  passages  from 
the  later  writings/  In  the  Wissenschaftslehre  in  ikrem  allgemeinen 
Umrisse,  we  are  told  that  the  schema  —  which  is  another  expres- 
sion for  knowing,  as  the  Dasehi  of  the  Absolute  —  is,  ''merely 
through  the  fact  that  God  is  ;  and  if  God  is,  it  is  impossible  that 
the  schema  should  not  be.  We  should  by  no  means  think  of  it 
as  an  effect,  produced  by  a  special  act  of  God,  in  which  he  trans- 
forms himself  within  himself;  but  we  should  think  of  it  as  an 
immediate  consequence  of  his  being."  ^  Again,  in  Das  Wesen  des 
Gelehrten  of  1805,  Fichte  says,  "  The  world  is  the  manifestation 
.  .  .  or  outer  existence  {Existenz)  of  the  divine  life."  This  hfe 
"manifests  itself  just  as  it  actually  is  and  lives  within  itself,  and 
can  manifest  itself  in  no  other  way?  Hence  between  its  true  in- 
ner being  and  its  outer  manifestation,  there  is  no  arbitrary  choice 
{grundiose  Willkur),  in  consequence  of  which  it  reveals  itself  only 
in  part  and  partly  conceals  itself.  But  its  manifestation,  /.  e.,  the 
world,  is  conditioned  solely  by  the  two  factors  of  its  own  inner 
essence  and  the  unchangeable  laws  of  its  expression.  .  .  .  God 
manifests  himself  as  God  can  manifest  himself.  His  whole  incon- 
ceivable nature  comes  forth  without  division  and  without  repres- 
sion, in  so  far  as  it  can  come  forth  in  a  mere  manifestation.  The 
divine  life  in  itself  .  .  .  is  a  self-enclosed  unity,  without  mutability 
or  change.  In  its  manifestation  it  becomes  ...  an  infinitely  de- 
veloping and  ever  ascending  life  in  an  endless  time-process."  * 
And  in  the  Wissenschaftslehre  of  1804  we  have  the  following 
emphatic  statement :  ''  If  you  posit  the  pure  immanent  being  as 
the  Absolute,  Substance,  God,  .  .  .  and  the  appearance,  i.  e.,  the 
.  .  .  inner  genetic  construction  of  the  Absolute,  as  the  revela- 

•  1  consider  this  question  (as  to  the  contingency  of  the  actual  world)  simply  with 
reference  to  the  second  period.  My  reason  for  this  is  that  the  later  writings  suggest 
the  doctrine  of  contingency  more  strongly  than  the  earlier  ones  do  ;  and  since  1  hope 
to  be  able  to  show  that  even  in  the  later  works  Fichte  does  not  really  hold  this  doc- 
trine, it  seems  hardly  necessary  to  undertake  the  easier  task  of  showing  it  for  the 
earlier  works. 

2  S.  W.,  II,  696.  3  The  italics  are  mine.  <  S.  W.,  VI,  361  f. 


100  FICHTE'S  FUNDAMENTAL   PRINCIPLE. 

tion  and  expression  of  God,  then  the  latter  is  seen  to  be  abso- 
lutely necessary  and  to  be  grounded  in  the  nature  of  the  Abso- 
lute itself  This  insight  into  the  absolute  inner  necessity  .  .  . 
is  a  characteristic  that  distinguishes  the  Wissenschaftslehre  from 
all  other  systems  whatsoever.  In  all  others  without  exception, 
there  is,  besides  the  absolute  substance,  an  absolute  contin- 
gency." We  cannot  emphasize  too  strongly  the  necessity  of 
the  manifestation.  Thought  struggles  against  this  conception 
"  with  all  its  might.  For  freedom  is  always  the  last  thing  that 
we  are  willing  to  give  up  ;  and  if  we  cannot  save  it  for  ourselves, 
we  try  at  least  to  find  a  refuge  for  it  in  God."  ^ 

To  these  passages  we  may  add  one  more,  from  the  Anweisung 
zum  seligen  Leben :  "God  himself — i.  e.,  the  inner  essence  of 
the  Absoldte,  which  is  distinguished  from  its  outer  existence  only 
for  our  finitude^  —  cannot  destroy  this  absolute  fusion  of  the 
essence  with  the  form.  To  our  first,  merely  factual,  way  of  look- 
ing at  it,  his  existence  seems  to  be  factual  and  contingent  (zufdl- 
lig).  But  for  real  thinking,  which  alone  is  decisive,  it  is  not  con- 
tingent ;  it  exists,  and  it  could  not  be  otherwise ;  it  must  follow 
necessarily  from  the  inner  essejice.  In  consequence  of  God's  inner 
essence,  then,  this  inner  essence  is  inseparably  united  with  the 
form."  Paraphrasing  the  opening  words  of  the  Gospel  according 
to  John,  Fichte  continues  :  *'  In  the  beginning,  wholly  indepen- 
dent of  all  possibility  of  the  opposite,  independent  of  all  arbi- 
trariness, all  chance,  and  thus  of  all  time,  grounded  in  the  inner 
necessity  of  the  divine  essence  itself,  was  the  form.  And  the 
form  was  with  God  .  .  .  and  the  form  itself  was  God  ;  thus  God 
came  forth  in  it  just  as  he  is  in  himself."  ^ 

These  passages  show  that  Fichte  often  conceived  the  relation 
between  the  Sein  and  Dasein  of  the  Absolute  as  necessary  rather 
than  contingent.  And  it  seems  to  me  that  it  is  possible  to  inter- 
pret what  he  says  about  freedom  so  that  it  will  harmonize  with 
this  conception.  Two  considerations  may  be  suggested  that  will 
enable  us,  I  think,  to  reconcile  his  doctrine  of  freedom  with  his 
theory  of  a  necessary  relation  between  the  Absolute  and  its  mani- 

iN.  W.,  II,  223.  It  is  obvious  that  the  freedom  of  which  Fichte  is  speaking 
here,  is  freedom  in  the  sense  of  liberty  of  indifference. 

2  The  italics  are  mine.  3S.  W.,  V,  510. 


BEING   AND  EXISTENCE.  lOI 

festation.  In  the  first  place  let  us  ask  ourselves  what  is  the 
essential  meaning  of  the  statement,  so  often  made  by  him, 
that  freedom  is  the  ground  of  actual  existence.  There  are  two 
or  three  passages  in  which  he  compares  his  philosophy  with  that 
of  Spinoza  and  declares  that  he  is  able  to  do  what  Spinoza  does 
not  succeed  in  doing  —  that  is,  to  pass  from  the  Absolute  to  the 
individual — solely  because  he  makes  use  of  the  conception  of 
freedom,  which  Spinoza  ignores.  E.  g.,  in  the  Darstellung  tier 
Wissenschaftslehre  he  says,  •*  The  changeless  does  not  pass 
over  into  the  changeable,  for  thus  it  would  cease  to  be  the 
changeless.  .  .  .  But  it  remains  for  itself,  enclosed  within  itself, 
like  itself  and  itself  alone.  Moreover,  the  world  is  not  a  reflec- 
tion, expression,  revelation,  symbol,  ...  of  the  eternal  ;  for 
the  eternal  cannot  reflect  itself  in  broken  rays.  But  this  world 
is  the  image  and  expression  of  formal  .  .  .  freedom.  ...  It  is 
the  conflict  of  being  and  not-being,  the  absolute  inner  contradic- 
tion. In  the  very  first  synthesis  [of  being  and  not-being]  formal 
freedom  is  wholly  separated  from  being,  is  for  itself  alone,  just 
as  being  is  for  itself,  goes  its  own  way  in  the  product  of  this 
synthesis."  ^  The  great  difference  between  the  Wissenschaftslehre 
and  Spinozism  is  that  the  former  employs  this  notion  of  freedom. 
Spinoza  has  no  "  point  of  transition  from  substance  to  accident. 
He  does  not  even  ask  for  such  a  transition.  .  .  .  Substance  and 
accident  are  not  really  distinguished  [in  his  system].  ...  In 
order  to  get  a  distinction,  he  makes  being,  as  accident,  dirempt 
itself  into  numerous  modifications.  .  .  .  Now  if  being  is  thus 
dirempted  by  absolute  necessity  and  if  it  does  not  exist  {exisiieren) 
otherwise,  how,"  we  may  ask  Spinoza,  "  do  you  come  to  think 
of  it  as  the  One,  and  what  truth  has  this  thought  of  yours  ?  Or 
ii  it  is  in  itself  one,  as  you  maintain,  whence  arise  in  it  the  diremp- 
tion  and  the  opposition  of  a  world  of  extension  and  a  world  of 
thought  ?  As  a  matter  of  fact,  you  are  unconsciously  employ- 
ing a  conception  which  you  explicitly  reject  throughout  your 
system  —  namely,  formal  freedom,  being  and  not-being,  the 
fundamental  form  of  knowing,  in  which  lies  the  necessity  of 
diremption.  .  .  .  The    Wissenschaftslehre,    however,    posits    this^ 

»S.  W..  II.  86  f. 


102  FICHTE'S  FUNDAMENTAL   PRINCIPLE. 

formal  freedom  as  connecting  link  and  regards  the  resulting 
diremption,  not  as  the  diremption  of  absolute  being,  but  as  the 
fundamental  form  which  accompanies  absolute  knowing  (the 
knowing  of  absolute  being)."  For  the  Wissenschaftslehre,  "  the 
accident  of  absolute  being  is  not  in  it,  for  thus  absolute  being 
would  lose  its  substantiality,  but  outside  it,  in  the  sphere  oi formal 
freedom.  .  .  .  For  its  existence,  and  it  alone  has  existence,  .  .  . 
knowing  depends  wholly  upon  itself,  but  not  for  its  original 
determination.  Hence  the  accident  of  absolute  being  is  simple 
and  unchangeable,  as  absolute  being  itself  is.  The  changeable- 
ness  has  quite  another  source,  namely,  the  formal  freedom  of 
knowing y  * 

What  now  does  Fichte  mean  by  saying  that  the  doctrine  of 
freedom  enables  us  to  unite  the  conceptions  of  the  eternal, 
changeless  One  and  the  fleeting,  transitory  Many  ?  It  seems  to 
me  that  we  can  answer  by  referring  to  our  previous  discussion  of 
the  passage  in  the  Wissenschaftslehre  of  1 8 1 2  in  which  he  develops 
his  concept  of  freedom.^  We  saw  there  that  he  starts  with  free- 
dom as  liberty  of  indifference,  but  ends  with  the  concept  of  free- 
dom as  the  power  to  reahze  an  ideal  by  subordinating  the  lower 
impulses  to  the  higher.  And  we  drew  a  parallel  between  this 
development  and  the  development  of  the  doctrine  of  the  Ego  in 
the  Grundlage  der  gesaimnten  Wissenschaftslehre.  In  the  Grund- 
lage,  the  principle  which  is  the  ground  of  all  actuality  is  at  first 
described  as  absolute  Ego,  as  infinite  activity  which  contains 
within  itself  no  ground  of  limitation.  But  in  the  progress  of  the 
argument  this  conception  is  transformed  into  that  of  the  Ego  as 
Idea,  as  self-realizing  principle,  in  whose  nature  is  contained  the 
necessity  that  it  shall,  not  simply  be,  but  be  for  itself,  come  to 
consciousness  of  itself  And  this  being-for-self,  this  coming  to 
self-consciousness,  is  possible  only  if  it  limits  itself  and  triumphs 
over  the  limitations. 

Now,  when  Fichte  says  that  freedom  is  the  ground  of  all  Dasein, 
it  seems  to  me  that  by  freedom  he  means  a  self-realizing  principle. 
It  is  because  his  philosophy,  unlike  Spinoza's,  takes  activity  as 
its  fundamental  concept,  because  the  Absolute  is  for  him  a  prin- 

1  S.  W.,  II,  88  f.  2  See  above,  pp.  95  ff. 


BEING   AND  EXISTENCE,  103 

ciple,  which,  by  virtue  of  its  inmost  nature,  is  impelled  toward 
self-realization,  it  is  for  this  reason,  he  says,  that  he  is  able  to 
bridge  the  gulf  which  remains  impassable  for  Spinoza.  This  is 
the  essential  meaning  of  his  frequent  assertion  of  the  importance 
of  the  concept  of  freedom  for  his  philosophy.  And  just  as  his 
principle  of  activity  in  the  Grundlage  is  described,  now  as  the  ab- 
solute Ego,  and  now  —  more  adequately  —  as  the  Idea  of  the 
Ego,  so  in  speaking  of  freedom,  he  sometimes  tells  us  that  it  is 
a  mere  undifferentiated  activity,  and  sometimes  that  it  is  a  prin- 
ciple which  tends  toward  self-realization.  In  the  first  case,  he 
describes  it  as  liberty  of  indifference — absolute  freedom  without 
any  law.  In  the  second  case,  he  shows  us  that  true  freedom  is 
not  power  to  do  anything  whatsoever,  the  mere  possibility  of 
everything  and  of  nothing,  but  power  to  realize  an  ideal ;  and  in 
order  that  freedom  may  be  this,  it  must  create  and  overcome  ob- 
stacles. It  is  therefore  essentially,  fundamentally,  a  self-manifest- 
ing principle ;  the  existence  of  the  world  is  not  contingent,  but 
is  inextricably  bound  up  with  the  very  nature  of  freedom. 

This  is  the  first  point  which  I  wished  to  suggest  as  helping  us 
to  reconcile  Fichte's  concept  of  freedom  with  his  doctrine  of  the 
necessary  existence  of  the  world.  We  can  see  now  that  when  he 
speaks  of  a  **  freedom  to  bind  itself  or  to  remain  free,"  he  is  em- 
phasizing only  one  aspect  of  the  ultimate  principle,  /.  e.,  the  one 
which  is  brought  out  in  his  conception  of  the  absolute  Ego ;  he 
is  reminding  us  that  there  is  nothing  outside  it  which  can  compel 
it  to  manifest  itself,  that  it  is  bound  by  no  external  laws.  And 
when,  on  the  other  hand,  he  tells  us  that  God's  Dasein  follows 
inevitably  from  his  Sein,  he  is  emphasizing  the  other  aspect,  which 
finds  expression  in  the  doctrine  of  the  Ego  as  Idea ;  he  is  point- 
ing out  that,  although  there  is  nothing  outside  it  which  compels 
it  to  manifest  itself,  yet  its  self-manifestation  follows  inevitably  — 
from  its  own  inner  nature. 

The  second  point  to  be  suggested  is  furnished  ^by  Fichte  him- 
self in  another  discussion  from  the  Wissenschaftslehre  of  1812.^ 
Here  he  is  concerned  once  more  with  the  question  how  the 
changeless  One  can   reveal  itself  in  change  and   manifoldness. 

IN.  w.,  11,326-346. 


104  FICHTE'S  FUNDAMENTAL   PRINCIPLE. 

The  Absolute,  he  says,  has  necessary  being  ;  it  could  not  not-be. 
As  contrasted  with  this,  the  being  of  the  manifestation  or  the 
being  of  knowing,  is  factual.  It  is  ^fact  that  there  is  knowing ; 
knowing  vouches  for  its  own  existence  :  but  it  has  no  necessary 
existence  as  the  Absolute  has.  From  the  fact  that  there  is 
something  else  than  the  Absolute,  we  learn  that  something  else 
can  be} 

Now  the  Absolute  appears  in  its  image  (Bild),  or  knowing,  as 
jt  is  in  itself;  therefore  the  image  must  be  one  and  changeless. 
But  the  image  of  the  Absolute  is  never  actual ;  it  is  always  to  be  ; 
hence  it  is  an  eternal  becoming.^  How  can  we  reconcile  these 
two  aspects  of  the  image  —  its  changeless  unity  and  its  changing 
manifoldness  ?  Since  we  are  now  in  the  realm  of  appearance  (the 
appearance  of  the  Absolute),  we  are  in  the  realm  of  the  factual. 
Hence  the  respect  in  which  the  image  is  a  manifold  must  be  given 
as  a  fact.  It  is  difact  that  the  image  appears  to  itself  {zve  are  con- 
scious of  ourselves).  But  if  it  does  this,  then  it  appears  in  a  new 
image  - —  a  Bild  voni  Bilde  —  and  in  this  new  image  there  may  well 
enough  be  infinite  change.  Thus  what  would  not  be  possible  for 
the  Absolute  itself,  is  possible  in  its  appearance  ;  here,  unity  can 
coexist  with  manifoldness.  The  possibility  of  change  and  mani- 
foldness is  grounded  in  the  fixed  being  of  the  Absolute,  but 
it  is  only  in  the  image  that  being  actually  becomes  change  and 
manifoldness.^ 

That  the  absolute  being  appears,  is,  as  we  have  seen,  a  fact. 
Jlence,  '*  from  the  point  of  view  of  our  consciousness,  the  appear- 
-;ance  is  something  that  could  also  not-be,  something  co7itiugent. 
.But  there  is  a  higher  question  :  Is  the  appearance  in  itself  con- 
utingent?  Can  God  appear,  or  also  not-appear?  And  is  the 
appearance  merely  an  act  of  his  freedom,  /;/  the  lower  significa- 
tion of  the  ivord^ — not  in  the  sense  of  an  absolute  life  that  is 
conceived  through  itself,  but  in  the  sense  of  a  life  that  is  abso- 
lutely without  law  ?  Has  God  freedom  of  this  second  sort,  or 
is  his  appearing  necessary  (in  the  sense  which  we  have  just  attrib- 
uted to  the  word  '  necessary  ')  ?     It  is  easy  to  see  that  the  latter 

IN.  W.,  II,  328  f.  2 N.  W.,  II,  334. 

3N.  W.,  II,  337-339.  ^  The  italics  in  this  phrase  are  mine. 


BEING   AND   EXISTENCE.  105 

is  the  case :  God  is  what  he  is,  simply  through  the  fact  that  he 
is/  Through  his  merely  formal  being,  his  whole  being  is  given. 
Now,  among  other  things,  he  appears.  Hence,  as  certain  as  it 
is  that  he  appears,  so  certain  is  it  that  he  appears  by  virtue  of 
{durcJi)  his  absolute  being.  And,  inasmuch  as  he  does  appear, 
he  cannot  not-appear.  The  fact  (Faktimi)  is  an  absolutely  neces- 
sary one."  ^  At  this  point  Fichte  begs  the  reader  not  to  misun- 
derstand the  nature  of  the  argument.  It  is  not  as  if  "  we  had  a 
real  concept  of  the  Absolute  and  found  in  it  some  characteristic 
{x)  in  consequence  of  which  the  Absolute  must  appear.  If  this 
were  the  case,  we  should  have  inferred  the  necessity  of  the  ap- 
pearance quite  independently  of  its  factual  givenness  {faktisches 
Gegebensein).  Here  the  case  is  quite  different  .  .  .  All  our  know- 
ing, without  exception,  starts  from  an  absolute  fact,  the  fact, 
namely,  that  the  appearajice  knows  about  itself,  appears  to  itself. 
...  If  one  posits  the  appearance  of  the  Absolute  as  something 
contingent,  perhaps  also  as  an  historical  event,  as  something  that 
was  not  and  once  upon  a  time  came  to  be,  one  puts  this  appear- 
ance into  time  and  gets  a  time  in  which  God  did  not  appear  and 
another  in  which  he  appeared — the  ordinary  concept  of  creation. 
Thus  one  falls  into  absolute  incomprehensibility.  According  to 
our  theory,  the  appearance  is  with  God  and  is  utterly  inseparable 
from  him  —  the  appearance,  which,  through  its  appearance  to 
itself,  tells  forth  itself  and  him  (the  eternal  Word  with  God). 
Neither  God  nor  it  is  in  time ;  on  the  contrary,  it  is  only  within 
it  that  time  develops  —  not,  indeed,  in  so  far  as  God  is  in  it  [in 
the  appearance] ,  but  in  so  far  as  it  appears  to  itself.  ^ 

This  passage,  it  seems  to  me,  is  of  great  value  in  helping  us  to 
understand  what  Fichte  means  by  the  frequent  statement  that  the 
entire  realm  of  the  factual,  of  existent  reality,  rests  upon  an  act 
of  freedom.  He  makes  it  apparent  here  that  he  is  not  using 
*  freedom  '  as  synonymous  with  *  Hberty  of  indifference '  ;  this,  he 
says,  is  the  lower  meaning  of  the  word.     God  could  not  be,  with- 

1  "  Schlechthin  dadurch,  dasi  er  ist."  It  is  unfortunate  that  the  only  good  ren- 
dering for  dadttrch  dass  is  *  through  the  fact  that '  ;  for  we  have  just  been  using  the 
word  '  fact'  to  translate  Y'xchie'' s faktisch,  which  applies  always  to  the  realm  of  the 
actual,  to  Dasein  as  distinguished  from  Sein. 

2N.  W.,  II,  343.  3N.  W.,  II,  344  f. 


I06  FICHTE'S  FUNDAMENTAL   PRINCIPLE. 

out  manifesting  himself;  the  factual  realm  is  not  contingent  in 
the  sense  that  there  might  equally  well  have  been  no  world  at  all 
or  quite  a  different  world  from  this.  But,  on  the  other  hand,  our 
only  ground  for  knowing  that  God  must  manifest  himself  is  that 
he  does  manifest  himself.  (Since  he  does  reveal  himself,  we 
know  that  he  could  not  remain  unrevealed.)  And  since  we  start 
from  the  fact  that  there  is  a  manifestation,  from  the  fact  that 
knowing  is,  and  since  this  fact  is  vouched  for  simply  by  itself,^ 
we  say  that  the  existence  of  knowing  is  contingent.  But  by  this 
we  mean  merely  that  our  assertion  that  there  is  a  world  of  con- 
scious experience  is  not  supported  by  some  other  proposition 
which  we  have  previously  established.  The  absolute  being  is 
indeed  the  ratio  essendi  of  the  actual  world,  but  it  is  not  the  ratio 
cognoscejidi ;  the  ratio  cognoscendi  of  our  existence  is  that  exis- 
tence itself 

It  seems  to  me  that  we  have  now  established  the  theory  which 
we  have  been  defending  at  length  —  namely,  that  Fichte  con- 
ceives the  relation  between  the  Sein  and  Dasein  of  the  Abso- 
lute as  necessary,  or  —  what  is  a  better  way  of  putting  it  —  that 
Sein  and  Dasein  are  for  him  simply  two  aspects  of  the  one 
principle,  and  hence  that  to  say  that  the  Dasein  is  contingent,  in 
the  strict  sense  of  the  term,  is  to  talk  nonsense.  It  remains  to 
ask  —  and  this  is  the  last  question  that  we  shall  have  to  consider 
—  whether  we  can  determine  more  exactly  what  Fichte  means 
by  the  aspect  of  Sein. 

Some  of  the  recent  discussions  of  the  philosophy  of  history, 
particularly  in  Germany,  have  served  to  throw  into  new  relief  the 
concept  of  value,  which  plays  so  important  a  part  in  Fichte' s 
philosophical  system.  If  we  say,  as  Fichte  and  many  other 
Geschichtsphilosophen  would,  that  all  that  is  actual  is  this  world- 
process,  and  that  in  this  world-process  certain  values  are  more 
or  less  completely  realized,  a  question  arises  which  not  all 
philosophers  venture  to  answer,  but  with  regard  to  which  Fichte 
has  taken  a  decided  stand.  The  question  to  which  I  refer,  is 
whether  the  (partial)  realization  of  values  in  human  history  is 
something  to  be  understood,  or  merely  something  to  be  accepted 

'  That  thought  is,  thought  itself  assures  us.      "Cogito,  ergo  sum." 


BEING   AND   EXISTENCE.  I07 

and  rejoiced  in.  Is  it  merely  —  to  use  a  phrase  of  Lotze's  ^  — 
a  *  fortunate  fact '  {gliickliche  Thatsache)  that  this  world  of  ours, 
with  all  its  failure  and  all  its  sin,  nevertheless  reveals  some  cor- 
respondence —  albeit  imperfect  —  to  the  absolute  norms  of  truth, 
goodness,  and  beauty  ?  Is  it  simply  a  fact,  which  we  recognize 
joyfully,  but  which  remains  ever  an  unexplained  mystery  —  for 
aught  we  know,  a  mere  coincidence  —  and  which  can  therefore 
give  us  no  assurance  that  the  future  will  contain  any  such  coin- 
cidences ?  Or  is  it  a  fact  which,  as  Fichte  would  say,  we  can  see 
from  the  genetic  point  of  view,  a  fact  whose  origin  we  can  under- 
stand, so  that  we  may  have  assurance  with  regard  to  the  future, 
may  look  forward  to  new  realizations  of  the  eternal  values  in  the 
world  of  time  and  space  ? 

It  is  no  part  of  my  purpose  to  discuss  this  question  on  its 
merits ;  I  have  raised  it  simply  in  the  hope  that  it  may  help  us 
to  understand  better  Fichte's  conception  of  the  ultimate  principle. 
It  is  evident  that  Fichte  himself  does  not  regard  the  actualiza- 
tion of  values  merely  as  a  happy  fact.  On  the  contrary,  as  all 
our  preceding  study  has  tended  to  show,  he  believes  that  the 
presence  of  value  in  the  world-process  is  to  be  explained  by  the 
fact  that  the  supreme  value  is  itself  the  ratio  essendi  of  this  proc- 
ess. The  world  exists  in  order  that  the  Idea  of  the  Ego  may 
become  actual,  and  the  Idea  is  itself  the  moving  force  in  the  proc- 
ess of  actualization.  The  Idea,  for  Fichte,  is  not  simply  an 
ideal  in  the  psychological  sense  —  the  thought  of  some  non-ex- 
istent value,  which  we  conceive  of  and  resolve  to  bring  into  ex- 
istence. It  has  indeed  this  psychological  aspect ;  all  that  we 
ordinarily  call  our  ideals  —  intellectual,  moral,  aesthetic  —  are 
faint  reflections  of  the  Idea  itself.  But  though  it  has  this  aspect, 
it  is  much  more  than  a  psychological  fact.  Again,  it  is  not 
merely  an  absolute  standard  of  value,^  by  which  we  may  meas- 

^ Logic  (translation  edited  by  Bosanquet),  2d  ed.,  Book  I,  Chap.  II,  \  65,  Lotze 
himself  uses  the  phrase  merely  with  reference  to  logical  values.  He  refers  to  the 
'  fortunate  fact '  that  the  world  of  actuality,  which  might  conceivably  be  quite  dif- 
ferent in  this  respect,  exhibits  a  considerable  degree  of  correspondence  with  the  logical 
norms. 

2  An  objective  standard,  as  distinguished  from  the  subjective  one  that  is  furnished 
by  our  ideals. 


I08  FICHTE'S  FUNDAMENTAL   PRINCIPLE. 

ure  the  worth  of  any  particular  part  of  the  world-process.  This 
aspect,  also,  the  Idea  has  ;  but  it  is  even  more  than  this.  It  is, 
for  Fichte,  at  once  the  supreme  value  —  the  absolute  norm  —  and 
the  directive  force  in  human  history.  The  Sollen  is  not  a  mere 
Ought ;  it  is  at  the  same  time  the  ground  of  all  becoming. 

In  Chapter  I,  we  expressed  this  thought  by  saying  that  for 
Fichte  the  clue  to  the  nature  of  the  ultimate  principle  is  to  be 
found  in  our  ideals  ;  that  he  refuses  to  believe  that  the  ideals 
which  we  are  striving  to  attain,  are  of  such  a  nature  that  we  never 
can  approximate  to  them ;  but  that  on  the  contrary,  he  insists 
that  they  reveal  to  us  the  very  principle  which  is  at  work  in  the 
world-process  itself.  The  Idea  of  the  Ego,  which  show^s  itself  to 
us  —  though  imperfectly  —  in  our  ideals  of  beauty,  goodness,  and 
truth  (all  of  which  may  be  regarded  as  various  forms  of  the  unity 
of  subject  and  object),  this  Idea  of  the  Ego  is  also  the  motive 
power  in  the  history  qf  the  race. 

Now  if  one  accepts  Fichte's  view,  one  must  of  course  say  that 
the  presence  of  value  in  the  world  is  not  a  mere  lucky  acci- 
dent, but  is  something  which  can  be  understood.  If  the  supreme 
value  is  itself  the  ground  of  all  that  exists,  we  can  see  why  it  is 
that  we  find  values  in  the  realm  of  existence.  It  is  true  —  and 
Fichte  often  asserts  it  in  his  later  writings  —  that  any  particular 
realization  of  absolute  values  will  always  be  to  us  a  mystery.  No 
science  will  ever  be  able  to  make  intelligible  the  development 
of  a  great  moral  leader  or  the  genesis  of  a  supreme  work  of  art. 
Before  a  Buddha  or  a  King  Lear  we  must  always  stand  in  silent 
wonder.  But  though  we  can  never  hope  to  understand  in  detail 
how  a  great  personality  or  a  great  artistic  achievement  comes  to 
be,  though  every  particular  actualization  of  a  supreme  value  has, 
and  always  will  have,  an  aspect  of  mystery,  still  the  more  general 
fact  that  absolute  values  find  realization  in  human  history,  we 
can  understand.  Although  we  can  never  grasp  the  how  of  the 
realization,  we  can  see  into  its  that. 

And  not  only  can  we,  on  Fichte's  theory,  understand  why 
human  life  has  this  aspect  of  value,  but  also  we  are  assured  of 
the  future  of  the  race.  Since  the  ground  of  the  world's  existence 
is  the  eternal  Ought-to-be,  we  may  rest  in  the  confidence  that  the 


BEING   AND   EXISTENCE.  109 

future  will  show  a  continuous  progress.  This  is  one  of  the  cen- 
tral doctrines  of  Fichte's  philosophy.  Human  life,  human  history, 
is  the  progressive  actualization  of  the  eternal  values,  the  ever 
fuller  realization  of  the  divine  Idea. 

We  have  said  that  for  Fichte  the  ultimate  principle  is  the  quin- 
tessence of  all  value,  and  that  it  is  at  the  same  time  the  ground 
of  the  world-process.  This  may  help  us,  I  think,  to  understand 
in  some  measure  the  change  which  appears  to  have  taken  place 
in  the  second  period.  The  distinction  between  the  Sein  and 
the  Dasein  of  the  Absolute,  which  has  given  much  difficulty  to 
students  of  Fichte  and  has  been  variously  interpreted,  can  best 
be  understood,  it  seems  to  me,  by  the  aid  of  this  conception  of 
the  ultimate  principle  as  being  at  once  the  supreme  value  and 
the  world-ground.  The  Absolute  in  its  aspect  of  Sein,  Fichte 
says,  is  eternal,  changeless,  sufficient  unto  itself*  And  just  this 
is  what  we  must  say  of  an  absolute  value.  It,  too,  is  timeless  in 
its  nature,  superior  to  change  and  decay.  Again,  absolute  Seiiiy 
Fichte  tells  us,  is  unity ;  and  if  we  say,  as  he  certainly  would, 
that  the  supreme  value  is  the  unity  of  subject  and  object  and  that 
all  our  ideals  are  so  many  various  forms  of  this  unity,  then  we 
can  understand  how  he  feels  justified  in  describing  absolute  Sein 
as  unitary.  On  the  contrary,  the  Dasein  of  the  Absolute  is  at 
once  changeless  and  changing,  one  and  many.  The  Dasein  is 
the  supreme  value  as  self-realizing  principle,  as  manifesting  itself 
in  the  world-process.  It  has,  therefore,  these  two  opposed  aspects. 
On  the  one  hand,  it  is  changeless,  eternal,  even  though  it  assumes 
the  form  of  time.  The  aesthetic  value  of  Booth's  Hamlet  did  not 
perish  when  death  claimed  the  great  actor  himself;  and  Pade- 
rewski's  playing  of  a  Beethoven  sonata  does  not  lose  its  artistic 
worth  when  the  piano-recital  is  over.  Even  as  realized  in  time, 
then,  value  keeps  its  timeless  nature.  But  though  in  this  sense 
the  Dasein  of  the  Absolute  is  changeless,  yet  as  world-ground  it 
is  the  source  of  time  and  becoming  and  thus  has  an  aspect  of 
change  and  manifoldness. 

But  this  is  not  all  that  Fichte  means  by  his  distinction  between 
Sein  and  Dasein.  In  saying  that  the  Absolute  is,  he  is  asserting 
something  more  than  that  value  is  essentially  independent  of  time. 


no  FICHTE'S  FUNDAMENTAL   PRINCIPLE. 

He  is  asserting  that  it  has  being  quite  independent  of  the  fact  of 
its  reahzation  in  the  world-process.  But,  we  may  ask,  what  kind 
of  being  is  it  that  can  be  attributed  to  an  unrealized  value  ?  In 
so  far  as  values  are  realized,  in  so  far  they  have  being  or  actual- 
ity. But  can  we  maintain  that  they  have  it,  as  unrealized  ?  Must 
we  not  content  ourselves  with  saying  that  in  this  case  they  have 
validity  ?  And  does  not  Fichte's  ascription  of  being  to  the  supreme 
value,  qua  unrealized,  suggest  that  he  has  hypostatized  it  ? 

In  answer  to  these  questions,  there  are  several  things  to  be 
said.     In  the  first  place,  whether  or  not  we  shall  designate  as 

*  being  '  the  sort  of  reality  which  an  unrealized  value  possesses,  is 
largely  a  matter  of  convenience.  Lotze,  in  his  admirable  discus- 
sion of  the  Platonic  Ideas,^  distinguishes  '  validity '  (Geltung)  as 
one  kind  of  reality,  from  '  being '  {Sein)  as  a  second,  and  from 

*  occurring  '  as  still  a  third  kind.     Fichte,  however,  uses  the  word 

*  existence  '  [Daseiri)  for  what  Lotze  calls  *  being '  and  employs 
the  word  *  being  *  to  designate  another  sort  of  reality.  As  we 
have  seen,  he  is  always  very  careful  to  distinguish  these  two. 
Existence,  in  his  use  of  the  term,  belongs  only  to  the  actual 
world  —  the  world  of  individual  consciousness  —  or  to  the  Idea 
in  so  far  as  it  embodies  itself  in  consciousness  ;  the  word  '  being  ' 
he  reserves  for  a  reality  of  a  different  kind. 

In  the  second  place,  it  may  be  well  to  remember  the  considera- 
tions which  Lotze  has  urged  in  the  following  words  :  "  It  must 
be  added  that  we  ourselves,  in  drawing  a  distinction  between  the 
reality  which  belongs  to  the  Ideas  and  laws  and  that  which 
belongs  to  things,  and  calling  the  one  Being  or  Existence  ^  and 
the  other  Validity,  have  so  far  merely  discovered,  thanks  to  the 
resources  of  our  language,  a  convenient  expression  which  may 
keep  us  on  our  guard  against  interchanging  the  two  notions. 
The  fact  which  the  term  validity  expresses  has  lost  none  of  that 
strangeness  which  has  led  to  its  being  confounded,  as  we  have 
seen,  with  existence.  It  is  merely  that  we  have  been  so  long 
accustomed  to  it ;  we  .  .  .  take  it  as  a  matter  of  course  that  the 

1(9/.  cit.,  Book  III,  Chap.  II. 

2  For  the  single  word  Sein,  which  Lotze  uses,  the  translator  employs  the  two  word 
'being  '  and  *  existence. ' 


BEING  AND   EXISTENCE.  Ill 

content  of  manifold  perceptions  and  phenomena  does  invariably 
adapt  itself  to  general  conceptions  and  can  be  read  by  us  in  the 
light  of  general  laws.  ...  But  that  this  should  be  the  case,  that 
there  should  be  universal  laws,  which  have  not  themselves  exist- 
ence like  things  and  which  nevertheless  rule  the  operation  of 
things,  —  remains  for  a  mind  which  realizes  its  meaning,  a  pro- 
foundly mysterious  fact."  ^ 

Lotze  is  speaking  especially  of  meanings  and  general  laws  ; 
but  what  he  says  is  equally  applicable  to  values.  That  there 
should  be  objective  values,  "  which  have  not  themselves  existence 
like  things  and  which  nevertheless"  are  valid  for  the  world  of 
things,  values  which  we  may  employ  in  estimating  the  worth  of 
any  particular  element  of  this  world  —  this,  too,  is  '*  for  a  mind 
which  realizes  its  meaning,  a  profoundly  mysterious  fact."  Lit- 
tle wonder  that  the  moral  law,  with  its  unconditional  demand  for 
realization  in  the  world  of  fact,  should  seem  to  men  not  less,  but 
more,  real  than  this  world  and  should  therefore  be  said  to  have 
being.  In  short,  as  Lotze's  words  imply,  the  distinction  which 
we  make  between  existence  and  validity  is  not  in  any  sense  the 
solution  of  a  problem,  but  merely  the  statement  of  one.  What 
kind  of  reality  we  ought  to  attribute  to  an  unrealized  value  or  an 
undiscovered  truth,  is  a  question  which  it  is  far  easier  to  ask  than 
to  answer. 

In  the  third  place  —  and  this  is  the  chief  thing  to  be  said  in 
regard  to  our  problem  —  it  must  never  be  forgotten  that  Fichte's 
ultimate  principle  is  not  merely  an  unrealized,  but  rather  a  self- 
realizing  value.  This,  it  seems  to  me,  is  the  great  difference  be- 
tween the  point  of  view  from  which  our  questions  have  been  put 
and  the  point  of  view  which  Fichte  takes,  which  all  of  us  must 
take  —  at  least  for  the  time  being  —  if  we  would  understand  him. 
For  if  the  supreme  value  is  at  the  same  time  a  self-realizing  prin- 
ciple, then  it  has  some  other  kind  of  reality  than  that  of  a  mere 
value.  There  are  three  different  conceptions  for  which  we  need 
appropriate  expressions.  First,  one  may  be  thinking  of  value 
merely  as  such,  without  reference  to  its  realization  or  non-real- 
ization.    Of  it  one  may  say  that  it  is  valid ;   for  it  has  validity 

^Op.  ciL,  Book  III,  Chap.  II,  I  320. 


112  FICHTE'S  FUNDAMENTAL   PRINCIPLE. 

quite  irrespective  of  its  realization.  Secondly,  one  may  wish  to 
speak  of  a  value  which  is  already  realized,  which  has  assumed 
individual  form  and  is  connected  with  some  definite  point  in  time. 
To  it  we  may  ascribe  actuality  or  existence.  The  ideal,  we  say,  has 
been  made  actual ;  the  value  really  exists,  is  incorporated  into  the 
actual  world.  But  thirdly,  one  may  wish  to  bring  out  the  thought 
that  the  value  is  itself  a  force,  an  active  principle  ;  that  its  realiza- 
tion depends  upon  itself  rather  than  upon  something  other.  In  the 
second  case  that  we  have  mentioned,  the  value  may  be  realized 
through  my  activity,  through  my  choice.  So  far  then  as  it  is 
concerned,  its  actualization  is  merely  contingent.  There  is  no 
necessary  connection  between  the  value  itself  and  the  fact  that  it 
is  realized ;  that  it  is  realized,  is  owing  solely  to  another  than 
itself  But  if  now  one  wishes  to  suggest  that  the  actualization 
is  not  something  contingent,  that  it  is  not  a  mere  accident 
that  absolute  values  are  realized  in  this  world,  that  it  does  not 
depend  upon  the  will  of  this  or  that  particular  individual,  but  that 
there  is  something  in  the  nature  of  value  itself  by  virtue  of  which 
the  realization  takes  place,  it  is  necessary  to  employ  some  other 
term  besides  *  validity,'  on  the  one  hand,  and  *  existence  *  or 
*  actuality  '  on  the  other.  Fichte  suggests  the  word  *  being.'  He 
distinguishes  it  carefully  from  *  existence '  ;  '  being,'  as  he  uses  it, 
does  not  imply  reality  in  time,  does  not  imply  actuality  of  any 
sort.  It  is  not  that  which  is^  but  that  which  is  to  be  actual ;  in 
this  sense  it  is  distinguished  from  the  realm  of  existing  fact.^ 
But  again,  it  is  that  which  is  to  be,  and  not  merely  that  which 
ought  to  be  ;  in  this  sense  it  is  distinguished  as  self-realizing  prin- 
ciple, from  a  mere  value. 

The  identification  of  the  Ought-to-be  and  the  Is-to-be  is  the 
essence  of  Fichte's  conception  of  the  ultimate  principle.  In  his 
terminology  the  same  word  is  employed  to  express  both  ideas. 
His  sollen,  corresponding,  as  it  does,  both  to  our  *  shall '  —  in 
many  uses  —  and  to  our  *  ought,'  unites  in  one  word  conceptions 

^  "  What  is,  is  not  that  which  appears  to  us  as  existing,  nor  that  which  all  of  us 
or  even  the  noblest  and  best  among  us  are^  but  that  toward  which  we  strive  and  shall 
strive  throughout  eternity,  .  .  .  The  moral  law  is  the  image  of  a  supersensuous, 
purely  spiritual  [reality],  thus  of  something  which  is  not,  but  ...  is  simply  to  be- 
come" i^Die  Staatslehre,  S.  W.,  IV,  387  f.). 


OF 
CALlfOBg^ 

BEING  AND   EXISTENCE.  113 

which  the  English  speech  indicates  by  two  separate  words,  and 
which  even  the  German  language,  in  the  ordinary  usage,  repre- 
sents by  different  forms  of  the  same  root.  Das  So/len,  in  Fichte's 
terminology,  signifies  both  what  ought  to  be  and  what  is  to  be. 
Availing  himself  of  the  fact  that,  in  his  language,  the  same  root 
has  the  two  significations,  he  unites  these  widely  differing  mean- 
ings in  a  single  word,  and  thus  gains  the  best  possible  expression 
for  his  thought. 

We  must,  however,  consider  more  at  length  the  question 
whether,  in  ascribing  being  to  his  supreme  principle,  Fichte  has 
hypostatized  the  absolute  value,  has  transformed  it  into  a  sub- 
stance. It  is  sometimes  urged  that  the  later  writings  represent 
a  marked  change  of  doctrine,  in  that  what  was  formerly  only  an 
ideal  or  norm  has  been  converted  into  an  existent  reality.^  This 
charge  I  cannot  admit.  It  seems  to  me  that  there  is  really 
no  more  tendency  toward  hypostatization  in  the  second  period 
than  in  the  first.  In  both  the  supreme  value  is  conceived  as 
self-realizing  principle ;  and  if  this  be  to  hypostatize  it,  it  is 
hypostatized  in  the  earlier  writings  as  truly  as  in  the  later.  The 
principal  change  which  takes  place  in  the  second  period  is  this  : 
Fichte  brings  out  the  thought  that  inasmuch  as  the  supreme 
value  is  at  the  same  time  the  ground  of  the  world's  existence,  it 
may  be  said  to  have  deing;  which  seems  to  be  distinct  from  val- 
idity, on  the  one  hand,  and  from  actuality —  existence  in  time  — 
on  the  other.^     But  except  for  the  more  frequent  ascription  of 

C/.  Lask  :  "  The  *  whole  '  of  knowing,  which  constitutes  the  Idea,  is  hyposta- 
tized" in  the  later  writings,  is  made  "into  a  metaphysical  reality"  {Fichtes  Ideal- 
ismus  und  die  Geschichte,  177).  "  His  concept  of  the  Absolute  proceeds,  indeed, 
from  an  hypostatization,  but  it  is  an  hypostatization  of  the  Idea  and  not  of  the  formal 
Ego"  {Op.  cit.,  183).  Rickert  (^Fichtes  Atheismusstreit  und  die  Kantische  Philoso- 
phies Kant-Studie7i,  IV,  137  fF.;  also  printed  separately)  seems  to  incline  toward  the 
same  view,  though  he  does  not  commit  himself  to  it  so  definitely.  In  the  period  of 
the  controversy  with  regard  to  atheism,  he  says,  Fichte's  "philosophical  concept  of 
God  "  was  "  that  of  a  supersensuous  order  [which  was,  however,  ordo  ordinans\ 
and  not  that  of  a  supersensuous  reality,"  But  *'  a  few  years  later  his  own  thoughts 
assumed  a  form  which  many  regard  as  equivalent  to  a  virtual  abandonment  of  this 
point  of  view,  and  in  which  at  any  rate  Fichte  passes  far  beyond  the  limitation  which 
he  has  here  placed  upon  himself"  {Kant-Studien,  IV,  158  ff. ). 

2  The  distinction  between  being  and  actuality  Fichte  makes  definitely.  That  be- 
tween being  and  validity  he  does  not  make  explicitly  ;  but  there  is  no  reason  to  think 
that  the  being  which  he  ascribes  to  his  ultimate  principle  is  conceived  by  him  as 
mere  validity. 


114  FICHTE'S  FUNDAMENTAL   PRINCIPLE. 

being  to  the  ultimate  principle  (and  the  somewhat  greater  tendency 
to  conceive  its  relation  to  the  actual  world  abstractly),  his  position 
does  not  differ  from  that  which  he  held  in  the  first  period.  The 
principle  is  conceived,  in  the  earlier  writings,  as  having  reality  in 
the  same  sense  as  in  the  later  works.  The  moral  world-order, 
the  ordo  ordinans,  which  builds  itself  up  in  us,  is  certainly  some- 
thing more  than  a  mere  ideal  or  a  mere  norm ;  it  has  some  other 
kind  of  reality  than  mere  validity  or  than  the  reality  of  a  psy- 
chical state.  And  when  Fichte  says,  in  the  Gerichtliche  Verant- 
wortiingsschrift,  that  the  Godhead,  which  he  has  identified  with 
this  moral  order,  is,  so  far  as  its  matter  is  concerned,  "  nothing 
but  consciousness,  pure  intelligence,  spiritual  life  and  activity," 
and  that  it  is  only  with  reference  to  limitations  and  conceivability 
that  one  must  refuse  to  call  God  conscious,^  he  is  making  of  his 
ultimate  principle  just  as  much  a  being  as  he  does  at  any  time  in 
the  second  period.^  The  assertion  that  God  has  being  is  indeed 
almost  wholly  confined  to  the  later  writings.^     But  Fichte  makes 

1  The  passage  is  quoted  above,  p.  58. 

2  The  thoughtful  reader  is  not  in  much  danger  of  being  misled  by  Fichte' s  occa- 
sional reference,  in  some  of  the  later  works,  to  *  Providence'  and  the  '  divine  plan.' 
Sometimes  he  speaks  of  the  Idea  as  '  God's  plan  for  the  progress  of  the  race.'  But 
such  expressions  occur  only  in  the  popular  writings  and  are  obviously  an  attempt  to 
adapt  his  doctrine  to  the  point  of  view  of  his  hearers.  Only  the  most  superficial 
criticism  could  interpret  him  as  meaning  that  the  God  of  the  later  works  is  a  con- 
sciousness which  sets  before  itself  certain  ends,  chooses  appropriate  means  for  their 
attainment,  and  in  this  way  guides  the  current  of  human  history.  On  at  least  one 
occasion  Fichte  takes  pains  to  make  this  clear.  In  Das  Wesendes  Gdehrten  (1805), 
he  explains  that  in  speaking  of  God's  *  plan  '  he  is  using  the  word  in  another  sense 

:/rom  that  which  is  indicated  when  we  talk  of  human  plans.  He  has  just  told  his 
Ihearers  that  the  sense-world  is  simply  a  means  to  the  realization  of  the  divine  Idea  ; 
.;:and  having  said  this,  he  goes  on  as  follows  :  ♦'  Reason  is  able  to  comprehend  the 
connection  between  means  and  purpose  only  by  thinking  of  an  understanding  which 
.lias  conceived  the  purpose.  .  .  .  Hence,  on  the  analogy  with  our  understanding,  one 
ithinks  of  God  as  conceiving  the  moral  life  of  man  as  the  sole  purpose  for  the  sake  of 
-which  he  has  manifested  himself  and  has  called  everything  else  except  this  moral  life 
into  existence.  [  Now  we  represent  the  matter  to  ourselves  thus] ,  not  as  if  it  were  really 
so  (as  if  God  thought  in  the  way  in  which  finite  beings  think,  and  as  if  for  him  exis- 
tence were  something  different  from  the  idea  of  existence),  but  simply  because  we  are 
not  able  to  conceive  the  relation  in  any  other  way.  And  in  this  absolutely  necessary 
mode  of  representation,  human  life  becomes,  as  it  ought  to  be,  the  Idea,  God's  chief 
thought  in  producing  the  world,  the  purpose  and  the  plan,  whose  carrying  out  God 
decreed  when  he  decreed  the  world"  (S.  W.,  VI,  367). 

3  We  have  seen  that  there  are  a  few  passages  in  the  Grundlage  of  1 794,  in  which 
Fichte  designates  the  supreme  principle  as  'being.'     See  above,  p.  81. 


BEING   AND   EXISTENCE.  II5 

it  very  clear  that  by  *  being  '  he  means  something  other  than 
actual  existence  ;  and  we  have  therefore  interpreted  his  use  of 
the  term  as  an  attempt  to  indicate  a  third  mode  of  reality,  in  ad- 
dition to  actuality  and  validity.  Now,  inasmuch  as  this  third 
sort  of  reality  is  ascribed  to  the  absolute  value  by  virtue  of  its 
being  regarded  as  the  ground  of  all  existence,  and  inasmuch  as 
Fichte  certainly  so  regards  it  in  the  first  period,  it  seems  permis- 
sible to  say  that  the  recognition  of  the  supreme  value  as  having 
*  being '  is  really  implicit  in  the  earlier  writings,  though  it  is  sel- 
dom explicit  there. 

On  these  grounds  I  am  disposed  to  maintain  that  we  can- 
not say  that  Fichte  hypostatizes  the  absolute  value  in  the  second 
period,  unless  we  are  prepared  to  admit  that  he  does  the  same 
thing  in  the  first.  The  question  then  remains,  whether  he  really 
does  this  in  the  earlier  writings,  whether  to  conceive  of  the  absolute 
value  as  ordo  ordiiians  is  to  hypostatize  it.  And  upon  this  ques- 
tion there  will  doubtless  be  differences  of  opinion.  Certain  it  '\% 
that  in  the  second  period  as  well  as  in  the  first,  Fichte  conceives 
his  principle  as  activity  rather  than  a  being  which  acts,  as  life 
rather  than  something  which  has  life.^  A  thing,  a  substance,  — 
in  the  most  generally  accepted  meaning  of  the  word  '  substance,' 
—  it  is  not.  But  on  the  other  hand  it  is  real,  and  real  in  a  dif- 
ferent sense  from  that  in  which  a  mere  norm  may  be  said  to  be 
real.  Rickert  seems  to  think  that  the  *  supersensuous  order  '  of 
the  GericJitliche  Verantwortungsschrift,  although  it  is  ordocrdinans, 
is  still  not  a  '  supersensuous  reality ' ;  ^  and  if  one  accepts  this 

J  This,  as  we  have  said,  has  been  proved  by  Loewe.     See  above,  pp.  73  f. 

2  See  above,  p.  II3,  note  I.  As  we  saw,  Rickert  would  probably  maintain  that 
although  the  moral  world -order  of  the  Atheismusstrntis  not  an  hypostatization,  Fichte 
does  hypostatize  his  principle  in  the  later  writings.  This  position  seems  to  me  quite 
untenable.  The  *  being  '  of  the  later  works  is  also  only  ordo  ordinans,  self-realizing 
value.  There  is  nothing  that  Fichte  says  in  the  second  period  —  except  such  refer- 
ences as  those  to  the  *  divine  plan,'  which  we  explained  above,  p.  1 14,  note  2  —  which 
any  more  strongly  suggests  a  personification  of  the  principle,  than  his  explanation,  in 
the  Gerichtliche  Verantwortungsschrift^  of  the  sense  in  which  he  denies  that  God  has 
consciousness.  If  therefore  one  says,  with  Rickert,  that  the  self-establishing  moral 
order  is  not  a  supersensuous  reality,  one  has  no  ground,  it  seems  to  me,  for  asserting 
that  Fichte  hypostatizes  his  principle  in  the  second  period.  (It  must  be  remembered 
that  Rickert  does  not  definitely  assert  this,  and  my  inferences  regarding  his  position 
may  not  be  justified. ) 


Il6  FICHTE'S  FUNDAMENTAL   PRINCIPLE. 

distinction,  one  must  say,  I  think,  that  Fichte's  principle  is  not 
an  hypostatization. 

But  the  question  whether  we  are  hyposiatizing  the  absolute 
value  in  thinking  of  it  as  self-realizing  principle,  is  not,  it  seems 
to  me,  the  main  one.  The  central  point  about  which  the  con- 
test must  be  waged,  is  this :  whether  we  must  believe  that  the 
presence  of  values  in  human  history  is  simply  to  be  accepted  as 
a  fact,  which  it  is  futile  for  us  ever  to  attempt  to  understand,  or 
whether,  on  the  contrary,  we  may  assert  that  it  is  reasonable 
to  seek  an  explanation  for  this  fact/  Inasmuch  as  philosophy  is 
the  effort  to  understand  the  facts  of  experience,  to  interpret  them 
so  as  to  make  them  intelligible  to  ourselves,  it  certainly  seems 
on  the  face  of  it  not  unreasonable  that  a  philosopher  should  try  to 
understand  the  presence  of  value  in  human  history.  And  since 
the  only  justification  that  a  philosophical  formula  can  hope  for, 
is  that  it  helps  to  make  certain  facts  of  experience  more  intelli- 
gible than  they  would  otherwise  be,  the  theory  that  the  supreme 
value  is  itself  a  motive  power  will  have  strong  claims  to  consid- 
eration, provided,  first,  that  it  is  in  itself  intelligible,  and  secondly, 
that  it  really  helps  us  to  understand  the  presence  of  value  in  the 
world-process. 

The  two  points,  then,  at  which  Fichte's  conception  is  liable  to 
attack  are  these  :  one  might  maintain  in  the  first  place,  that  the 
notion  of  value  as  self-realizing  principle  has  no  meaning  for  us 

—  that  it  is  a  mere  form  of  words,  which  does  not  stand  for  any 
definite  idea ;  and  in  the  second  place,  that  even  if  we  waive  this 
objection,  it  does  not  explain  what  it  professes  to  explain.  With 
regard  to  the  first  point,  it  must  be  confessed  that  the  conception 
of  self-realizing  value,  of  a  moral  ordo  ordinans,  is  not  a  per- 

'  There  is,  of  course,  the  still  more  fundamental  question,  whether  we  have  the  right 
to  say  that  any  values  are  objective.  That  certain  elements  of  the  actual  world  have 
subjective  value,  that  we  feel  them  to  be  valuable,  is  an  indubitable  fact,  guaranteed  by 
experience  itself.     But  whether,  in  addition,  they  have  objective  worth,  and  whether 

—  to  speak  more  generally  —  there  are  any  objective  norms,  this  is  a  question,  the 
consideration  of  which  naturally  precedes  the  discussion  of  the  problem  to  which  we 
have  referred  in  the  text.  But  inasmuch  as  those  who  charge  Fichte  with  having 
hypostatized  his  absolute  value,  are  apparently  agreed  that  objective  values  do  find 
actualization  in  the  world-process,  it  does  not  seem  necessary  to  consider  this  question 
here. 


BEING  AND   EXISTENCE.  117 

fectly  definite  and  altogether  comprehensible  notion.  It  is  evi- 
dent that  Fichte  himself  would  admit  this  up  to  a  certain  point. 
But  at  the  same  time  he  would  maintain  that  the  vagueness  of 
the  notion  can  readily  enough  be  accounted  for  in  harmony  with 
his  own  principles  and  hence  should  not  be  regarded  as  an  in- 
superable objection  to  his  theory.  In  the  Bestimmung  des  Men- 
schen,  one  of  the  popular  works  of  the  second  period,  he  desig- 
nates the  ultimate  principle  as  the  supreme  and  living  Will, 
whose  activity  is  the  world-process.  But  he  points  out  at  the 
same  time  that  we  cannot  attribute  personality  to  it  and  that  we 
can  never  hope  to  comprehend  its  nature.  "How  thou  art  for 
thyself  and  appearest  to  thyself,  I  can  never  see,  just  as  I  can 
never  become  thou.  .  .  .  What  I  comprehend,  becomes,  through 
my  very  comprehension  of  it,  finite.  ...  I  have  only  a  con- 
sciousness which  proceeds  discursively  and  I  cannot  conceive 
any  other  kind.  How  could  I  ascribe  this  consciousness  to  thee  ? 
In  the  concept  of  personality  limitation  is  involved.  How  could 
I  attribute  personality  to  thee  without  attributing  limitation  ?  "^ 

What  Fichte  would  say,  then,  is  this.  The  concept  must  be 
vague,  because  it  stands  for  that  which  is  not  a  part  of  our  ex- 
perience. To  assert  that  the  absolute  norm  is  a  self-realizing 
principle  is  another  way  of  saying  that  the  ground  of  all  actuality 
is  a  supreme  Will  which  is  identical  with  the  supreme  value. 
Now,  in  our  experience  will  and  value  stand  apart.  Granted  — 
what  Fichte  would  of  course  admit — that  we  are,  in  our  essence, 
will,  it  is  nevertheless  true  that  this  will  is  directed  toward  values 
which  we  apprehend  as  independent  of  it.  It  is  this  dualism  of 
will  and  value  in  human  experience  ^  which  makes  it  so  difficult 
for  us  to  conceive  that  ultimately  —  in  their  deepest  meaning — 
these  two  may  be  one.^     But  it  is  of  course  a  cardinal  doctrine  of 

iS.W.,  II,304f. 

2  Even  here,  there  is  a  sense  in  which  it  may  be  said  that  value  has  motive  power. 
The  feeling  of  value  is  an  indispensable  factor  in  volition,  is  the  moving  force  in  all 
choice.  In  this  psychological  sense,  value  is,  in  our  experience,  a  self- realizing  prin- 
ciple. Nevertheless,  it  is  always  felt  here,  as  other  than  our  will  ;  the  dualism  of 
will  and  value  is  characteristic  of  all  our  volition. 

3  The  old  question  whether  right  is  right  because  God  wills  it,  or  whether,  on  the 
contrary,  God  wills  it  because  it  is  right,  would  be  answered  from  Fichte' s  point  of 
view  by  saying  that  neither  of  these  is  the  ground  of  the  other,  but  that  the  two  are 
simply  different  expressions  for  the  same  thing.  Cf.  Lotze,  Outlines  of  the  Philoso- 
phy of  Religion  (translation  edited  by  Ladd,  l886),  \  8l. 


Il8  FICHTE'S  FUNDAMENTAL   PRINCIPLE. 

Fichte's  philosophy  that  the  oppositions  which  we  find  in  human 
experience  point  to  an  underlying  unity,  that  all  difference  implies 
oneness. 

That  will  and  value  form  a  duality  simply  for  us,  is  occasion- 
ally suggested  by  Fichte  himself.  In  a  passage  previously  quoted 
from  the  Thatsachen  des  Bewusstseins,  he  says,  "The  being  of 
life  .  .  .  becomes  final  purpose  merely  in  the  synthesis  with  the 
becoming  as  the  form  of  life.  Outside  this  synthesis,  beyond  this 
form,  we  must  not  speak  of  a  final  purpose,  but  only  of  a  being 
pure  and  simple."  ^  This  contains  by  implication  the  thought 
that  what  is  apprehended  by  us  as  final  purpose,  as  the  goal  of  all 
our  striving,  as  the  supreme  value,  is  itself  the  ground  of  all  ac- 
tuality. The  infinite  Will  is  not  a  will  that  apprehends  values 
as  distinct  from  it  and  as  issuing  commands  to  it ;  it  is  itself  the 
quintessence  of  all  value. 

The  second  objection  which  we  have  mentioned  as  likely  to  be 
brought  against  Fichte's  theory  is  that  this  conception  of  a  supreme 
Will,  which  is  at  the  same  time  der  Inbt griff  aller  Werte,  does  not, 
even  if  we  grant  that  it  has  some  meaning,  explain  to  our  full  satis- 
faction the  presence  of  value  in  the  world-process.  If  the  objec- 
tion were  raised,  it  would  probably  take  this  form :  we  now  have 
the  difficulty,  it  would  be  urged,  of  understanding  why  the  abso- 
lute values  do  not  receive  completer  realization  than  is  the  case. 
If  the  ground  of  the  world-process  is  the  supreme  value,  it  is  easy 
to  see  why  values  should  receive  actualization  in  this  process  ; 
but  it  is  not  easy  to  understand  why  they  should  have  just  so 
much  actualization  and  no  more  —  why  there  should  be  so  many 
parts  of  the  process  whose  value  is  negative  rather  than  positive. 
In  other  words,  it  would  be  maintained,  the  problem  of  evil  is  the 
rock  upon  which  our  theory  must  shatter. 

It  would  be  asserting  too  much  to  say  that  Fichte  has  given  us 
a  complete  solution  of  this  problem.  His  own  answer  to  the 
objection  is  that  evil  exists  precisely  in  order  that  it  may  be  over- 
come. "All  death  in  nature  is  birth.  ...  It  is  not  death  that 
kills,  but  the  more  living  life,  which,  concealed  behind  the  old, 
begins   and   develops  itself.     Death   and    birth  are  simply  the 

^  S.  W.,  II,  683.     The  passage  is  quoted  above  (pp.  79  f. )  at  greater  length. 


BEING  AND   EXISTENCE.  II9 

struggle  of  life  with  itself,  in  order  that  it  may  manifest  itself  in 
ever  greater  glory  and  greater  likeness  to  itself."  ^  In  other 
words,  Fichte  maintains  that  the  good  which  has  triumphed  over 
evil  is  somehow  richer  and  fuller  for  that  very  triumph.  And 
however  unable  one  may  be  to  accept  his  answer  as  perfectly 
satisfactory,  one  can  hardly  maintain,  I  think,  that  any  of  the  other 
*  solutions '  of  the  problem  of  evil  is  freer  from  difficulty  than 
this  one.  Apparently  one  must  choose  between  accepting  a 
partial  solution  and  giving  up  the  problem  as  utterly  insoluble. 
Many,  indeed,  in  our  own  generation,  have  preferred  the  second 
alternative.  Resigning  all  attempts  to  understand  why  there  is 
value  in  the  world,  and  why  there  is  no  more  than  there  is,  they 
have  contented  themselves  simply  with  recognizing  the  fact  that  the 
absolute  norms  do  find  realization,  to  a  certain  limited  extent,  in 
the  sphere  of  existence.  The  difficulty  of  explaining  both  the 
presence  of  good  and  the  presence  of  evil  in  the  realm  of  existence 
is  surely  great  enough  to  give  all  of  us  a  certain  sympathy  with 
this  attitude.  What  I  cannot  understand,  however,  is  how  some 
of  those  who  adopt  it  can  declare  that  there  is  for  them  no  prob- 
lem of  evil ;  that  by  their  acceptance  of  the  world-process  as  a 
factual  '  given,'  for  which  they  do  not  attempt  to  find  an  explana- 
tion, they  have  avoided  the  problem  which  forms  so  serious  a 
difficulty  for  any  one  who  tries  to  frame  a  theory  of  the  nature  of 
the  world-ground.  How  one  can  say  this,  I  repeat,  is  difficult  for 
me  to  understand.  Of  cojirsc,  one  can  avoid  any  problem  what- 
ever, by  simply  declining  to  consider  it ;  but  we  do  not  make  the 
problem  of  evil  non-existent  by  employing  any  such  easy  device  as 
this.  By  refusing  to  look  through  the  field-glass,  the  command- 
ing general  may  avoid  seeing  the  enemy  in  the  distance  ;  but  he 
has  not  thereby  warded  off  the  danger  which  impends.  The 
only  thinker  for  whom  there  is  no  problem  of  evil,  would  be 
one — if  such  a  one  could  be  found  —  who  denied  the  objectivity 
of  all  values.  For  him  there  would  be  nothing  but  fact,  and  mere 
fact  has  no  aspect  of  value  ;  there  is  therefore  neither  good  nor 
bad,  and  hence  no  problem  of  evil.  But  for  one  who  admits 
objective  values  at  all,  for  him  there  is  the  problem  —  whether  or 

^  Die  Bestimmung  des  Mens c hen,  S.  W.,  IT,  317  f. 


120  FICHTE'S  FUNDAMENTAL   PRINCIPLE. 

not  he  recognizes  it  as  such  —  how  it  is  that  certain  elements  in 
this  world  of  ours  have  an  aspect  of  value,  how  it  is  that  there 
is  good  in  the  world  and  how  it  is  that  there  is  bad/ 

It  is  the  aspect  of  value  in  human  experience  which  Fichte 
takes  as  the  clue  to  the  meaning  of  that  experience.  Every  life 
is,  in  its  essence,  the  striving  to  realize  ideals  (though  often  mis- 
taken ones).  This  suggests  that  the  key  to  the  meaning  of  the 
world  itself  is  to  be  found  in  the  conception  of  an  infinite  striving 
toward  an  infinitely  distant  goal.  The  transformation  of  the  orig- 
inal datum  which  he  suggests,  is  simply  this  :  that  whereas  for  the 
individual  striving,  the  goal  is  conceived  or  imagined,  so  that  we 
have  a  duality  of  will  and  value,  for  the  infinite  striving  this  duality 
does  not  exist.  We  cannot  suppose  that  the  world-ground  is 
altogether  of  the  same  sort  as  the  human  will.  If  all  reality  is 
to  be  referred  to  a  unitary  principle,  —  and  this,  as  we  know,  is 
the  fundamental  assumption  of  Fichte's  philosophy, —  then  the 
supreme  Will  and  the  supreme  value  cannot  stand  apart. 

But,  it  may  be  asked,  in  describing  his  principle  as  Will,  does 
not  Fichte  virtually  imply  that  it  is  a  conscious  being  ?  He  does 
not  himself  designate  it  as  such,  because  he  thinks  of  conscious- 
ness as  always  involving  opposition.  But  is  not  his  principle, 
after  all,  what  we  mean  by  a  conscious  being,  though  its  con- 
sciousness may  be  of  a  higher  order  than  ours  ?  If  this  question 
is  answered  in  the  affirmative,  then  we  have  virtually  admitted 
that  Fichte's  conception  of  the  Absolute  has  been  reached  by 
the  hypostatization  of  a  value. 

With  regard  to  this  question,  we  must  in  the  first  place  reiter- 
ate our  assertion  that  if  this  be  true,  it  is  at  any  rate  just  as  true 
of  the  first  period  as  of  the  second.  Whatever  Fichte  may  mean 
by  saying,  in  the  Gerichtliche  Verantzvortungsschrift,  that  the 
Godhead  (the  moral  world-order),  so  far  as  its  matter  is  con- 
cerned, is  "mere  consciousness,  .  .  .  pure  intelligence,"  but  that 
it  is  impossible  for  us  to  conceive  *'  how  it  knows  itself  and  others," 
and  that  hence  we  must  refuse  to  attribute  personality  and  con- 

•  It  should  be  noted  that  the  aspect  of  this  problem  which  men  have  chiefly  con- 
sidered, is,  How  comes  there  to  be  evil  in  the  world  ?  The  presence  of  good  is  not 
usually  regarded  as  furnishing  any  difficulty.  But  it  will  readily  be  seen  that  this 
naive  assumption  obscures  a  very  real  problem. 


BEING   AND   EXISTENCE.  121 

sciousness  to  it  —  whatever  he  may  mean  by  this,  there  is  no 
reason  to  suppose  that  he  is  giving  us  a  different  doctrine  from 
that  of  the  Bestimmung  des  Menscheti,  which  describes  the  Abso- 
lute as  supreme  Will,  and  yet  points  out  that  we  cannot  compre- 
hend its  nature  and  may  not  ascribe  consciousness  and  person- 
ality to  it/ 

But  when  we  have  said  this,  the  real  question  still  remains  to 
be  answered  :  does  Fichte  conceive  of  his  Absolute  as  a  higher 
sort  of  consciousness  —  the  'supra-conscious/  if  one  prefers  the 
term  ?  It  is  difficult  to  express  our  meaning  if  the  word  '  con- 
sciousness '  is  to  be  tabooed ;  but  the  issue,  it  seems  to  me,  is 
fairly  clear.  The  question  is  whether  Fichte  believes  that  there 
is  a  sort  of  universal  consciousness,  in  which  all  finite  ones  are 
included  —  a  consciousness  which  differs  from  ours  in  that  in  it 
all  oppositions  are  harmonized,  and  that  hence  the  supreme  val- 
ues are  not  set  over  against  it  as  norms,  but  are  one  with  it. 
Does  he  recognize  such  a  universal  consciousness?  Or  would 
he  rather  say  that  there  is  no  consciousness  save  the  many  finite 
ones ;  that  the  Absolute  is  conscious  only  in  these ;  and  that, 
therefore,  even  for  it,  there  is  no  consciousness  in  which  all  differ- 
ences are  harmonized  ? 

My  answer  to  this  question  is  given  with  some  hesitation. 
Fichte  has  not  thrown  much  light  upon  it,  and  I  do  not  feel  sure 
that  my  interpretation  is  correct.  On  the  one  hand,  the  passages 
to  which  we  have  just  referred  certainly  seem  to  indicate  a  belief 
in  the  reality  of  a  higher  order  of  consciousness  —  a  supra-con- 
scious being,  if  one  will  consent  to  take  the  word  *  being  '  without 
any  implication  of  substantiality.^  But  on  the  other  hand,  we 
must  remember  that  the  Absolute  exists  only  in  and  through 
finite  consciousnesses  ;  that  except  as  it  is  in  them,  Fichte  speaks 
of  it,  not  as  Dasein,  but  as  Sein.     This  would  seem  to  imply  that 

1  A  passage  similar  to  these  two  occurs  in  a  letter  from  Fichte  to  Reinhold,  written 
in  1800  {Leben  tmd  Briefivechsel^  2te  Aufl.,  II,  278). 

2  We  said  above  that  Fichte' s  principle  is  conceived  as  activity  rather  than  some- 
thing which  acts.  But  the  same  thing  should  be  said  of  the  human  being ;  it  too 
Fichte  thinks  of  as  life,  activity,  consciousness,  not  as  a  substantial  self  which  pos- 
sesses these  as  attributes.  It  is  hence  no  less  accurate  to  speak  of  a  supra-conscious 
being  than  to  speak  of  a  conscious  one. 


122  FICHTE'S  FUNDAMENTAL   PRINCIPLE. 

there  is  no  consciousness  of  any  sort  except  in  the  Daseiii  of  the 
Absolute,  i.  c,  in  the  actual  world  of  finite  beings. 

It  is  this  second  consideration  which  has  decided  the  matter 
for  me.  While  I  admit  that  there  is  room  for  difference  of  opinion, 
it  seems  to  me  that  Fichte  does  not  recognize  a  universal  conscious- 
ness —  one  in  which  all  the  oppositions  of  human  experience  are 
resolved  —  as  existent,  as  actual.  Such  universal  consciousness 
is  the  goal  toward  which  the  world-process  (the  Dasein  of  the 
Absolute)  is  tending,  but  it  will  never  be  attained.  The  Absolute 
is  itself  conscious  only  in  and  through  us  ;  thus,  its  conscious- 
ness is  partial,  fragmentary,  characterized  by  the  opposition  of 
subject  and  object. 

And  yet  Fichte  would  certainly  not  say  that  the  all-embracing, 
all-harmonizing  consciousness  is  a  7nere  ideal.  For  this  would 
be  to  leave  the  question  in  doubt,  whether  the  world-process  has 
tended  and  will  continue  to  tend,  toward  the  goal  of  perfect  unity. 
And  this  question,  he  would  say,  is  not  to  be  left  in  doubt.  The 
certainty  that  there  is,  and  that  there  will  be,  progress,  that  the 
world-process  is  in  its  essence  an  approximation  to  the  perfect 
harmony  of  subject  and  object,  this  triumphant  certainty  he 
expresses  when  he  speaks  of  the  *  being '  of  the  Absolute  as  dis- 
tinguished from  its  '  existence.'  The  conviction  that  the  presence 
of  value  in  the  realm  of  the  actual  is  neither  an  accident  nor 
merely  the  result  of  the  individual  choices  of  isolated,  self-depend- 
ent consciousnesses,  this  conviction  is  the  heart  and  soul  of 
Fichte' s  doctrine  of  the  being  of  the  Absolute.  The  assertion 
that  God  has  being  is  not  the  assertion  of  an  actually  existent 
universal  consciousness  ;  it  is  rather  the  declaration  that  the  uni- 
versal consciousness,  the  "  unity  of  the  pure  spirit,"  in  which  "all 
individuals  are  included,"  is  not  merely  that  which  ought  to  be, 
but  also  that  which  in  ever  increasing  measure  (though  never 
perfectly)  is  to  be. 


NOTE   A. 

The    Various    Forms    of   Kant's    Conception    of    Iniellektuelle 

Anschauung. 

The  interpretation  of  Kant's  iniellektuelle  Anschauung  which 
has  been  briefly  outlined  in  the  text  differs  somewhat  from  that 
given  by  Thiele  in  his  thorough  and  suggestive  study  of  the 
problem.^  As  we  have  already  pointed  out,  Thiele  recognizes 
three  stages  in  the  development  of  the  doctrine.  In  the  first, 
"  the  content  of  intellectual  perception  is  given  without  recep- 
tivity, that  of  perceptive  understanding  without  spontaneity."^ 
In  the  second,  "  intellectual  perception  .  .  .  posits  its  content 
by  self -activity."  ^  In  the  third,  "  the  content  and  the  object  of 
intellectual  perception  are  identical."  ^  In  opposition  to  Thiele, 
I  suggested  in  Chapter  I,  that  it  is  better  to  recognize  two  main 
stages  in  the  development  of  the  doctrine,  rather  than  three. 
Several  considerations  have  led  me  to  this  opinion.  In  the  first 
place,  it  seems  to  me  that  it  is  not  well  to  draw  too  sharp  a  line 
between  Thiele's  second  and  third  stages.  Even  if  we  admit 
that  they  represent  somewhat  different  points  of  view,  they  are 
very  closely  related  and  might  better  be  regarded  as  two  slightly 

1  Kanf  s  iniellektuelle  Anschauung  als  Grundbegriff  seines  JCriticismus,  Halle, 
1876. 

2  Op.  cit.,  18.  *  Receptivity '  is  used  here  in  a  different  sense  from  that  which  I 
have  given  to  it.  In  denying  that  the  iniellektuelle  Anschauung  of  the  first  stage  has 
receptivity,  Thiele  does  not  intend  to  assert  the  presence  in  it  of  any  element  of  spon- 
taneity. All  that  he  means,  is  that  the  nature  of  the  given  is  not  changed  by  having 
to  conform  to  a  subjective  mode  of  perception.  He  refuses  to  call  iniellektuelle 
Anschauung  '  receptivity  '  because  the  latter  term  seems  to  him  to  imply  that  v^rhat  is 
received,  must  be  phenomenal.  In  the  strict  sense  this  is  of  course  true.  Apparently, 
however,  Kant  did  not  at  first  see  this  difficulty  :  for  him,  in  the  earlier  stages  of  his 
thought,  objects  are  phenomenal,  not  because  they  are  received,  but  because  they 
are  received  by  subjective  forms  of  perception.  It  seems  to  me,  then,  that  we  are 
justified  in  speaking  of  the  intellectual  perception  of  the  first  stage  as  pure  receptivity. 

We  need  not  stop  to  consider  Thiele's  rather  fanciful  interpretation  of  the  phrase 
intuitiver  Verstand  {Op.  cit.,  25ff. ).  As  he  himself  virtually  admits,  it  is  hardly 
justified  by  Kant's  ordinary  use  of  the  term,  which  makes  it  synonymous  with  iniellek- 
tuelle Anschauung. 

^Op.cii.^ZA-  ^Op.cii.,^^. 

123 


124  FICHTE'S  FbNDAMENTAL   PRINCIPLE. 

different  phases  of  a  second  main  stage.  In  the  second  place, 
there  is  some  reason  to  believe  that  in  the  first  stage  itself  the 
conception  has  two  aspects  which  differ  from  each  other  at  least 
as  much  as  Thiele's  second  and  third  stages.  And  finally,  if  we 
recognize  two  main  forms  instead  of  three,  we  can  correlate  these 
two  —  as  was  suggested  in  Chapter  I  —  with  the  conceptions  of 
receptivity  and  spontaneity.  Thus  we  should  say  that  Thiele's 
second  and  third  stages  represent  a  position  which  Kant  reached 
by  starting  with  i\\G.  formal  aspect  of  human  experience,  while 
Thiele's  first  stage,  and  a  somewhat  different  phase  of  it,  which 
we  shall  point  out  directly,  were  gained  by  starting  with  the  ma- 
terial aspect. 

It  is  Kant's  wavering  as  to  the  relation  between  the  categories 
and  intellektiielle  Anschauung  which  justifies  us  in  recognizing  two 
slightly  different  phases  in  what  Thiele  calls  the  first  form  of  the 
doctrine.^  Sometimes  he  says  that  the  categories  would  be  ap- 
plicable to  intellectual  perception,  and  at  other  times  he  seems 
inclined  to  deny  it.  The  first  view  is  represented  by  such  pas- 
sages as  the  following : 

'*  If  I  take  away  ...  all  perception  from  an  empirical  cogni- 
tion, there  still  remains  the  form  of  thinking,  i.  e.,  the  way  in 
which  an  object  is  determined  for  the  manifold  of  a  possible  per- 
ception. Hence  the  categories  have  a  wider  range  than  sensuous 
perception,  in  that  they  think  objects  in  general,  without  refer- 
ence to  the  special  mode  (that  of  sensibility)  in  which  an  object 
may  be  given.  But  they  do  not  thereby  prove  the  existence  of 
a  larger  sphere  of  objects,  because  one  cannot  assume  that  such 
objects  can  be  given  without  presupposing  that  another  kind  of 
perception  than  the  sensuous  is  possible  ;  and  this  presupposi- 
tion we  have  no  right  to  make."  '^ 

*'  If  we  wished  to  apply  the  categories  to  objects  that  are  not 
regarded  as  phenomena,  we  should  have  to  assume  another  per- 
ception than  the  sensuous.  .  .  .  Now  since  such  a  one,  i.  e.,  the 
intellectual  perception,  lies  quite  outside  our  faculty  of  cognition, 

1  As  a  matter  of  convenience,  we  shall  consider  this,  which  we  have  just  stated  as 
our  second  point  against  Thiele,  before  taking  up  the  first. 

2  A,  253  f.  ;  B,  309. 


INTELLEKTUELLE  ANSCHAUUNG.  125 

the  use  of  the  categories  cannot  possibly  extend  beyond  the  boun- 
dary of  objects  of  experience."  ^ 

"  The  categories  ...  do  not  presuppose  any  determinate 
mode  of  perception  (possible  merely  for  us  human  beings),  such 
as  perception  in  space  and  time,  which  is  sensuous.  They  are 
merely  thought-forms  for  the  concept  of  an  object  of  perception 
in  general,  of  whatever  kind  it  may  be,  even  though  it  be  a 
supersensuous  perception,  of  which  we  cannot  form  any  definite 
concept."  ^ 

These  passages  certainly  suggest  that  there  is  nothing  in  the 
nature  of  the  categories  which  would  prevent  our  applying  them 
to  intellectual  perception.  We  cannot  so  use  them,  because  we  are 
not  capable  of  intellectual  perception  ;  but  if  such  perception 
were  possible  for  us,  we  could  apply  our  categories  to  it  and  thus 
gain  a  knowledge  of  things  as  they  really  are.  On  the  other 
hand,  however,  there  are  several  passages  in  the  Kritik  in  which 
the  applicability  of  the  categories  to  intellektuelle  Aitschauiing  is 
denied.  "  If  by  merely  intelligible  objects  we  mean  things  which 
are  thought  through  pure  categories,  without  any  schema  of  sen- 
sibility, this  kind  of  objects  is  impossible.  For  the  condition  of 
the  objective  use  of  all  our  concepts  of  the  understanding  is 
merely  the  mode  of  our  sensuous  perception,  through  which  ob- 
jects are  given  to  us  ;  and  if  we  abstract  from  this  perception, 
the  categories  have  no  reference  to  any  object.  Even  if  one 
wished  to  assume  another  kind  of  perception  than  this  sensuous 
one  of  ours,  our  functions  of  thinking  would  have  no  meaning 
with  reference  to  it.  If  [on  the  other  hand]  we  understand  [by 
intelligible  objects]  simply  objects  of  a  non-sensuous  perception, 
for  which  indeed  our  categories  are  not  valid  and  of  which  there- 
fore we  can  never  have  any  cognition,  .  .  .  noumena  in  this 
merely  negative  sense  must  certainly  be  admitted.  .  .  .  But  in 
this  case  the  concept  of  a  noumenon  is  problematic."^  And 
again  :  *'  The  pure  concepts  of  the  understanding  .  .  .  apply  to 
objects  of  perception  in  general,  whether  or  not  it  is  like  our  per- 

1 B,  308. 

^Vber  die  Fortschritte  der  Metaphysik  (1791),  H,  VIII,  533.  Cf.  also  Pro- 
legomena, \  34,  H,  IV,  64  f.  3  A,  286  ;  B,  342  f. 


126  FICHTE'S  FUNDAMENTAL   PRINCIPLE. 

ception,  provided  only  that  it  is  sensuous  and  not  intellectual^  ^ 
We  find,  then,  definite  statements  for  each  of  these  opposed 
views.  On  the  one  hand,  Kant  seems  to  say  that  the  categories 
would  be  applicable  to  a  non-sensuous  perception  if  this  percep- 
tion were  itself  possible  for  us.  On  the  other,  he  declares  with 
equal  definiteness  that  with  reference  to  such  a  perception  they 
would  have  no  meaning.  Thiele  explains  this  apparent  contra- 
diction by  supposing  that  the  denial  of  the  applicability  of  the 
categories  belongs  only  to  a  later  form  of  the  doctrine,  in  which 
vitellektuelle  Anschauung  is  regarded  as  creating  its  own  object.^ 
In  the  first  stage,  when  intellectual  perception  was  conceived  as 
a  faculty  to  which  objects  are  given  in  their  real  nature,  Kant 
held  that  it  is  subject  to  the  categories  ;  it  was  only  when  he 
abandoned  this  point  of  view  for  a  higher  one,  when  the  notion 
of  creative  activity  was  substituted  for  that  of  passive  apprehen- 
sion, that  he  ceased  to  believe  in  the  applicability  of  the  cate- 
gories. That  there  are,  however,  passages  in  which  he  denies 
their  applicability  and  which  at  the  same  time  suggest  his  earlier 
conception  of  intellektuelle  Anschauung,  Thiele  readily  admits.' 
But  he  explains  this  by  supposing  that  a  doctrine  which  really 
holds  only  of  the  intellectual  perception  of  the  second  stage  is 
thoughtlessly  carried  over  by  Kant  to  that  of  the  first  stage. 

It  seems  to  me  that  a  more  satisfactory  explanation  than  this 
is  possible.  Instead  of  maintaining  that  Kant's  denial  of  the 
applicability  of  the  categories  has  its  source  in  his  new  concep- 

^  B,  148.  Cf.  with  these  passages  from  the  Kritik,  the  following  from  the  trea- 
tise, Uber  eine  Entdeckung  (1790)  :  If  we  had  intellectual  perception,  "not  only 
should  we  no  longer  have  need  of  the  categories,  but  they  .  .  .  could  not  be  used 
at  all  "  (H.,  VI,  32).  2  Op.  cit.,  40  ff. 

3  Perhaps  more  readily  than  he  is  really  compelled  to  do.  While  I  myself  believe 
that  some  of  the  passages  which  deny  the  applicability  of  the  categories  represent 
the  first  foim  of  the  doctrine  of  intellektuelle  Anschauung^  it  seems  to  me  that  there 
is  room  for  difference  of  opinion  upon  this  very  point.  The  passages  in  question — 
the  chief  of  which  have  just  been  quoted — do  not  unmistakably  suggest  the  earlier 
conception  of  intellektuelle  Anschauung ;  i.  e. ,  they  contain  no  distinct  reference  to 
the  knowledge  of  things-in-themselves,  and  they  do  not  speak  of  objects  SiS  given  in 
intellectual  perception.  On  the  other  hand,  it  may  be  said  that  they  contain  no  refer- 
ence to  intellectual  perception  as  creative  activity,  and  also  that  the  context  seems  to 
suggest  that  it  is  conceived  as  the  apprehension  of  things-in-themselves.  On  the 
whole  I  incline  to  think  with  Thiele  that  these  passages  represent  the  first  form  of 
the  doctrine. 


INTELLEKTUELLE  ANSCHAUUNG.  12/ 

tion  of  intellektuelle  AnscJiaiiung  as  creative  activity,  we  may  at- 
tribute it  simply  to  the  natural  development  of  his  earlier  doc- 
trine of  intellectual  perception  as  the  immediate  apprehension  of 
things-in-themselves.  It  has  frequently  been  pointed  out  that  he 
came  to  believe  in  the  subjectivity  of  time  and  space  before  he 
conceived  the  idea  that  the  categories  also  are  subjective  forms. 
During  this  period,  then,  when  he  still  regarded  the  categories 
as  valid  for  things-in-themselves,  it  is  not  strange  that  he  should 
have  thought  of  intellectual  perception  as  subject  to  the  cate- 
gories, that  he  should  have  conceived  it  as  differing  from  our 
sensuous  perception  merely  in  being  free  from  the  limitations  of 
space  and  time,  not  in  being  free  from  the  categories.  But  later, 
when  he  had  come  to  regard  even  the  pure  conceptions  of  the 
understanding  as  forms  of  human  cognition,  his  view  underwent 
some  change.  If  the  content  of  intellectual  perception  were 
brought  under  the  subjective  forms  of  our  understanding,  it 
would  no  longer  represent  things  as  they  are  in  themselves. 
Hence,  if  there  is  any  faculty  that  can  know  the  real  nature  of 
things,  it  must  be  one  which  does  not  employ  categories,  which 
does  not  arrange  and  unify  its  content,  which  in  fact  has  no 
activity,  but  is  mere  passive  apprehension  of  noumena.  Thus 
the  belief  that  intellectual  perception,  in  the  earher  form  of  the 
doctrine,  could  not  be  subject  to  categories,  is  not,  as  Thiele 
supposes,  a  foreign  element  thrust  into  the  conception,  but  is 
rather  the  result  to  which  we  naturally  come  if  we  start  with  the 
thought  of  intellektuelle  Anschatmng  as  pure  receptivity  and 
carry  it  out  to  its  logical  conclusion. 

Even  in  its  higher  phase,  however,  the  notion  is  full  of  diffi- 
culty. As  long  as  intellectual  perception  is  regarded  as  recep- 
tivity, as  long  as  its  content  is  supposed  to  be  given  to  it  from 
without,  it  cannot  strictly  be  said  to  know  things  in  their  real 
nature.  For  things-in-themselves,  things  apart  from  the  mind 
that  apprehends  them,  cannot  be  constituted  just  as  they  are 
when  apprehended.  It  is  only  when  the  knowing  mind  is  one 
with  the  known  object,  when,  in  Kant's  words,  "  the  objects 
themselves  .  .  .  are  produced"^  through  the  apprehension  of 

^  B,  145. 


128  FICHIE'S  FUNDAMENTAL  PRINCIPLE. 

them,  that  we  can  be  said  to  know  them  as  they  really  are.  But 
this,  though  Kant  did  not  see  it,  does  away  at  once  with  the 
notion  of  an  object  which  exists  independently  of  a  subject. 
Only  by  means  of  a  conception  which  completely  overthrows 
the  doctrine  of  the  Ding  an  sick,  can  we  understand  the  possi- 
bility of  knowledge  of  the  Ding  an  sich. 

Thus  the  difficulties  in  the  notion  of  intellectual  perception  as 
pure  receptivity  pave  the  way  for  the  theory  that  it  is  pure 
spontaneity.  That  these  perplexities  had  something  to  do  with 
the  development  of  the  second  doctrine  in  Kant's  mind  seems 
not  improbable  ;  ^  but  that  he  clearly  recognized  the  inadequacy 
of  the  first  theory  and  deliberately  set  out  to  formulate  a  better 
one,  as  Thiele  appears  to  think,  is  hardly  likely.  What  really 
happened,  was  probably  something  like  this  :  that  while  Kant 
was  writing  the  First  Edition  of  the  Kritik  he  conceived  intellek- 
tuelle  Anschauung  as  receptivity  and  therefore  described  it  as  the 
apprehension  of  the  thing-in-itself ;  and  that  afterwards,  when  he 
was  working  out  the  Second  Edition,  with  its  detailed  treatment 
of  the  transcendental  unity  of  apperception,  he  quite  naturally 
approached  the  problem  from  the  point  of  view  of  spontaneity, 
and  described  intellectual  perception  as  the  pure  self-conscious- 
ness which  develops  its  content  from  within  instead  of  receiving  it 
from  without.^  But  we  need  not  suppose  that  the  formulation  of 
this  second  conception  brought  with  it  the  abandonment  of  the 
first.  On  the  contrary,  the  cruder  form  seems  to  have  persisted 
side  by  side  with  the  more  developed  one,  so  that  whenever 
Kant  looked  at  the  question  from  the  point  of  view  of  sense  in- 

1  The  following  passage  from  §  9  of  the  Prolegomena  suggests  that  he  sometimes 
recognized  the  fact  that  mere  passive  apprehension  of  objects  can  never  be  knowledge 
of  their  real  nature  :  "If  our  perception  had  to  be  of  such  kind  that  it  represented 
things  as  they  are  in  themselves,  there  would  be  no  perception  a  prioi-i,  but  it  would 
all  be  empirical.  For  I  can  know  what  is  contained  in  the  object  in  itself  only  if  the 
object  is  present  to  me,  is  given.  Even  then  it  is  indeed  incomprehensible  how  the 
perception  of  a  present  thing  should  make  me  know  it  as  it  is  in  itself,  since  its  prop- 
erties cannot  wander  over  into  my  consciousness  (  Vorstellungskraft)  "  (H.,  IV,  31). 

2  I  do  not  mean  to  imply  that  there  are  no  traces  of  the  conception  of  intellektuelle 
Anschauung  as  spontaneity  earlier  than  the  Second  Edition.  On  the  contrary,  as  we 
shall  soon  see,  the  germs  of  the  doctrine  appear  in  the  Inauguraldissertation  of  1770 ; 
but  it  was  not  until  the  Second  Edition  of  the  Kritik  that  the  thought  was  really 
worked  out. 


INTELLEKTUELLE  ANSCHAUUNG.  1 29 

stead  of  understanding,  he  fell  naturally  and  unconsciously  into 
the  earlier  way  of  thinking. 

This  seems  to  be  the  more  reasonable  view  of  the  matter. 
Kant's  second  conception  of  intellektuelle  Anscliauung  can  better 
be  explained  as  an  attempt  to  surmount  the  dualism  of  form  and 
content  by  starting  with  the  notion  of  pure  self-consciousness 
than  as  a  deliberate  effort  to  improve  upon  the  first  conception. 
Evidence  for  this  interpretation  is  found  in  the  fact  that  definite 
statements  of  the  earlier  and  cruder  doctrine  appear  in  works 
which  were  written  later  than  the  Second  Edition  of  the  KiHtik 
der  reinen  Vernunft}  If  we  supposed  that  Kant  had  definitely 
abandoned  the  first  fOrm  of  his  theory  when  he  developed  the 
second,  we  should  hardly  be  able  to  explain  this  persistence  of 
the  earlier  form. 

In  the  second  conception  of  intellektuelle  Anschaintng  we  may 
perhaps  distinguish  two  phases,  as  we  did  in  the  first.  If  so,  they 
correspond  to  Thiele's  second  and  third  stages.  According  to 
his  interpretation,  the  intellectual  perception  of  the  second  stage 
is  regarded  as  form  which  creates  its  own  content,  as  a  faculty  of 
cognition  through  which  the  object  itself  is  produced.  But  the 
content  is  still  something  external  to  the  form,  and  thus  we  have 
not  yet  reached  the  conception  of  a  perfect  unity  of  subject  and 
object.  In  the  third  stage,  however,  Kant  develops  the  thought 
of  a  conciousness  in  which  this  harmony  is  complete. 

Some  of  the  passages  which  most  naturally  suggest  Thiele's 
second  stage  belong  to  a  period  earlier  than  that  of  the  Kritik 
der  reinen  Vernunft.  In  the  Inauguraldissertation  of  1770,  e.  g., 
Kant  says,  ''  The  perception  of  our  mind  is  always  passive,  and 
thus  it  is  possible  only  in  so  far  as  something  is  able  to  affect  our 
senses.  But  the  divine  perception,  which  is  the  cause  [princi- 
pium)  of  objects,  not  their  effect  (^priitcipiatum),  since  it  is  inde- 
pendent, is  the  archetype,  and  hence  completely  intellectual."  ^ 
Again,  in  a  letter  to  Marcus  Herz,  in  1772,  he  writes,  "If  that 
which  in  us  is  called  representation  (  Vorstellujig)  were  in  regard 
to  the  object  an  action  {actio),  i.  e.,  if  the  object  were  produced 

^  Cf.y  e.  g.,  the  passage  in  the  Fortschritte  der  Metaphysiky  quoted  above,  p. 
125.     See  also  H.,  V,  421  f.  {Kritik  der  Urtheilskraft).  2  h.,  II,  404. 


130  FICHTE'S  FUNDAMENTAL   PRINCIPLE. 

through  it,  in  the  sense  in  which  the  cognitions  of  the  divine  mind 
are  represented  as  the  archetypes  of  things  (Urbilder  der  Sacheri)^ 
then  the  conformity  of  the  representation  with  the  object  could 
be  understood.  Thus  the  possibility  of  the  intellectus  archetypus, 
in  whose  perception  the  things  themselves  have  their  ground,  .  .  . 
is  at  least  intelligible."  ^ 

We  find  a  somewhat  similar  statement  in  the  Second  Edition 
of  the  Kritik.  Our  "  mode  of  perception  ...  is  called  sensi- 
bility because  it  is  not  original,  i.  e.,  it  is  not  a  perception  through 
which  the  existence  of  the  object  of  perception  is  given  (this  kind 
of  perception,  so  far  as  we  can  see,  can  belong  only  to  the  Divine 
Being)  ;  but  it  is  dependent  upon  the  existence  of  the  object  and 
therefore  is  possible  only  because  the  subject's  consciousness 
[Vorstellungsfdhigkeit)  \s  affected  by  the  object."  It  is  ** sensi- 
bility .  .  .  because  it  is  derived  (intuitus  derivativus),  not  origi- 
nal (intuitiis  originarius),2ir\d  hence  not  intellectual  perception."^ 

According  to  Thiele  these  passages  show  that  Kant  has  not 
yet  risen  to  the  conception  of  mtellektuelle  Anschauung  as  a  per- 
fect unity  of  subject  and  object.  Things  are  indeed  produced 
through  the  activity  of  the  divine  understanding,  but  they  are,  as 
it  were,  projected  from  it,  externalized.  Although  they  are 
wholly  dependent  upon  it  for  their  being,  although  they  are 
products  of  its  own  nature,  still  they  are,  in  a  sense,  foreign  to 
it.  The  conception  which  Thiele  distinguishes  from  this  and 
regards  as  the  third  stage  in  the  development  of  the  doctrine,  is 
not  found  earlier  than  the  Second  Edition  of  the  Kritik.  The 
following  passages  illustrate  it  : 

"  That  understanding  through  whose  self-consciousness  the 
manifold  of  perception  was  also  given  —  an  understanding  through 
whose  idea  ( Vorstellung)  the  objects  of  this  idea  existed  at  the 
same  time  —  would  not  need  for  the  unity  of  its  consciousness  a 
special  act  of  the  synthesis  of  the  manifold."  ^ 

"  The  consciousness  of  self  (or  apperception)  is  the  simple 
idea  ( Vorstellung)  of  the  Ego ;  and  if  through  it  alone  all  the 
manifold  in  the  subject  were  given  by  self -activity,  then  the  inner 
perception  would  be  intellectual."  * 

iH.,  VIII,  689.  2B,  72.  3B,  138  f.  *B,  68,  quoted  above,  p.7. 


INTELLEKTUELLE  ANSCHAUUNG.  131 

That  these  two  sets  of  passages  represent  two  distinct  concep- 
tions of  intellekttielle  Aiischmiiuig  does  not  seem  to  me  so  evident 
as  it  apparently  does  to  Thiele.  Of  the  three  quotations  which 
we  have  given  as  representative  of  Thiele's  second  stage,  that 
found  in  the  letter  to  Herz  is  the  only  one  which  seems  to  me 
to  suggest  his  interpretation  at  all  definitely  ;  ^  but  when  we  have 
once  made  this  interpretation  of  the  passage  in  the  letter,  it  is 
natural  enough  to  extend  it  to  the  statements  which  we  have 
quoted  from  the  Inaugiiraldissertation  and  the  Kritik. 

On  the  whole  I  should  be  inclined  to  say  that  the  earlier  set 
of  passages  represents  simply  a  theory  which  Kant  had  inherited 
from  other  thinkers  and  which  he  had  not  yet  fully  made  his 
own.  Previously  to  the  great  development  of  the  conception  of 
the  transcendental  unity  of  apperception  in  the  Second  Edition 
of  the  Kritik,  he  either  regarded  intellektuelle  Anschaumig  as  pure 
receptivity,  or  if  he  thought  of  it  as  spontaneity,  merely  adopted 
without  much  reflection  the  conventional  notion  of  the  divine 
understanding  as  creative.  It  was  only  when  he  began  to  work 
upon  the  Second  Edition  that  the  conception  of  intellektuelle 
Anschauung  as  creative  really  became  an  integral  part  of  his 
own  thought.  When  this  took  place,  the  old  doctrine  of  the  re- 
lation between  the  created  thing  and  the  creative  understanding 
received  new  significance ;  then  for  the  first  time,  Kant  saw  what 
is  meant  by  the  perfect  harmony  of  subject  and  object.  In  the 
thought  of  a  self-consciousness  which  does  not  create,  but  is  its 
own  object,  he  at  last  reached  the  notion  of  a  form  that  is  com- 
pletely one  with  its  content. 

But  while  we  may  recognize  this  difference  between  the  two 
conceptions  of  the  creative  understanding,  it  seems  to  me  a  mis- 
take to  emphasize  it  as  strongly  as  Thiele  does.     Apparentl3r 
Kant  himself  did  not  discriminate  very  clearly  between  them. 
This  is  not  surprising ;  for  as  soon  as  we  ask  ourselves  what 

1  /.  (?.,  it  is  the  only  one  which  seems  to  imply  that  the  object  produced  by  the  ac- 
tivity is  yet  set  over  against  the  perceiving  subject ;  and  unless  the  passages  in  ques- 
tion suggest  this,  we  have  no  sufficient  ground  for  recognizing  Thiele's  second  stage 
as  distinct  from  his  third. 

2  This  seems  to  be  indicated  by  the  presence  in  the  Second  Edition  of  the  passage 
which  we  quoted  on  the  preceding  page. 


132  FICHTE'S  FUNDAMENTAL   PRINCIPLE. 

we  mean  by  saying  that  intellectual  perception  creates  its  own 
object  and  knows  this  object  perfectly,  we  see  that  the  only 
thing  which  can  be  meant,  is  that  it  is  one  with  its  object.  We  can 
perhaps  form  the  notion  of  a  creative  faculty  which  projects  objects 
from  itself  by  an  unconscious  activity  and  hence  regards  them  as 
given  to  it  from  without.  But  such  a  faculty  would  not  be  intel- 
lectual perception.  For  if  it  regarded  the  object  as  something 
foreign,  it  would  fail  to  apprehend  its  true  nature  ;  things  would 
be  distorted  by  this  mode  of  conceiving  them.  Only  in  that 
creative  form  which  is  one  with  its  content,  in  whose  apprehen- 
sion of  the  object  there  is  no  sense  of  foreignness  or  givenness, 
do  we  find  the  ideal  of  cognition. 

Thus  the  doctrine  that  intellectual  perception  creates  its  own 
object,  contains  by  implication  the  thought  that  in  it  the  dualism 
of  subject  and  object  is  resolved  into  perfect  unity.  Whether 
Kant  himself  clearly  saw  this,  may  perhaps  be  doubted ;  but  it 
cannot  be  denied  that  the  more  developed  form  of  the  doctrine 
is  implicit  in  the  cruder  one.  Nor  can  we  fail  to  see  that  this 
conception  of  perfect  knowledge  could  have  been  reached  only 
by  starting  from  the  side  of  spontaneity.  If  we  try  to  frame  the 
jdeal  on  the  analogy  of  sense  rather  than  that  of  understanding, 
-we  can  never  get  beyond  the  notion  of  a  faculty  which  mirrors 
its  object  perfectly,  and  yet  can  never  be  perfect  knowledge  be- 
cause it  mirrors  the  object  instead  of  being  it.  And  again,  if  we 
frame  our  notion  on  the  analogy  of  spontaneity,  and  yet  have  in 
mind  the  spontaneity  of  consciousness  rather  than  that  of  self- 
consciousness,  it  is  doubtful  whether  we  shall  rise  higher  than  the 
concept  of  an  unconscious  creative  activity.  It  is  only  when  we 
think  of  intellektuelle  Anschauung  as  analogous  to  our  own  self- 
consciousness  that  we  get  the  true  conception,  which,  in  all  the 
various  phases  of  his  theory,  Kant  was  struggling  to  grasp. 

To  sum  up  in  a  few  words  the  result  of  this  discussion,  there 
are  two  objections  to  Thiele's  interpretation.  One  is  that  we 
seem  to  have  no  very  good  reason  for  recognizing  three  main 
stages,  rather  than  two,  in  the  development  of  Kant's  doctrine. 
For  in  the  first  place,  the  difference  between  Thiele's  second  and 
third  stages  is  not  so  marked  as  that  between  the  conception  of 


INTELLEKTUELLE  ANSCHAUUNG.  1 33 

intellektiielle  Aiischauimg  as  activity  and  the  conception  of  it  as 
receptivity.  And  in  the  second  place,  we  have  seen  that  even  the 
doctrine  of  intellectual  perception  as  receptivity  appears  in  two 
somewhat  different  forms.  It  seems  to  me  therefore  much  better 
to  distinguish  two  main  stages  in  the  development  of  the  doctrine, 
and  then  to  recognize  within  each  of  them  two  slightly  different 
phases.  This  interpretation  has  the  further  advantage  that  it 
enables  us  to  correlate  our  two  main  stages  with  the  conceptions 
of  receptivity  and  spontaneity  —  conceptions  whose  opposition 
constitutes  a  distinctive  feature  of  Kant's  philosophy. 

The  other  objection  is  that  Thiele  apparently  regards  each 
stage  in  the  development  of  the  doctrine  as  representing  a  definite 
abandonment  of  the  preceding  stage.  This  seems  to  me  quite 
incompatible  with  the  fact  that  in  some  of  Kant's  late  writings  we 
find  passages  which  suggest  the  earlier,  rather  than  the  later,  form 
of  the  doctrine.  It  is  more  nearly  correct  to  say  that  Kant  never 
sharply  distinguished  between  the  two  forms,  and  that  whenever, 
in  his  later  writings,  he  looked  at  the  question  from  the  point  of 
view  of  receptivity,  he  went  back  quite  naturally  to  the  cruder 
conception  of  intellektiielle  Anschaming  as  the  passive  apprehen- 
sion of  things-in-themselves. 


NOTE  B. 

Kant's  'I  Think.' 

Thiele's  contention  that  Kant  regards  human  knowing  as  dif- 
fering from  its  ideal  merely  in  degree,  is  supported  by  a  long 
and  somewhat  involved  argument,^  which  we  can  notice  only 
briefly.  Its  thesis  seems  to  be  that  while  Kant  denies  all  con- 
tent to  the  pure  Ego  of  apperception,  he  nevertheless  makes  it  an 
identity  of  knowing  and  being  and  thus  in  some  measure  the  reali- 
zation of  the  ideal  of  knowledge.  In  a  passage  in  the  Second 
Edition  of  the  Kritik  der  reinen  Vernunft,  Kant  declares  that  the 
*  I '  in  the  T  think'  is  something  real  and  yet  is  neither  phenome- 
non nor  thing-in-itself  ^  This  passage  is  regarded  by  Thiele  as 
supporting  his  interpretation.  He  lays  stress  upon  the  fact  that 
the  Ego  is  here  designated  as  an  intellectual  representation  (in- 
tellekttielle  Vorstellung).  Kant  does  not  give  it  the  name  of  in- 
tellectual perception,  he  says,  partly  because  *  perception '  is  as- 
sociated in  his  mind  with  the  notion  of  a  manifold,  partly  because 
he  ordinarily  thinks  of  perception  as  subject  to  the  categories, 
and  most  of  all  because  the  term  *  intellectual  perception  '  has 

1  op.  cit.,  94-172. 

2  •*  The  *  I  think  '  is  ...  an  empirical  proposition  and  contains  within  itself  the 
proposition  *  I  exist.'  ...  It  expresses  an  undetermined  empirical  perception  {An- 
schauung),  that  is,  sense-perception  (  Wahrnehmung)  —  and  hence  it  shows  that  sen- 
sation, which  of  course  belongs  to  sensibility,  forms  the  ground  of  this  existential 
proposition  —  but  it  precedes  experience.  .  .  .  An  undetermined  sense-perception 
(  Wahrnehmung)  signifies  here  only  something  real  which  has  been  given,  and  indeed 
only  to  thinking  in  general ;  which  therefore  is  given,  not  as  phenomenon  and  not  as 
thing-in -itself  [Sache  an  sich  selbsi)  or  noumenon,  but  as  something  which  exists  in 
fact  and  which  is  indicated  as  such  \i.  e. ,  as  factual  existence]  in  the  proposition  •  I 
think.'  For  it  should  be  noted  that  when  I  characterize  the  proposition  *  I  think,'  as 
empirical,  I  do  not  mean  thereby  to  say  that  the  *  I '  in  this  proposition  is  an  empirical 
representation  ;  on  the  contrary  it  is  purely  intellectual,  because  it  belongs  to  think- 
ing in  general.  But  without  any  empirical  representation  to  furnish  matter  for  think- 
ing, the  act  '  I  think '  would  not  take  place,  and  the  empirical  factor  is  [therefore] 
only  the  condition  of  the  application  or  use  of  the  pure  intellectual  faculty"  (B, 
422  f. ) .  With  this  we  may  compare  the  following  :  ' '  The  consciousness  of  myself  in 
the  representation  '  I '  is  not  perception,  but  a  merely  intellectual  representation  of 
the  self -activity  of  a  thinking  subject  "  (B,  278). 

134 


KANT'S  '/  think:  135 

for  him  "  a  decided  reference  to  the  Creator."  But  we  can  see 
in  this  description  of  the  pure  Ego  the  essential  characteristic  of 
intellectual  perception  —  the  complete  "  identity  of  knowing  and 
being."  The  *  I '  in  the  '  I  think  '  is  not  phenomenal,  because  "  that 
which  is  indicated  in  the  representation  *  I '  is  not  something  dis- 
tinct from  the  representation,  something  of  which  the  representa- 
tion could  be  the  appearance."  On  the  Other  hand,  it  is  not 
thing-in-itself,  because  it  has  no  content,  and  especially  because  it 
rises  above  the  opposition  of  phenomenon  and  thing-in-itself 
The  thing-in-itself  can  never  be  an  object  of  knowing.  But  in 
this  act  '  I '  the  **  being  of  the  Ego  in  itself  "  is  not  present  as  an 
Ansich,  "just  because  it  is  illuminated  by  knowing."  ^ 

Another  passage  which  Thiele  regards  as  furnishing  strong 
evidence  for  his  theory  is  found  in  a  note  to  §  46  of  the  Prole- 
gomena^ which  reads  as  follows  :  ''If  the  representation  of  apper- 
ception, the  '  I,'  were  a  concept,  by  which  something  were  thought, 
it  could  be  used  as  predicate  of  other  things  or  would  contain 
such  predicates.  But  it  is  nothing  more  than  a  feeling  of  exist- 
ence {Gefithl  eines  Daseins),  without  the  least  concept ;  it  is  only 
the  representation  of  that  to  which  all  thinking  stands  in  relation 
(in  the  relation  of  accident)."'-^  In  this  ''feeling  of  existence," 
Thiele  urges,  we  have  that  unity  of  knowing  and  being  which  is 
the  essence  of  absolute  knowing.  "  In  the  act  of  thought  '  I  '  is 
immediately  contained  the  existence  of  the  Ego  as  a  feeling ;  at 
bottom  this  means  nothing  else  than  that  the  act  '  I '  is  identity  of 
knowing  and  being."  ^ 

The  force  of  Thiele's  argument  is  decidedly  weakened  when 
we  consider  the  context  of  the  passages  upon  which  he  lays  so 
much  stress.  Both  the  quotation  from  the  Kritik  and  that  from 
the  Prolegomena  appear  as  foot-notes  in  a  discussion  of  the  paral- 
ogisms of  pure  reason.  In  each  case,  Kant  is  protesting  against 
our  supposing  that  the  pure  consciousness  of  self  is  a  source  of 
knowledge.  The  *  I  think '  is  purely  empty,  form  without  any 
content ;  whatever  Kant  may  have  meant  by  speaking  of  it  as 
"  intellektuelle  Vorstellung"  or  as  "  Gefiihl  eines  Daseins,"  he 
certainly  did  not  mean  to  describe  it  as  a   unity  of  form  and 

1  Op.  cii.,  143  ff.  2  H,  IV,  82,  note.  ^Op.  cii.,  139. 


136  FICHTE'S  FUNDAMENTAL   PRINCIPLE. 

matter.  The  general  criticism  may  be  made  upon  Thiele's  whole 
argument,  that  it  tries  to  read  into  Kant  a  theory  which  is  cer- 
tainly not  in  Kant.  It  is  perfectly  true  that  the  doctrine  of  the 
transcendental  Ego  suggests  to  us  the  way  in  which  its  funda- 
mental defects  may  be  corrected,  but  it  is  equally  true  that  Kant 
himself  refuses  to  make  the  correction.  We  know  that  some 
one,  comrng  after  him,  conceived  the  idea  of  trying  to  show  that 
human  experience,  in  its  inmost  essence,  must  be  that  very  unity 
of  form  and  content  which  is  the  ideal  of  all  its  striving.  This  is 
what  Fichte  and  Hegel  attempted  to  do,  but  it  is  precisely  in  this 
direction  that  they  went  beyond  anything  that  Kant  ever  dreamed 
of.  In  short  the  spirit  of  the  Kritik  compels  Kant  to  maintain 
that,  so  far  as  we  can  ever  know,  the  dualism  of  form  and  matter 
is  absolute.  We  may  frame  a  vague  notion  of  some  superhuman 
understanding  for  which  this  opposition  does  not  exist ;  but  this 
intellectual  perception  must  always  be,  not  merely  an  unrealiz- 
able ideal,  but  an  ideal  to  which  our  cognition  cannot  even 
approximate. 

In  justice  to  Thiele  it  should  be  said  that  to  a  certain  extent 
he  seems  to  recognize  this.  The  quotation  from  the  Prolegomena 
he  speaks  of  as  "  a  flash  of  light,  whose  gleam  has  no  further 
influence  in  Kant's  conscious  philosophizing."  ^  Nevertheless,  he 
believes  that  the  unconscious  influence  of  this  momentary  insight 
is  seen  in  the  Second  Edition  of  the  Kritik^  and  he  obviously 
regards  the  passage  as  indicating  that  Kant  sometimes  caught 
glimpses  of  the  truth,  that  our  own  self- consciousness  is,  in  a 
sense,  that  very  unity  of  subject  and  object  which  we  posit  as  the 
ideal.  This,  it  seems  to  me,  is  far  from  being  the  case.  One 
thing  of  which  Kant  seems  always  certain  —  in  the  Second 
Edition  as  in  the  First  —  is  that  for  human  knowledge  the  ideal 
is  essentially  and  utterly  inaccessible. 

1  op,  cit.y  140. 


INDEX, 


Absolute,  the,  71  ff.,  8;^  ff.,  94  f.,  104, 
121  f .  ;  as  self- realizing  principle,  35 
f.,  38,  40  ff.,  54,  77  f.,  95  ff.,  102  ff., 
107  f.,  Il6ff.  ;  as  supreme  value,  77, 
107  ff.,  117  f.  ;  as  will,  II7  f.,  120 
f.  ;  has  it  consciousness  ?  1 20  ff.  ;  does 
Fichte  conceive  it  negatively  ?  89  ff.  ; 
is  Fichte' s  concept  of  it  gained  by  hy- 
postatization ?  1 10,  113  ff.,  120  ff.  ; 
no  predicates  can  be  attached  to,  71 
ff.,  81 ;  why  it  manifests  itself,  34  ff., 
92  ff.  ;  the  Ansich  and  the  Filrsich  of, 
78,  83,  ^l  ff. ,  see  also  Sein  and  Dasein; 
and  absolute  knowing,  see  Absolute 
knowings  and  the  Absolute. 

Absolute  Ego,  the,  see  Ego,  as  absolute. 

Absolute  knowing,  69  ff.  ;  and  the  Abso- 
lute, 71  ff.,  76  ff.,  83  ff.,  see  also  Sein 
and  Dasein. 

Absolute  value,  the,  as  self- realizing  prin- 
ciple, 77  f.,  107  ff..  Ill  ff.,  116  ff.  ;  is 
it  hypostatized  by  Fichte?  Iio,  1 13 
ff.,  120  ff. 

Activity  and  passivity  of  the  Ego,  33. 

Actual,  the,  3  f.,  8  f.,  16,  41  ff.,  77,  85, 
104  ff.,  no  ff.,  121  f.  ;  always  char- 
acterized by  opposition,  15  f.,  41  f., 
77;  and  the  ideal,  4  ff.,  19  ff.,  77  f., 
82  f.,  106  ff.  See  also  Being,  and 
actuality  and  Sein  and  Dasein. 

.Esthetic,  and  rational  Ideas,  14 ;  judg- 
ment,   13  f. 

Altruism  and  the  suppression  of  individu- 
ality, 64  ff. 

Anstoss,  der,  in  Fichte' s  doctrine,  ^t,  ff., 
42. 

Apperception,  Kant' s  transcendental  unity 
of,  2f.,  6f.,  19,  I34ff. 

Atheism,  charge  of,  57  f.,  75. 

Becoming,  see  Being,  and  becoming. 

Being,  Fichte' s  concept  of,  73  f.,  86  ff., 
90  f.,  109  ff.  ;  and  actuality,  109  ff., 
114  f.,  see  also  Sein  and  Dasein  ;  and 


becoming,  77  ff.,  loi  f.,  104,  109  ;  and 
existence,  see  Sein  and  Dasein  ;  and 
freedom,  69,  84  f.  ;  and  validity,  no 
ff.  ;  two  meanings  of  the  word,  in 
Fichte' s  terminology,  73  f.  ;  often 
identified  with  the  thing-in-itself,  82. 
Bosanquet,  31  note. 

Caird,  13  note. 

Categories,  relation  of  the,  to  intellectual 
perception,  124  ff. 

Consciousness,  Fichte's  conception  of  the 
nature  of,  16  f.,  19  f.,  22  ff.,  58  f.,  70 
f.,  85  f.,  117  f.;  Kant's  conception  of 
the  nature  of,  i  ff.,  14  f.,  134  ff.;  rela- 
tion of,  to  its  ideal,  4  ff.,  13  ff.,  19  ff., 
34  ff.,  45  ff.,  85  f.,  106  ff.,  134  ff.;  ulti- 
mate disappearance  of,  43  f.,  50  f,,  54 
ff.,  66  f.;  the  universal,  54,  121  f. 

Content,  see  Form  and  content. 

Contingency,  see  Necessity  and  contin- 
gency. 

Creighton,  4,  12  note. 

Darstellung  der  Wissenschaftslehre,  69 
ff.,  84  ff.,  93  ff,  loi  f. 

Dasein,  see  Sein  and  Dasein, 

Design,  concept  of,  regarded  by  Kant  as 
having  merely  subjective  validity,  15. 

Desire,  an  essential  factor  in  volition,  52  ; 
place  of,  in  the  moral  life,  lo  f.,  47  ff. 

Dialectic  method,  used  by  Fichte,  32. 

Dogmatism  and  idealism,  23  ff. 

Dualism,  in  human  experience,  recog- 
nized by  Fichte,  16,  20  ;  Fichte's  ex- 
planation of  the,  in  human  experience, 
33  ff.,  41  ;  Kant's,  see  Kanf  s  dualism 
and  Form  and  content. 

Ego,  the,  16,  25  ff.;  as  absolute,  28,  ^,1 
ff,40  ff,46,  48,  72,  81,85,  87,  97, 
102;  as  freedom,  97  f.;  as  Idea,  see 
Idea  of  the  Ego  ;  as  intellektuelle  An- 
schauung  and  as  Idea,  38  ff.,  46;  as 


37 


138 


INDEX. 


intelligence,  34  f.,  46,  54;  as  unity  of 
subject  and  object,  16,  25  ff.,  39  ff.,  48 
f. ;  the  finite  and  the  infinite,  34  ff. ,  43 
f.,  46,  48  ff.,  82  f.;  the  self-limitation 

of,  33  ff. 

Erste  Einleitung  in  die  Wissenschafts- 
lehrcy  22  ff.,  27,  29. 

Evil,  problem  of,  118  ff. 

Experience,  dualistic  nature  of,  recognized 
by  Fichte,  16,  20.  See  also  Conscious- 
ness. 

Fichte,  criticizes  Kant  for  his  dualism, 
13  note;  misunderstood  by  his  con- 
temporaries, 26  ff.  ;  and  Kant,  i,  15 
ff.,  22,  36  ff.,  40  note,  45  ff.,  49,  56, 
62,  82  ;  and  Spinoza,  loi  ff. 

Fichte,  I.  H.,  26  note. 

Fichte' s  intellektuelle  Ansckauung,  38 
ff.  ;  has  two  significations,  40  note ; 
Thiele's  criticism  of,  40  note. 

Fichte's  philosophy,  motive  of,  16;  not 
subjective  idealism,  25  ff.  ;  presuppo- 
sitions of,  17  f.  ;  relation  betvireen  the 
two  periods  of,  69,  71  ff.,  113  ff.,  120 
f . ;  teleological  aspect  of,  35  f.,  79, 
107  ff. ;  of  history,  60  f.,  76  note,  106 
ff. 

Fichte's  terminology,  change  in,  in  the 
second  period,  75. 

Fichte's  ultimate  principle,  always  con- 
ceived as  activity,  73  f.,  115;  the  tem- 
poral and  the  timeless  aspect  of,  76  ff., 
92  f.,  loi  ff.,  109.  ^tt3i\so  Absolute, 
Ego,  God,  Idea  of  the  Ego. 

Final  purpose,  the,  79  f.  See  also  Idea 
of  the  Ego  and  Sollen. 

Finite  and  infinite,  35  f.,  43  f.,  54  f. 

Fischer,  Kuno,  82  note. 

Form  and  content,  relation  of,  in  the 
Kritik  der  reinen  Vernunft,  I  ff.,  134 
ff.  ;  in  Kant's  ethical  writings,  lo  ff.  ; 
in  the  Kritik  der  Urtheilskraft,  13 
ff.  ;  Fichte's  conception  of  the  relation 
of,  25  ff.,  42  ff. 

Fortlage,  75  f. 

Freedom,  87  f.,  92  ff.,  lOO  ff.  ;  as  the 
ground  of  actuality,  92  ff.,  loi  ff.  ;  as 
liberty  of  indifference,  92  ff.,  97,  103  ; 
as  power  to  realize  an  ideal,    94   ff.. 


102  f.  ;  true,  not  liberty  of  indifference, 
94  ff.,  103  ff.  ;  Kant's  conception  of, 
96  f.;  and  being,  69,  84  f. ;  and  neces- 
sity, 93  ff. ,  99  f.  ;  reconciliation  of,  and 
necessity,  100  ff. 

George  Eliot,  64  note. 

Goal  of  the  world-process,  see  Idea  of  the 

Ego. 
God,  Fichte's  conception  of,  46  f.,  57  fif., 

83  f.,  87  f.,  104  ff.,  114  f.,  117  f.,  120 

ff.  ;  not  substance,  58. 
Good,  the,  see  Summutn  bonutn. 
Grundlage  der  gesammten  Wissenschafts- 

lehre,  29  ff.,43  ff.,  81  ff.,  87  f.,  97,  103. 
Grundsatz,  the  first,  29  f.  ;  the  second, 

30  f. ;  the  third,  32  f. 
Grundzuge  des  gegenwdrtigen  Zeitalters, 

die,  61  ff.      ^ 

Happiness  and  virtue,  Kant's  doctrine  of 

the  relation  of,  12. 
Harms,  90  f. 
Hegel,  32,  41,  136. 
History,   Fichte's  conception   of,   60  f., 

106  ff.  ;  philosophy  of,   in  Germany, 

106  f.  ;  Fichte's  philosophy  of,  60  f., 

76  note,  106  ff. 
Human  race,  the,  not  an  end  in  itself,  66. 

Idea  of  the  Ego,  the,  28,  35  ff. ;  as  un- 
attainable goal,  37,  39  f.,  43,  49,  51, 
60,  84  ;  as  pure  form,  43  f.,  47  ff.  ;  as 
organic  unity  of  form  and  content,  38 
ff.,  44,  46,  48  f. ,  52  ;  never  conceived 
by  Fichte  as  an  artificial  unity,  45,  47  ; 
reconciliation  of  the  two  conceptions  of, 
53  ff.  ;  is  the  formal  nature  of,  involved 
in  the  doctrine  of  the  disappearance  of 
individuality?  56  ff.  ;  individuality  and, 
39,  43  f-,  50  f-,  53  ff »  60  ff.,  66  f. ;  re- 
lation of  genius  to,  62  ff. 

Ideal  of  experience,  the,  Fichte's  con- 
ception of,  see  Idea  of  the  Ego  ;  Kant's 
conception  of,  see  Kanf  s  intellektuelle 
Anschauung.  See  also.  Consciousness, 
relation  of,  to  its  ideal. 

Ideals,  relation  of  human,  to  the  Idea, 
77,  107  f. 

Idealism  and  dogmatism,  23  ff. 


INDEX. 


139 


Idealistic  and  realistic  conceptions  of  the 
Absolute,  89  f. 

Impulse,  natural,  see  Desire. 

Individual,  the,  as  embodiment  of  the 
Idea,  61  ff. 

Individuality,  39,  54  ff-,  5^  ff-,  108;  and 
altruism,  64  ff. ;  and  art,  62  ff. ;  higher 
and  lower,  61  ff.  ;  ultimate  disappear- 
ance of,  39,  43  f-.  50  f-j  53  ff-»  60  ff., 
66  f. 

Infinite,  the,  as  the  self-determined,  42, 
44.     See  also  Finite  and  infinite. 

Infinite  Ego,  see  EgOy  as  absolute. 

Intellektuelle  Anschauung,  different  sig- 
nifications of  the  term,  in  Kant  and 
Fichte,  40  note.  See  also  Fichte's 
intellektuelle  Anschauung  and  Kant's 
intellektuelle  Anschauung. 

Judgment,  affirmative  and  negative  aspects 
of,  30  f.  ;  involves  disjunction,  31 
note  ;  relation  of,  to  the  self,  29  f. 

Kant,  misinterpretations  of,  9,  134  ff.  ; 
rejection  of  Fichte' s  doctrine,  8  f.  ; 
and  Fichte,  see  Fichte,  and  Kant. 

Kant's  dualism,  i  ff.,  19  f.,  36,  134  ff.  ; 
Fichte' s  attitude  toward,  16,  1 8  ff. 
See  also  Form  and  content. 

Kant's  intellektuelle  Anschauung,  the 
ideal  of  knowledge,  4,  6  ff.,  14  f.  ; 
a  problematic  concept,  7,  15  >  and  the 
sesthetic  Ideas,  14 ;  and  the  categories, 
124  ff.  ;  first  stage  in  the  development 
of,  4  ff.,  124  ff.  ;  second  stage  in  the 
development  of,  6  f. ,  1 28  ff.  ;  relation 
of,  to  human  cognition,  4  ff.,  134  ff.  ; 
Thiele's  interpretation  of,  4,  123  f., 
126  ff. 

Kant's  '  I  think,'  2  f.,  6,  19,  134  ff. 

Knowing,  as  union  of  being  and  freedom, 
69  f.  ;  has  only  factual  being,  104 ; 
self-negation  of,  86  ff. ;  and  being,  see 
Absolute  knowing,  and  the  Absolute ; 
absolute  and  particular,  70  f. ;  human, 
implicitly  a  unity,  16  ff. ;  and  its  ideal, 
see  Consciousness,  relation  of,  to  its 
ideal. 

Knowledge,  Fichte' s  conception  of  the 
nature  of,  16,  19    f.,  29  ff.  ;    Kant's 


conception  of  the  nature  of,  i  ff.,  14  f., 
134  ff.    ■ 

Lask,  62  note,  1 13  note,  115  note. 
Leon,  82  note. 
Loewe,  73  f.,  82  with  note. 
Lotze,  107,  iiof.,  117  note. 

Metaphysics,    the   possibility   of,  Fichte 

on,  17  ff.  ;  Kant  on,  8,  17. 
Moral  ideal,  Fichte' s,  47  ff.  ;  Kant's,  10 

ff.  ;     two    possible    interpretations   of 

Kant's,  12. 
Moral  law,  Kant's  conception  of  the,  10 

f.  ;  reality  of  the.  III. 
Moral  progress,  see  Progress. 
Morality,  Fichte' s  conception  of,  47  ff.  ; 

Kant's  conception  of,  lo  f.,  56. 

Natural  impulse,  see  Desire. 

Necessity  and  contingency,  93  f.,  103  ff. 

Non-Ego,  28,  30  ff.,  36,  43  f.,  46,  54  ; 

two  senses  in  which   Fichte  uses  the 

term,  28. 

One,  the,  and  the  Many,  loi  ff.,  109. 
Ordo  ordinans,  57  f.,  78,  1 14,  II6  ff. 
Ought,  the,  see  Sollen. 
Ought-to-be,  the,  and  the  Is-to-be,  112  f.. 

Periods  of  Fichte' s  philosophy,  relation 
between  the  two,  see  Fichte' s  philos- 
ophy. 

Personality,  involves  limitation,  58  ; 
Fichte' s  denial  that  God  has,  58,  1 14 
f.,  117,  120  f. 

Philosophy,  Fichte' s  conception  of,  16 
ff.,  22  f.  ;  Fichte' s,  see  Fichte' s philos- 
ophy ;  of  history,  see  History. 

Platonic  Ideas,  Lotze' s  discussion  of  the, 
no  f. 

Pringle-Pattison,  56  ff. 

Progress,  the  possibility  of,  Fichte  on,  37, 
46  f.,  51,  53,  60  f.,  107  ff.,  122; 
Kant  on,  8,  10,  45. 

Providence,  Fichte's  conception  of,  114 
note. 

Raich,  62  note. 

Reality,  relation  of,  to  the  self,  30. 

Rickert,  113  note,  115  f. 


140 


INDEX. 


Schelling,  misunderstanding  of  Fichte, 
26  f. 

Second  period  of  Fichte' s  philosophy 
nature  of  the  change  in  the,  75  ff.,  82, 
113  f. 

Self,  substantiality  of  the,  30  note,  1 21 
note ;  relation  of  judgment  to  the,  29  ff. 

Self-consciousness,  and  intellektuelle  An- 
sckauung,  2  f.,  6  f.,  127  ff.  See  also 
Ego  and  Kanf  s  '  I  think. ^ 

Sein,  see  Being. 

Sein  and  Dasein,  77  ff.,  83  ff.,  92  if.,  109 
ff.,  121  f.;  distinction  between,  found 
in  the  first  period,  81  f.;  apparent  op- 
position of,  71  ff.,  78  ff.,  92  ff. ;  real 
unity  of,  83  ff.,  94  ff. ;  significance  of 
Fichte' s  distinction  between,  77  ff,,  109 
ff.,  121  f. 

Sense- world,  the,  35,  39,  57. 

Sittenlehre,  die,  of  1798,  47  ff.,  62. 

Sollen,  das,  78,  95  f. ,  98  ;  unites  the  con- 
ceptions Ought-to-be  and  Is- to-be,  112.  i. 

Space  and  time,  involve  spontaneity,  I 
note. 

Spinozism,  difference  between  the  Wis- 
senschaftslehre  and,  loi  ff. 

Subject  and  object,  see  Form  and  content. 

Subjective  idealism,  Fichte' s  philosophy 
not,  25  ff. 

Summum  bonum,  Kant's  conception  of 
the,  12. 

Supra-conscious,  concept  of  the,  58  ff., 
67,  121  f. 

Teleological  aspect  of  Fichte' s  philos- 
ophy, 35f-,79,  107  ff. 

Terminology,  change  in  Fichte' s,  in  the 
second  period,  75. 

Thatsachen  des  Bewusstseins,  die  (1810), 

79  U  83  f- 
Thiele,  4,  9  note,  40  note,  123  f.,  126 
ff. ;  criticism  of  Fichte,  40  note ;  inter- 
pretation of  Kant's  ♦  I  think,'  9  note, 
41    note,    134    ff.;    interpretation    of 


Kant's  intellektuelle  Anschauung,  4, 
123  f.,  126  ff. 

Thing-in-itself,  Fichte' s  rejection  of  the, 
16,  23  ff.,  28,  35,  40  note,  73;  intel- 
lektuelle Anschauung  as  knowledge  of 
the,  4  fif.,  40  note,  126  ff. 

Thompson,  94,  96. 

Time,  a  condition  of  the  realization  of  the 
Idea,  82. 

Timeless,  the,  and  the  temporal,  76  ff., 
92  f.,  1 01  fif.,  109. 

Ultimate  principle,  Fichte's,  see  Fichte' s 
ultimate  principle. 

Unity,  an  ideal,  20,  42,  85  f,  ;  two  con- 
ceptions of,  43,  54  f.,  85  f.  ;  and  dif- 
ference, 55,  85  f. 

Universal  consciousness,  the,  121  f. 

Validity,  i  lo  fif. 

Value,  the  supreme,  see  Absolute  value ; 
realization  of,  in  the  world-process,  60 
f.,  77  fif.,  106  fif.,  116  fif.  ;  timeless 
nature  of,  78,  109  ;  unrealized,  in  what 
sense  has  it  being  ?  I  lo  fif.  ;  dualism  of 
will  and,  1 17  f.,  120. 

Virtue  and  happiness,  Kant's  conception 
of  the  relation  of,  12. 

Will,  the,  as  world-ground,   117  f.,  120 

f.  ;  the  human,  1 1 7. 
Wipplinger,  60  note. 
Wissenschaftslehre,   the,    as  knowing   of 

knowing,   86 ;  presuppositions  of  the, 

17;  the  practical,  32,  34  ff.,  39;  the 

theoretical,  32  fif.,  39. 
Wissenschaftslehre,  die,   of  1 804,  88  fif.  ; 

of  1812,  93  fif.,  102  fif. 
World,    the,    35,   39,  57  ;  a   product   of 

freedom    and    necessity,    92 ;  why   it 

exists,  34  fif.,  92  fif. 
World-process,  goal  of  the,  see  Idea  of 

the  Ego. 

Zweite  Einleitung  in  die  Wissenschafts- 
lehre, 38  fif.,  46. 


S 


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